Issue No. 520

Afwerki is reshaping the Horn in his own image. Does anybody care?
 

Eritrean strongman Isaias Afwerki is the Horn’s new helmsman - victor, player and mentor-in-chief. Capitalising on recent strategic gains and favourable outcomes in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, he is quietly reconfiguring the Horn, projecting malign peer influence, and sowing seeds of future conflict and instability. A few Sudanese military leaders are the latest regional actors to join the regional scramble to reset ties with Afwerki. If Afwerki succeeds, he could create a regional 'axis of strongmen' wedded to his vision of militarised, authoritarian state-building. For the Horn’s fragile states like Somalia - inadvertently boxed into picking Asmara as security partner – the resurgence of Eritrea has a destabilising impact.
 
The Vice-Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, Gen Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, earlier this week paid a one-day visit to Eritrea for talks with Isaias Afwerki. As is customary, the Eritrean Information Ministry disclosed little about the visit.
 
“President Isaias underlined Eritrea’s stance and firm belief that the problem in Sudan could be only solved by the Sudanese people themselves without interference of foreign actors,” said the Ministry newspaper, Shabait. Gen Hemedti is also cited as congratulating Eritrea for rejoining the regional body, IGAD, even though this has not been made definite yet.
 
Hemedti and Afwerki are kindred spirits and have met many times before. The chemistry between them is good. Each sees himself in the other. They are both shrewd and ruthless domestic and regional players. They have extensive regional structures and networks of influence and support. Hemedti’s influence now stretches from Yemen to the Sahel. Proximity to Moscow, interests in gold mining and other minerals, as well as linkages with the Russian mercenary group, Wagner, all help the two men to find common drop and gel. Hemedti is said to be consolidating power in a bid to eclipse his rival, Gen Abdulfatah al-Burhan. He apparently sees utility in a pact with Afwerki.
 
Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are deployed in restive eastern Sudan where Khartoum has been trying to douse a low-grade insurrection by the Beja. Escalated Eritrean meddling in recent years in eastern Sudan has aggravated tensions. A deal with Eritrea would therefore be good for Hemedti politically, but also militarily. It frees up assets and men he now needs to project strength as he jockeys to consolidate his grip on the Sudanese capital as an RSF stronghold.
 
Afwerki sees potential in the youthful Hemedti. He probably is calculating he can forge with the Sudanese general the same strategic partnership and relationship of tutelage he forged five years ago with Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia. In the event of a catastrophic Burhan-Hemedti rupture and armed confrontation, it is plausible Asmara may intervene to lend a hand to its favoured Sudanese ally.
 
Eritrea’s new surge to project power and influence across the Horn is animated by many considerations. One stands out - to insert itself back into IGAD and to progressively “take over” the agenda of the organisation. During his visit to Nairobi recently, Afwerki spent more time talking about why IGAD needed restructuring than why his country deserved to be invited back. His tone was one of petulant entitlement. Eritrea, after all, demonstrated its military and political prowess in the Tigray War, weakened a formidable foe and deserved to be rewarded with a leadership role within IGAD.
 
A Twitter page that is known to reflect the views of the Asmara regime - @NationalER_int - on 16 March hinted at another imperative: to create a security and defence umbrella for the Horn states (one in which it plays a dominant role).   
 
“If the Rapid Support Forces – (RSF) follows the #ENDF, & the Somali Armed Forces strengthen its relationship with the Eritrean Defense Forces (#EDF) & exchanges experience, will put an end to the cowardly plots of attacks or foreign invasions in the region, forever.”
 
Eritrea has a military alliance with Ethiopia and has trained thousands of Somali troops. Asmara is intent on deepening military and security cooperation with Kenya and South Sudan. Since 2018, Afwerki has been marketing the idea of creating a new regional force domiciled in Eritrea that is able to intervene in conflicts. With tens of thousands of Ethiopian troops now in Eritrea, and others from Somalia training there, he arguably has the nucleus of a future Horn force.
 
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came into office a year ago with a mindset to disentangle Somalia from Eritrea. Since then, the Horn changed and Afwerki emerged as regional kingmaker. Mogadishu has since resumed cordial ties with Asmara.
 
The West has long chafed at the malign peer influence exerted by Afwerki in the Horn. But by tacitly letting Afwerki get his way in Ethiopia, failing to act to rein him in, it abetted Eritrea’s new rise and potential dominance in the Horn. It must now live with the consequences.