Issue No. 508

Published 17 Feb 2023

The Impact of Russia’s War on the Horn of Africa

Published on 17 Feb 2023 17:18 min
The Impact of Russia’s War on the Horn of Africa


It is almost one year since the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. This act of aggression has dominated newspaper headlines worldwide. Although the war’s impact on Europe is well-known, it has also exacerbated food insecurity in the Horn of Africa.

At a time when markets have not yet recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has raised the price of food worldwide. In the Horn of Africa, spikes in food prices and disruption of imports have catastrophic effects on food security in a region already suffering from severe drought.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report from March 2022, Somalia was nearly 100% dependent on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia, with the majority of imports coming from Ukraine (more than 65%). Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda are also heavily dependent on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.

At the beginning of the war, Russia made two decisions that have had a deleterious effect on the global food market. First Russian decided to temporarily restrict most food exports, including barley, sugar, and wheat. This decision inevitably led to increases in food prices pretty much everywhere. Second Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports halted the majority of Ukraine’s food exports. Hundreds of ships remained docked due to the Russian naval blockade. In addition, both sides have planted naval mines along shipping routes.

In April 2022, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan began talks aimed at lifting the naval blockade on grain exports from the Black Sea. Then, in June 2022, the UN, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia signed the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Under this agreement, merchant ships were allowed to carry grain to supply the global food market. The agreement was originally valid for 120 days and was extended for another 120 days in November. Another extension is due in February 2023.

Based on available data, more than 800 ships have carried exported food to different markets under the Black Sea Grain Initiative. However, the volume of exports is still below pre-war levels. Out of the 800 ships, 11 have carried food to the Horn; 7 ships carried cargo destined for Ethiopia, two for Somalia, and two for Djibouti. All of these ships carried wheat except for one that carried sunflower oil.
Countries in the Horn do not all share the same view of the war. Four resolutions adopted during the 11th emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly reflect their differences.

The first, Resolution ES-11/1, was adopted on 3 March 2022. This resolution condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces and a reversal of its decision to recognise the self-declared People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Djibouti and Somalia voted in favour, Eritrea against, and Ethiopia was absent for the vote.

The next, Resolution (ES-11/2), was adopted on 24 March 2022. It reaffirmed former commitments and obligations under the UN Charter, and reiterated the demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine's recognized sovereign territory. This resolution also expressed grave concern over attacks on civilian populations and infrastructure. Djibouti voted in favour, Eritrea against, Ethiopia abstained, and Somalia was absent.

The reason behind the third resolution was the discovery of a massacre committed by Russian armed forces in the Ukrainian town of Bucha. The first information about the massacre was published on 1 April. Resolution ES-11/3, adopted on 7 April 2022, suspended the membership of Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council. Ethiopia and Eritrea voted against the resolution, and both Djibouti and Somalia were absent.

The last, Resolution ES-11/4, was adopted after Russia held sham referendums in territories it newly occupied in Ukraine. Passed on 12 October 2022, this resolution calls these referendums illegal and invalid under international law. Somalia voted in favour of the resolution, Ethiopia and Eritrea abstained, and Djibouti was absent.

Diplomatically Eritrea consistently stands with Russia. Other Horn countries have made different choices.

Russian aggression has not ended, despite having made no meaningful strategic or operational gains. Neither Ukraine nor Russia appears ready to negotiate a peace. Ongoing Russian mobilisation signals no end to the conflict in the near future. Countries in the Horn, especially drought-affected Somalia, need to look for other food suppliers. In the meantime, international partners need to redouble their humanitarian assistance. Russia’s war in Ukraine has only made a bad situation worse in the Horn of Africa.

by the Somali Wire team 

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 130
The Elephant on the Summit: Ethiopia’s War Cannot Be Won the Old Way
The Horn Edition

Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.


9:36 min read 28 Oct
Issue No. 981
The Desperation Conundrum: How HSM Is Unravelling Somalia
The Somali Wire

In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.


0 min read 23 Oct
Issue No. 980
Somalia’s Volatile Calendar – The October Jinx
The Somali Wire

Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.


26:19 min read 21 Oct
Issue No. 979
Using Force Against Sheikh Sharif a Bad Idea
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.


11:59 min read 14 Oct
Issue No. 978
Setbacks on Three Fronts Signal Big Risks for Somalia’s Federal Government
The Somali Wire

It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.


9:18 min read 09 Oct
Issue No. 977
The Politics of 'Hiiraan State': The Hawaadle Discontent
The Somali Wire

Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.


23:44 min read 30 Sep
Issue No. 976
Doolow - Dawn of Drone Despotism?
The Somali Wire

Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.


22:57 min read 25 Sep
Issue No. 975
A Murder Most Foul – New Unrest In Hiiraan
The Somali Wire

While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.


0 min read 16 Sep
Issue No. 974
Somaliland’s Washington Push: High Stakes, Steep Hurdles
The Somali Wire

On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.


16:26 min read 11 Sep
Scroll