‘Dan qaran’ and Somalia’s social contract
On 15 June, one month after his election, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) selected lawmaker Hamza Abdi Barre as his prime minister. Ten days later, Somalia’s parliament unanimously endorsed Hamza’s nomination. It was a clear signal of support for the new administration after a prolonged, fractious electoral period.
On 2 August, PM Hamza announced his cabinet and the government’s priorities for the next four years. The 75-member cabinet – comprised of 25 ministers, 25 state ministers, and 25 deputy ministers – was overwhelmingly approved by Somalia’s Lower House of Parliament. 229 MPs voted in favour of the cabinet, seven voted against it, and one abstained. The resulting government has been nicknamed “dan qaran” – the government of national interest.
PM Hamza’s office presented a government program containing six main pillars:
1. Security and re-liberation [of territory held by Al-Shabaab]. The main aspects of this pillar include revisiting security policies, security sector reform (SSR), institutional reform, and operations against terrorist groups.
2. Justice. This pillar will mainly focus on revisiting the policies and laws that underpin an independent judiciary.
3. Somalis in agreement with themselves. This pillar will focus on developing a national reconciliation strategy, completing the constitution, dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, and unifying the country’s election system and public registration.
4. Economic sustainability. This pillar focuses on building up the domestic economy, developing sound fiscal policies, and increasing revenue.
5. Social development. This pillar focuses on education, job creation, and essential public services, including responding to emergencies such as the current drought.
6. Somalis in agreement with the world. This pillar focuses on rebuilding Somalia’s international relationships and cooperation.
Like the previous two governments, the current government’s initial priority will be, by necessity, security. It will have two main lines of effort: offensive operations to blunt the advances that Al-Shabaab made under the previous government combined with a whole-of-government approach to preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). But there are also more contentious security issues that will require extensive consultation with all political stakeholders and international partners. These include implementing the National Security Architecture (NSArch), the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and the gradual transfer of responsibilities from ATMIS to the Somali Security Forces (SSF), and force generation. PM Hamza’s priorities are in line with President Hassan Sheikh’s overall policy.
This has not always been the case in Somalia with the executive branch and it presents a crucial opportunity to have the head of government and the head of state rowing in the same direction, rather than expending their time and energy on palace intrigue and power struggles. The same is true for the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The federal Parliament must focus on legislating rather than obstructing the executive branch.
While political stability within the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – between the president and the PM, and between the executive and legislative branches – is essential for implementing the government’s program, Somalia’s federal structure means that there is a third, equally critical relationship: between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMSs).
All six pillars of PM Hamza’s program are fundamental in terms of their importance to a functioning state. However, they will also need to be implemented in the appropriate sequence. The government must focus initially on security and justice (pillars one and two) and political dialogue (pillar three), especially in terms of completing the constitution. Without some degree of political consensus, passing legislation will be impossible. And unless the government’s priorities are grounded in solid legislation, many gains are likely to prove ephemeral, as they have under previous administrations.
Without an effective military and stabilisation campaign, the government will struggle to fulfil its fundamental responsibility: safeguarding its population. And unless it is able to liberate much of the territory currently controlled by Al- Shabaab, it will not be able to deliver basic services to those communities. But the usual cycle of liberating a few villages in Lower and Middle Shabelle and then watching Al-Shabaab re-take them a few days or weeks later will not suffice this time. ATMIS is scheduled to draw-down thousands of its forces by the end of this year and to completely hand over security responsibilities to the SSF by the end of 2023. If security gains are not made before then and if the government does not produce a realistic plan to backfill the ATMIS forces, it will find itself at major disadvantage against Al-Shabaab – right in the middle of HSM’s term.
Disagreements are common in every system of government, even those with strong laws and institutions. It is therefore essential to have legal and institutional mechanisms, such as a constitution and an independent judiciary, to resolve these disagreements. Right now, though, Somalia either lacks such institutions or they tend to be weak. It is still very much a government of men (and women), not laws.
The new cabinet members have some heavy tasks ahead of them. They must quickly tackle those problems that present an existential threat to the country’s stability, such as drought, looming famine, and a resurgent Al-Shabaab. By doing so, they can hopefully create the political space to address other fundamental issues of governance and the rule of law. A government of dan qaran must work for the people, not its own parochial interests. Somalia needs more of John Locke and less of Thomas Hobbes.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.