Issue No. 437

‘Dan qaran’ and Somalia’s social contract

On 15 June, one month after his election, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) selected lawmaker Hamza Abdi Barre as his prime minister. Ten days later, Somalia’s parliament unanimously endorsed Hamza’s nomination. It was a clear signal of support for the new administration after a prolonged, fractious electoral period.

On 2 August, PM Hamza announced his cabinet and the government’s priorities for the next four years. The 75-member cabinet – comprised of 25 ministers, 25 state ministers, and 25 deputy ministers – was overwhelmingly approved by Somalia’s Lower House of Parliament. 229 MPs voted in favour of the cabinet, seven voted against it, and one abstained. The resulting government has been nicknamed “dan qaran” – the government of national interest. 

PM Hamza’s office presented a government program containing six main pillars:

1. Security and re-liberation [of territory held by Al-Shabaab]. The main aspects of this pillar include revisiting security policies, security sector reform (SSR), institutional reform, and operations against terrorist groups.

2. Justice. This pillar will mainly focus on revisiting the policies and laws that underpin an independent judiciary.

3. Somalis in agreement with themselves. This pillar will focus on developing a national reconciliation strategy, completing the constitution, dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, and unifying the country’s election system and public registration.

4. Economic sustainability. This pillar focuses on building up the domestic economy, developing sound fiscal policies, and increasing revenue.

5. Social development. This pillar focuses on education, job creation, and essential public services, including responding to emergencies such as the current drought.

6. Somalis in agreement with the world. This pillar focuses on rebuilding Somalia’s international relationships and cooperation.

Like the previous two governments, the current government’s initial priority will be, by necessity, security. It will have two main lines of effort: offensive operations to blunt the advances that Al-Shabaab made under the previous government combined with a whole-of-government approach to preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). But there are also more contentious security issues that will require extensive consultation with all political stakeholders and international partners. These include implementing the National Security Architecture (NSArch), the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and the gradual transfer of responsibilities from ATMIS to the Somali Security Forces (SSF), and force generation. PM Hamza’s priorities are in line with President Hassan Sheikh’s overall policy.

This has not always been the case in Somalia with the executive branch and it presents a crucial opportunity to have the head of government and the head of state rowing in the same direction, rather than expending their time and energy on palace intrigue and power struggles. The same is true for the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The federal Parliament must focus on legislating rather than obstructing the executive branch.

While political stability within the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – between the president and the PM, and between the executive and legislative branches – is essential for implementing the government’s program, Somalia’s federal structure means that there is a third, equally critical relationship: between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMSs).

All six pillars of PM Hamza’s program are fundamental in terms of their importance to a functioning state. However, they will also need to be implemented in the appropriate sequence. The government must focus initially on security and justice (pillars one and two) and political dialogue (pillar three), especially in terms of completing the constitution. Without some degree of political consensus, passing legislation will be impossible. And unless the government’s priorities are grounded in solid legislation, many gains are likely to prove ephemeral, as they have under previous administrations.

Without an effective military and stabilisation campaign, the government will struggle to fulfil its fundamental responsibility: safeguarding its population. And unless it is able to liberate much of the territory currently controlled by Al- Shabaab, it will not be able to deliver basic services to those communities. But the usual cycle of liberating a few villages in Lower and Middle Shabelle and then watching Al-Shabaab re-take them a few days or weeks later will not suffice this time. ATMIS is scheduled to draw-down thousands of its forces by the end of this year and to completely hand over security responsibilities to the SSF by the end of 2023. If security gains are not made before then and if the government does not produce a realistic plan to backfill the ATMIS forces, it will find itself at major disadvantage against Al-Shabaab – right in the middle of HSM’s term. 

Disagreements are common in every system of government, even those with strong laws and institutions. It is therefore essential to have legal and institutional mechanisms, such as a constitution and an independent judiciary, to resolve these disagreements. Right now, though, Somalia either lacks such institutions or they tend to be weak. It is still very much a government of men (and women), not laws.

The new cabinet members have some heavy tasks ahead of them. They must quickly tackle those problems that present an existential threat to the country’s stability, such as drought, looming famine, and a resurgent Al-Shabaab. By doing so, they can hopefully create the political space to address other fundamental issues of governance and the rule of law. A government of dan qaran must work for the people, not its own parochial interests. Somalia needs more of John Locke and less of Thomas Hobbes.

The Somali Wire Team