Issue No. 560

Published 03 Jul 2023

Kenya and Ethiopia under pressure from Al-Shabaab: Uncertainty among Front Line States

Published on 03 Jul 2023 16:45 min
Kenya and Ethiopia under pressure from Al-Shabaab: Uncertainty among Front Line States
 
On 1 February 2023, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hosted a summit of ‘Front Line States,’ in which a joint offensive of the Somali National Army (SNA) and the militaries of neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti was announced. These countries agreed to deploy additional troops to Somalia to support the government’s planned second phase offensive against Al-Shabaab. Five months after the announcement of the originally dubbed ‘Operation Black Lion,’ little progress has been observed.
 
As military operations against Al-Shabaab have stalled in recent months, the militants have taken advantage of the gap, ramping up recruitment and training, escalating extortion activities, and scaling up attacks targeting high-value locations. Evidence seems to point towards an Al-Shabaab that is stronger than ever before, rather than a weakened organisation unable to pose a serious threat.
 
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has overrun several military bases over the past five months, including a Danab military compound in Gal’ad in Galmudug, a Ugandan-manned Forward Operational Base (FOB) in Buulo Mareer, and an SNA base in Janay Abdale near Kismayo. Videos and photos posted online by Al-Shabaab after such attacks suggest it managed to seize more weapons and ammunitions in the past several months than in the previous four years, including state of the art military equipment and vehicles.
 
Al-Kataib, Al-Shabaab’s media wing, published a video on 28 June showcasing the apparent graduation of 5,000 new fighters in an impressive ceremony in an open field. The 5,000 were shown wearing new boots and uniforms, each carrying a firearm. This show of strength raises the question of where Al-Shabaab sourced 5,000 new uniforms, not to mention the funds needed to train, arm, feed and transport such a large number.
 
A wave of Al-Shabaab operations, including IED attacks, has also plagued Kenya’s Northeastern and Coastal provinces since early June, claiming more than 30 lives. Such attacks are likely to lead to a further strengthening of the Kenyan border, while the deployment of additional Kenyan troops to Somalia remains at a planning stage. Al-Shabaab explosive experts have also entered Ethiopia, reportedly to Eel Haluul, in Godgod in the Afdheer zone of the Somali region in mid June, together with 70 Al-Shabaab fighters. On 19 June, prominent Al-Shabaab scholar Sheikh Adan Sunni visited the town of Rabdhure, some 36 km from the border town of Ato. There he spoke of the importance of the East African Jihad, boasting that the Al-Shabaab flag would soon fly over Kenya and Ethiopia. Another Al-Shabaab leader Sheikh Ibrahim, who hails from Oromia, also gave a speech, in Oromo, echoing the statements of Sheikh Adan Sunni.
 
So far, the Front Line State showing the most enthusiasm and commitment has been Ethiopia, which deployed hundreds of Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) soldiers in Doolow in the Gedo region in March. The ENDF already had a presence outside of ATMIS in Somalia, particularly along the border areas of the Bakool region. The last few months have seen an increase in the frequency of attacks by Al-Shabaab against ENDF camps in the Bakool region, as well as in IED attacks targeting ENDF supply lines.
 
The willingness of Ethiopia to send additional troops to Somalia to start the second phase offensive against Al-Shabaab has alerted the organisation; a delegation of senior Al-Shabaab leaders, led by Sheikh Fu’ad Shangoole, held a meeting in the village of Dhursheen Kuus, 35 km south of El Barde town in the Bakool region on 31 May. The aim of the meeting was reportedly to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ENDF. Al-Shabaab leaders apparently came to the following conclusions.
 
Since the Al-Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia in July 2022, Ethiopian forces have fortified their borders, challenging a potential second incursion into Ethiopia.
 
While Al-Shabaab was expecting an Ethiopian offensive from the border towns of El Barde, Ato, Yeed, and Washaaqo, where ENDF is stationed, it observed Ethiopian forces coordinating a possible counter-offensive together with SNA forces from the towns of Hudur and Wajid. Such a combined offensive could mean that Al-Shabaab operating in Bakool could find themselves attacked from both front and rear, forcing Al-Shabaab to clear Ethiopian and Somali forces stationed in Hudur and Wajid.
 
ENDF forces deployed to Somalia were mostly inexperienced, both in combat and in the knowledge of the Somali terrain.
 
All of this may suggest that Al-Shabaab is taking the possibility of an Ethiopian-led offensive seriously. Al-Shabaab is strengthening its presence along Somalia’s borders with Ethiopia at a time when Ethiopia is disbanding and disarming its regional Special Forces, including the Somali region’s Liyu police, weakening Ethiopia’s security presence in the area. Despite their responsibility for past atrocities, the Liyu police were effective in maintaining security in the Somali border areas. The replacement of the Liyu with federal forces has led to mistrust within the local population. Unconfirmed reports have emerged of human rights abuses and the indiscriminate killing of civilians by ENDF along the Somali borders. This situation has in turn been exploited by Al-Shabaab, which has highlighted ‘crimes’ being committed by the ‘crusaders.’
 
The absence of additional Kenyan and Djiboutian forces in Somalia to date casts doubt on the level of cooperation that is taking place between the Front Line States and Ethiopia’s previous deployments in Somalia. The original motivation for ‘Operation Black Lion’ appears to be waning, even its name being an unfortunate reference to Ethiopia’s national symbol, leaving a sour taste in the mouths of many in Somalia.
 
The Somali government has nevertheless been moving forward with the second phase offensive. A prominent senior military official, General Mohamed Ali Bariise was very recently appointed to lead the joint command centre being established in Mogadishu. Yet despite the establishment of such a centre, the nature of the coalition, and its objectives, remain unclear.
 
It is essential for Somalia to take ownership of any military intervention taking place on its soil, and any coordinated coalition offensive could require months of careful planning. A Somali-led initiative could be used to clear and hold territories. Al-Shabaab is making shows of strength and is targeting and strategizing against Kenya and Ethiopia, making regional unity and cooperation against the group vital.
 
The Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 966
A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound
The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.


24:38 min read 16 Jul
Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Scroll