Issue No. 502

Published 03 Feb 2023

The Somali National Army: Building a modern military

Published on 03 Feb 2023 14:52 min
The Somali National Army: Building a modern military
 
What motivates a soldier to take up arms? There has been little attention given to understanding what the Somali National Army (SNA) needs to become a focused and motivated fighting force. One of the most useful prisms through which to analyse this question is that of the three components of an effective fighting force-- the conceptual, moral, and physical. Collectively they help us understand a soldier’s will to fight. And without will, a military is vacuous.  
 
The conceptual component addresses the ideas behind how to fight. It involves the SNA’s ability to use standardised procedures that are learned, practiced, and perfected. It also seeks a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment, considering the interwoven complexities of Al-Shabaab, Somali society and government security forces. 
 
The physical component considers the means to fight including personnel, equipment, and training. 
 
The moral component is the ability to motivate people to fight. At the crux of the moral component is the bonding of motivation and cohesion to create an effective military. This is the glue. 
 
Tentative annual extensions of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and its European Union (EU) support, combined with technology and support from the United States and other bilateral partners, could inadvertently undermine the SNA’s will to fight after external forces withdraw. Ensuring sustained success might, therefore, be aided by a careful review of all three components of an effective fighting force, as part of Somalia’s evolving security sector reform strategy. 
 
The Conceptual Component. To be successful in any military campaign, there needs to be a clear overarching objective. The objective is reinforced by principles and doctrine derived from learned experiences. Out of the three components, this is Somalia’s strongest. Previous and current military missions have helped to generate an increased understanding of best practices and the importance of a collective government response in counter-terrorism campaigns. Although the SNA is not there yet, many of its soldiers are battle-hardened. With time, their collective knowledge will overshadow the value of external training missions. To establish this bedrock, patience is key. It takes time to institutionalise a recognisable conceptual component. 
 
The Physical Component. Supremacy in technology and weapons will not be enough to guarantee success in Somalia. In the fight against Al-Shabaab, technology may bring short-lived tactical success, but does nothing to defeat the root causes of insurgency. Continued international presence in Somalia-- linked to high-technology, shared intelligence and compensation-- should be moderated to allow the SNA to adapt to its own unique operating environment. The international community must avoid building an institution whose success and survival are intrinsically linked with external assets. Withdrawing assistance should start early and continue gradually to avoid the sense of losing a decisive advantage overnight. 
 
The Moral Component. This speaks to the essence of what instils a warrior ethos that inspires and motivates soldiers to continue to confront a brutal enemy like Al-Shabaab. Unlike the conceptual and physical, it cannot be taught, or bought. It emerges from shared trust, national identity, faith in reliable practices and confidence in government support. In Somalia, inter-clan rivalries, political distrust, and unpredictable support remain as significant constraints to sustaining a robust moral component of an effective fighting force. Building security forces without a moral component is only effective in the short-term. 
 
Reflecting on the SNA through this prism offers a new perspective on the future of Somalia’s security. Improvements on each of the three components of an effective fighting force are critical now and will be long into the future.

 

By The Somali Wire Team

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