Issue No. 501

 
Since August 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has regained control of vast territory in south-central Somalia previously occupied by Al-Shabaab. In January, the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by clan militias, regional state forces and international allies, expanded combat to Jubaland and South West State (SWS).  President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud describes this as the start of a decisive “second phase” to defeat the jihadist group. For the first time in two decades, Somalis can look to the future with some hope and even entertain the tantalising prospect of a new era. 
 
But the risks and challenges ahead must not be downplayed. The frenetic pace and scale of territorial acquisition is bound to place an extraordinary burden on the government to hold, pacify, administer, and stabilise the liberated areas.
 
Al-Shabaab’s authoritarian governance model has clear advantages over that of the FGS. It allowed the militants to exercise full functional control in certain areas. They brooked no opposition and monopolised local power. They out-coerced and disarmed the clans. Al-Shabaab’s monopoly on violence and its harsh sharia system ensured both strict compliance and social order. It deployed some of the resources it generated from ‘taxtortion’ and collection of zakat(wealth tax) into rudimentary public services. 
 
The transition from rigid Al-Shabaab rule to a more relaxed hybrid system that relies on local participation and fosters inclusivity is certainly superior from a governance perspective. But a great deal hinges on how fast such a viable and inclusive local structure of governance can be established. A prolonged interregnum risks an unhealthy competition for resources and power among clans and creates chronically unstable administrations. This is a particular risk in areas rife with land disputes and blighted by violent contests for scarce resources, especially water, and pasture. Anarchy, poor governance, and armed conflict in the liberated areas is certain to trigger displacement and migration, further compounding Somalia’s bleak humanitarian conditions. The FGS faces an onerous and complicated undertaking. How it navigates these challenges will be closely watched. Failure could be catastrophic. 
 
The government says it is not blind to the complex challenges it faces. It has crafted two complementary framework/policy papers – one on a national stabilisation plan and another on national reconciliation. Its strategy is now being marketed to donors and partners with a view to mobilising resources to stabilise the recovered areas. Regrettably, the strategy was drafted with little input from federal states and Somali civil society. While the lack of public participation and clarity may not be an impediment if corrected in time, an inclusive policy blueprint is essential for wider buy-in and successful implementation.
 
Rebuilding livelihoods is also crucial to stabilising Somalia’s recovered areas. A decade of Al-Shabaab rule and predation eviscerated rural economies, created enclaves of misery and made captive populations. A plan for economic regeneration focused on rebuilding local livelihood systems and geared towards the recovery of rural economies offers the best means for durable peace and stability. 
 
Somalia is vast and uneven in terms of economic activity and potential. Many regions, devastated by decades of droughts and famine, are dependent on external aid. But some regions, especially those along the coast and riverine belts, offer better economic prospects and could benefit from positive interventions from the Somali government and its partners. There is great potential in fishing, agriculture, and animal husbandry. A micro-lending scheme is one available tool to provide the urban poor and unemployed with seed capital to venture into the informal economy. Women’s cooperatives in Somalia have shown remarkable ability and competence in maximizing modest assistance to improve household incomes. Education and targeted training for youth in a variety of life skills and trades are equally important.
 
Another consideration is that Somalia’s road infrastructure is broken. The country relies heavily on aviation. The opening of major routes hitherto controlled by Al-Shabaab would offer significant economic opportunities. No meaningful economic revival is feasible without a massive investment to rehabilitate, expand and modernise the ground transport system. This would allow easier movement, connect traders to markets, and spur growth.
 
Economic policy planning requires good data. For a variety of reasons, there is little reliable information on the areas now liberated from Al-Shabaab control. Detailed data on demography, local political economies, livelihood systems, and clan dynamics are vital to enable policymakers to craft and implement sound strategies. The FGS should harness domestic and international expertise to generate the ideas and analysis required for targeted interventions. 
 
A revival of local Somali economies is essential to a stable post-conflict Somalia, and indispensable to secure peace.
 

The Somali Wire Team