Issue No. 513

Published 01 Mar 2023

The UN Arms Embargo is No Impediment to Rebuilding Somalia's Military

Published on 01 Mar 2023 16:47 min
The UN Arms Embargo is No Impediment to Rebuilding Somalia's Military
 
There are a number of considerable challenges to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces. These include competing visions among Somali elites and international partners, legacies from Somalia’s previously failed state, clan dynamics, and the ongoing war with Al-Shabaab (AS). However, perhaps the most often cited challenge is the long-standing UN arms embargo on Somalia. 
 
In January 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 733, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia. The embargo was amended in 2001 to allow the supply of non-lethal military aid for use in humanitarian operations in Somalia. In November 2022, the UNSC passed Resolution 2662, extending the embargo for an additionalyear. 

Before Resolution 2662 was passed, Somalia had been gathering support among its regional and international partners toward lifting the embargo. Its main claim was that the embargo was an obstacle to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces, mainly the Somali National Army (SNA). 
 
In spite of the SNA’s war against Al-Shabaab, the embargo was extended.  The resolution passed with 11 votes in favour and 4 abstentions (China, Gabon, Ghana, and Russia). But is the arms embargo a genuine obstacle to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces?
 
It is important to note that the current resolution contains not just an arms embargo, but a sanctions package. The sanctions included target Al-Shabaab leaders, and aim to disrupt the group’s financial support, banning charcoal exports and imports, a lifeline of AS finances, as well as components that used in manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Potential arms imports to Somalia are divided into two categories, specified in Annex A and Annex B of UNSC Resolution 2662. The main difference between the two categories is that all deliveries of items listed in Annex A are intended solely for the development of Somalia’s security and police institutions. These items can be procured only if there is no objection from the sanctions oversight committee. For items listed in Annex B, only a notice of delivery is required. All weapons with calibres higher than 14.7mm, artillery calibres above 82mm, surface to air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, and sophisticated systems such as aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval vessels must be approved. 
 
The bottom line is that the embargo is not blocking Somalia from getting what is needed by its security forces. The sanctions impose a process under which Somalia must clearly state what it wants to procure and why. The embargo itself is a passive security measure that also protects Somalia. This is particularly true in relation to sophisticated man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided missiles, which are designed to be used against air and land assets in a point-and-shoot fashion. Such weapons would be extremely dangerous in Al-Shabaab hands. 
 
Contrary to MANPADS, complex systems such as piloted aircraft, UAVs, armour, and others require skilled military personnel and intensive training. In the near future, Somalia’s armed forces will also need to acquire weapons and equipment for long-range ground operations, aerial surveillance, and air mobile operations. There are two crucial elements in expanding the military’s capabilities. First, acquiring new and more sophisticated weapons and equipment needs to be part of a long-term strategic planning process. Second, there needs to be stable funding that can sustain the process of procuring weapons and equipment. 
 
The current embargo is more a reputational issue than an actual problem for rebuilding Somalia's armed forces. More important, Somalia needs to consolidate its current forces, establish common training standards, strengthen itscommand and control structure, and clearly demarcate federal, state and local forces. These tasks are certainly not insubstantial; they require a long-term strategy with an action plan and specific time frame for achieving defined goals. 
 
With a clear strategy for rebuilding Somalia’s military, there is no reason the ongoing UN arms embargo needs to be considered a roadblock. Instead, a long-term plan combined with political will and sufficient funding are the keys to success.   

By the Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll