Issue No. 557

Somalia on the brink start of ATMIS withdrawal
 

Somalia appears on the brink. Threat of conflict in Gedo, security forces clashing in Baraawe and Eel Beerde, former Hiiraan Governor Ali Jeyte Osman declaring independence of the region, and fresh violence in Garowe are all raising serious questions about the country’s stability as the planned African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw down begins. By the end of June, 2000 ATMIS troops are expected to have withdrawn, ahead of more substantial withdrawals scheduled for later this year. Both Somali politicians and ATMIS officials have repeatedly emphasised Somalia’s preparedness to take on greater responsibility for its own security. One high-level federal government official said there is no reason for ATMIS to remain in Somalia.
 
But Somalia’s neighbours are raising concerns at the start of the first withdrawal. At the recent IGAD summit held in Djibouti, Kenyan President William Ruto and his Djiboutian counterpart Ismail Omar Guelleh questioned the capacity of Somalia to assume ATMIS roles. For Kenya, this is particularly pertinent. Brazen Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan civilians and security forces have killed well over a dozen people along the border in recent days, particularly in Mandera, Lamu and Garissa counties. The use of IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades in these attacks reveals the scale of the challenge facing Somalia’s security forces along its border alone.
 
With initial successes of the counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab that began August 2022 having stalled, an emboldened Al-Shabaab will doubtless look to capitalise on the openings created by ATMIS withdrawal. Signs of a resurgent and still dangerous Al-Shabaab were perhaps most clearly seen in the 26 May attack on the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) base that killed dozens of Ugandan soldiers. Ugandans have been regarded as among the more experienced forces currently operating in Somalia. This does not bode well for the reportedly imminent arrival of fresh Ugandan and Eritrean-trained Somali forces will little or no-combat experience.
 
Force generation is one of the most complex aspects of armed conflict. Turning thousands of fresh recruits into effective fighters, often on a limited budget, is far from straightforward. This is particularly true for Somalia, which lacks an effective centralised training programme for its soldiers. Instead, the federal government has found it necessary to send recruits to other countries, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Turkey and Uganda, for training. Al-Shabaab’s rhetoric indicates that it could target newly trained Somali troops taking over from departing ATMIS forces. Previously it framed its 9 June siege on the Pearl Beach Hotel in Mogadishu as a challenge to Ugandan-trained Somali National Army (SNA) forces.
 
It is still unclear which Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) ATMIS will soon hand over to Somali security forces, with only two being handed over publicly-- and thereby made more vulnerable-- so far. Some FOBs may simply be closed. Both options raise their own issues. First, transferring ATMIS bases to the SNA will further stretch SNA capacity, limiting its potential for future offensives in central and southern Somalia. Second, abandoning FOBs could create more space for Al-Shabaab to retake the areas in which these FOBs are currently situated. In 2016, when Ethiopian forces abandoned FOBs in central and southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab quickly seized the towns and villages that surrounded them, some of which it still holds today. While ATMIS’ tenure has been controversial, its FOBs have served as critical ‘holding forces’ to help secure some areas liberated from Al-Shabaab.
 
There are also significant political considerations at the start of ATMIS withdrawal. Leaving aside serious discord between Garowe and Mogadishu, growing polarisation in Hirshabelle, and political divisions between Gedo and Jubaland, even elements of Somalia’s security forces have become divided. Just two weeks ago, violent conflict erupted across several towns in South West State. In Baraawe and Eel Berde, SNA forces and regional Darwiish forces clashed, with at least 10 killed in Baraawe and dozens injured. The nature of Somalia’s complex and divided security architecture further complicates ATMIS withdrawal. Twenty-two thousand soldiers-- ATMIS’ total-- cannot be easily replaced. Somalia is yet to demonstrate it has the capacity to fill such a void.
 
After more than 30 years and 6 multinational peace missions, Somalia will soon take near-total responsibility for its own security. This is a seminal moment for the country, yet it appears more fractured by the day. The withdrawal of ATMIS troops at the same time as increasing political divisions threatens to unravel the stability for which HSM has strived. Reconciliation efforts across Somalia’s multiple political divides must start now, to close potential space for Al-Shabaab to exploit. The federal government and FMS leaders must refocus on the enormity of the central task at hand. Lifting the UN arms embargo will not solve the issues of force generation or FOB hand overs. Instead, shoring up vulnerable FOBs, providing more appropriate weapons to the SNA, and freeing elite units from relatively stable areas would assist the transition. But Somalia must also prepare itself for what are likely to be a brutal few months as ATMIS forces start to draw down.