It is almost one year since the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. This act of aggression has dominated newspaper headlines worldwide. Although the war’s impact on Europe is well-known, it has also exacerbated food insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
At a time when markets have not yet recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has raised the price of food worldwide. In the Horn of Africa, spikes in food prices and disruption of imports have catastrophic effects on food security in a region already suffering from severe drought.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report from March 2022, Somalia was nearly 100% dependent on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia, with the majority of imports coming from Ukraine (more than 65%). Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda are also heavily dependent on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.
At the beginning of the war, Russia made two decisions that have had a deleterious effect on the global food market. First Russian decided to temporarily restrict most food exports, including barley, sugar, and wheat. This decision inevitably led to increases in food prices pretty much everywhere. Second Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports halted the majority of Ukraine’s food exports. Hundreds of ships remained docked due to the Russian naval blockade. In addition, both sides have planted naval mines along shipping routes.
In April 2022, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan began talks aimed at lifting the naval blockade on grain exports from the Black Sea. Then, in June 2022, the UN, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia signed the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Under this agreement, merchant ships were allowed to carry grain to supply the global food market. The agreement was originally valid for 120 days and was extended for another 120 days in November. Another extension is due in February 2023.
Based on available data, more than 800 ships have carried exported food to different markets under the Black Sea Grain Initiative. However, the volume of exports is still below pre-war levels. Out of the 800 ships, 11 have carried food to the Horn; 7 ships carried cargo destined for Ethiopia, two for Somalia, and two for Djibouti. All of these ships carried wheat except for one that carried sunflower oil.
Countries in the Horn do not all share the same view of the war. Four resolutions adopted during the 11th emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly reflect their differences.
The first, Resolution ES-11/1, was adopted on 3 March 2022. This resolution condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces and a reversal of its decision to recognise the self-declared
The next, Resolution (ES-11/2), was adopted on 24 March 2022. It reaffirmed former commitments and obligations under the UN Charter, and reiterated the demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine's recognized sovereign territory. This resolution also expressed grave concern over attacks on civilian populations and infrastructure. Djibouti voted in favour, Eritrea against, Ethiopia abstained, and Somalia was absent.
The reason behind the third resolution was the discovery of a massacre committed by Russian armed forces in the Ukrainian town of Bucha. The first information about the massacre was published on 1 April. Resolution ES-11/3, adopted on 7 April 2022, suspended the membership of Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council. Ethiopia and Eritrea voted against the resolution, and both Djibouti and Somalia were absent.
The last, Resolution ES-11/4, was adopted after Russia held sham referendums in territories it newly occupied in Ukraine. Passed on 12 October 2022, this resolution calls these referendums illegal and invalid under international law. Somalia voted in favour of the resolution, Ethiopia and Eritrea abstained, and Djibouti was absent.
Diplomatically Eritrea consistently stands with Russia. Other Horn countries have made different choices.
Russian aggression has not ended, despite having made no meaningful strategic or operational gains. Neither Ukraine nor Russia appears ready to negotiate a peace. Ongoing Russian mobilisation signals no end to the conflict in the near future. Countries in the Horn, especially drought-affected Somalia, need to look for other food suppliers. In the meantime, international partners need to redouble their humanitarian assistance. Russia’s war in Ukraine has only made a bad situation worse in the Horn of Africa.
by the Somali Wire team
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