Issue No. 555

On 31 May 2023, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in the village of Sii-Xawle in Somaliland’s Sool region. Preliminary investigations suggested that the bomb exploded prematurely, killing two men who were responsible for its emplacement – likely on the main road between Bur’o and Laas Aanood. Although a Somaliland government press release described the incident as a “suicide mission,” the IED’s design makes it more likely that any ‘suicide’ was purely accidental. Images of the device circulating on social media appear to show a pressure plate trigger mechanism of the kind used to target moving vehicles. Since there is very little civilian traffic along that stretch of road due to the current conflict in Laas Aanood, the IED was likely intended to strike a Somaliland military vehicle and disrupt supply lines.
 
Given the frequency of recent IED attacks across southern Somalia and northern Kenya, the accidental detonation of a single bomb in a remote rural area of Sool region may seem of little consequence. Yet the presence of IEDs in Somaliland has been extremely rare and, in recent years, limited almost exclusively to the municipality of Laas Aanood. Investigations have yet to determine the identities of the bombers or the provenance of the device. However, the planned use of an IED so far west of the town and on a strategic Main Supply Route for the Somaliland army may well be linked to the rapid expansion of Al-Shabaab (AS) forces, activities, and influence in the Sool region.
 
There can be no question that the root cause of the conflict in Laas Aanood is the perception among many Dhulbahante that the clan has been both politically and ecoonmically marginalised under Somaliland’s Isaaq-dominated system of governance. Moreover, the Dhulbahante community is deeply divided over the question of international recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Dhulbahante grievances have found expression in the formation of movements like ‘Khaatumo’ and ‘Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC),’ as well as political affiliations with Puntland and Mogadishu. But Laas Aanood and its environs have been peacefully administered by Somaliland from 2007 until 2023, with growing investment from Hargeisa contributing to the socio-economic development of the town and the wider region. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the more proximal triggers of recent violence to understand both its timing and the rapid, unexpected escalation of armed conflict.
 
The explanation, unfortunately, owes a great deal to Al-Shabaab. The militant group has maintained a presence in Laas Aanood since the early 2000s. But since 2009, the group has been accused of a series of assassinations and bombings in the town, mainly targeting Somaliland government officials, security personnel, and political activists. By the time fighting erupted in February of this year, Somaliland authorities had attributed some 40 killings to the extremist group, 27 of which had been prosecuted before Somaliland courts resulting in 31 convictions. Many Dhulbahante, however, blame Hargeisa for failing to provide adequate security in Laas Aanood, with some going so far as to accuse it of orchestrating these killings.
 
In early 2022, Al-Shabaab launched a concerted effort to expand its presence and influence in the Sool region. By April of last year, approximately 300 AS fighters were deployed near Buuhoodle, southwest of Laas Aanood, in anticipation of a planned operation into eastern Ethiopia. The jihadist offensive took place in July, mainly from bases in Bakool and Hiiraan regions, but the Buuhoodle contingent was held back because of a heavy Ethiopian security presence across the border around Wardheere.
 
Meanwhile, between April and July 2022, Al-Shabaab initiated negotiations with select Dhulbahante clan and SSC leaders to build a covert alliance between the groups. In August they embarked on a joint recruitment drive, in which Al-Shabaab deliberately misrepresented itself as a faction of SSC. Training camps were established in various remote locations, including at least three near Buuhoodle, under the command of Ali Hussein Abdi Kamiin – better known by his nickname Abdi Madoobe. Somaliland describes Madoobe as a long-serving member of Al-Shabaab, an allegation rejected by Madoobe and his SSC supporters. In early 2023, regional intelligence services indicated that Madoobe had travelled to the Bakool region to meet AS commanders to seek guidance and support.
 
Regardless of Madoobe’s personal affiliation, there is a growing body of evidence and intelligence to support the contention that Al-Shabaab is becoming more deeply involved in the conflict in Laas Aanood. Some of the individuals previously convicted of assassinations there have travelled regularly to Jilib and other southern AS strongholds, sometimes staying for extended periods. Likewise, since late 2022, immediately prior to the outbreak of fighting, known AS figures made hundreds of telephone calls and sent financial transfers to Laas Aanood-based insurgents. Over the past couple of months, AS reinforcements, apparently affiliated with Abdi Madoobe’s forces, have arrived in Buuhoodle from Bakool and Galgala. The total number of AS fighters in the Sool region is now plausibly estimated at 1,000.
 
The vast majority of AS fighters are not directly engaged in current skirmishes. Most appear to be based in the vicinity of Buuhoodle, while others have been dispersed to smaller rural settlements. This is similar to Al-Shabaab’s quiet infiltration of hundreds of fighters into southeastern Ethiopia since July 2022. It is no exaggeration to state that a wide swathe of territory between the Ethiopian border and the highland terrain south of the main Bur’o to Laas Aanood road is now under the influence – though not necessarily the physical control – of Al-Shabaab.
 
The explosion at Yagoori should not be sensationalised. Somaliland has yet to complete its investigation into the incident. Until the identities of the perpetrators are known, and the nature of the IED is better understood, it cannot be definitively linked to Al-Shabaab. But since no other group in Somalia – other than Daesh – has demonstrated the ability to manufacture such devices, it is a plausible preliminary assumption. It could also turn out to be an isolated incident rather than the beginning of a new trend. Regardless, the current conflict in Sool represents a new front in Al-Shabaab expansion.
 
The international community must now heed Somaliland’s repeated warnings of an Al-Shabaab presence in and around Laas Aanood. If leaders and fighters are allowed to fully establish themselves as a force in the region, it will have serious consequences for the stability and security of Somaliland.