Issue No. 513

The UN Arms Embargo is No Impediment to Rebuilding Somalia's Military
 

There are a number of considerable challenges to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces. These include competing visions among Somali elites and international partners, legacies from Somalia’s previously failed state, clan dynamics, and the ongoing war with Al-Shabaab (AS). However, perhaps the most often cited challenge is the long-standing UN arms embargo on Somalia. 
 
In January 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 733, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia. The embargo was amended in 2001 to allow the supply of non-lethal military aid for use in humanitarian operations in Somalia. In November 2022, the UNSC passed Resolution 2662, extending the embargo for an additionalyear. 

Before Resolution 2662 was passed, Somalia had been gathering support among its regional and international partners toward lifting the embargo. Its main claim was that the embargo was an obstacle to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces, mainly the Somali National Army (SNA). 
 
In spite of the SNA’s war against Al-Shabaab, the embargo was extended.  The resolution passed with 11 votes in favour and 4 abstentions (China, Gabon, Ghana, and Russia). But is the arms embargo a genuine obstacle to rebuilding Somalia’s armed forces?
 
It is important to note that the current resolution contains not just an arms embargo, but a sanctions package. The sanctions included target Al-Shabaab leaders, and aim to disrupt the group’s financial support, banning charcoal exports and imports, a lifeline of AS finances, as well as components that used in manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Potential arms imports to Somalia are divided into two categories, specified in Annex A and Annex B of UNSC Resolution 2662. The main difference between the two categories is that all deliveries of items listed in Annex A are intended solely for the development of Somalia’s security and police institutions. These items can be procured only if there is no objection from the sanctions oversight committee. For items listed in Annex B, only a notice of delivery is required. All weapons with calibres higher than 14.7mm, artillery calibres above 82mm, surface to air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, and sophisticated systems such as aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval vessels must be approved. 
 
The bottom line is that the embargo is not blocking Somalia from getting what is needed by its security forces. The sanctions impose a process under which Somalia must clearly state what it wants to procure and why. The embargo itself is a passive security measure that also protects Somalia. This is particularly true in relation to sophisticated man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided missiles, which are designed to be used against air and land assets in a point-and-shoot fashion. Such weapons would be extremely dangerous in Al-Shabaab hands. 
 
Contrary to MANPADS, complex systems such as piloted aircraft, UAVs, armour, and others require skilled military personnel and intensive training. In the near future, Somalia’s armed forces will also need to acquire weapons and equipment for long-range ground operations, aerial surveillance, and air mobile operations. There are two crucial elements in expanding the military’s capabilities. First, acquiring new and more sophisticated weapons and equipment needs to be part of a long-term strategic planning process. Second, there needs to be stable funding that can sustain the process of procuring weapons and equipment. 
 
The current embargo is more a reputational issue than an actual problem for rebuilding Somalia's armed forces. More important, Somalia needs to consolidate its current forces, establish common training standards, strengthen itscommand and control structure, and clearly demarcate federal, state and local forces. These tasks are certainly not insubstantial; they require a long-term strategy with an action plan and specific time frame for achieving defined goals. 
 
With a clear strategy for rebuilding Somalia’s military, there is no reason the ongoing UN arms embargo needs to be considered a roadblock. Instead, a long-term plan combined with political will and sufficient funding are the keys to success.