Issue No. 425

Published 14 Jul 2022

The Statesman and the Stuntman: HSM Meets Isaias Afewerki

Published on 14 Jul 2022 31:04 min

 The Statesman and the Stuntman: HSM Meets Isaias Afewerki

Last week, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) flew to Asmara and spent four days in the country in an audacious bid to secure the return of thousands of Somali troops languishing in military camps in the Red Sea state.

Social media platforms have been inundated with spectacles of pomp and pageantry as the two heads of state reviewed a military parade, visited a training site for Somali marines, and marvelled at Eritrean development projects. Eritrea’s troll armies have joined forces with the remnants of Farmaajo’s ‘Nabad iyo Nolol’ propaganda machine to proclaim enduring friendship and solidarity between these two brotherly nations. The stilted optics of the encounter were awkward, cringeworthy even: Somalia’s reformist, democratic leader gripping and grinning with Eritrea’s Cold-War era tyrant. But away from the cameras and behind the bogus bonhomie, a much more sombre, high stakes gambit was unfolding.

The abandonment of an estimated 5,000 Somali security trainees in Eritrea is among the most toxic of the legacies that ex-president Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo left to his successor. The entire affair has been cloaked in secrecy and subterfuge. The troops were initially recruited on false pretences, lured by the promise of lucrative security jobs in Qatar during the FIFA World Cup. When reports emerged that they had been transferred instead to Eritrea, the Farmaajo administration initially denied everything. Then, when families of the disappeared began to protest, demanding to learn their boys’ fate, senior officials started passing the buck, with commanders from the military and intelligence services each accusing one another of being responsible. Ultimately, when Farmaajo was ejected from office in Somalia’s belated May 2022 election, he elusively announced that he had passed the file to his successor – clearly hoping to escape any blame for the scandal.

In the meantime, Somalis have been left to speculate as to the fate of the Eritrean trainees. Estimates of their original number ranged from 7,000 – 10,000, of which approximately 1,000 have returned to Somalia and joined the ranks of Duufaan (Storm), NISA’s paramilitary forces, and Rooxaan (NISA’s clandestine death squads). Roughly 500 were reportedly killed in training accidents or died of ‘natural causes.’ A handful of deserters who succeeded in escaping to their homeland (where most went into hiding) claim to have been consigned to forced labour in mines and agricultural projects, alongside Eritrean conscripts. A June 2021 report by the United Nations UN Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Eritrea alleges that some of the Somali trainees were deployed to fight in Tigray, alongside Eritrean troops, where they were implicated in gross human rights abuses and possible war crimes. The media is abuzz with reports that Isaias is demanding US$50 million or more in compensation for the soldiers’ training and welfare. The Somali public now demands that the new government uncover the truth and ‘bring the boys home.’

That the new Somali president chose Eritrea as the destination for his first state visit in Africa (he had previously travelled to Turkey and the UAE) speaks volumes to his priorities. Many diplomatic observers expected him to travel to Kenya first, to mend strained relations, or possibly to one of Somalia’s other neighbours. Instead, HSM has signalled his determination to bring this sordid affair to an end and repatriate the remaining Somali nationals from Eritrean soil, providing much-needed closure to the recruits, their families, and a bewildered nation.

Isaias, on the other hand, had far less altruistic objectives in welcoming HSM to Asmara. Eritrea remains diplomatically isolated, politically febrile, and financially bankrupt. The much-vaunted ‘Tripartite Alliance’ forged in 2018 between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia has disintegrated; Farmaajo is no longer in office and Abiy Ahmed’s short-lived bromance with the Eritrean despot is sputtering. Fears that the Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF) may launch an offensive to oust the PFDJ regime in Asmara, amplified by official Eritrean news media, have rattled the party’s upper echelons, induced unprecedented anxiety amongst Isais’s security chiefs, and galvanised opposition groups. And Eritrea’s national treasury is nearly US$4 billion in debt: a ratio of roughly 175 per cent to GDP.

Against this backdrop, the old fox in Asmara, badly needs any publicity he can get to project the image of a ‘normal’ state. Eritrean state media milked the HSM visit to maximum  propaganda effect but, in so doing, conveyed a distinct air of artifice. The formalities looked staged and unconvincing. The troops carried no weapons. And HSM does not appear to have conducted the kind of ceremonial inspection that is customary at such events; instead, he was introduced to a select handful of officers, raising doubts about whether the soldiers on parade were, in fact, all Somalis. No drills or demonstrations of military prowess took place. A patrol boat with a Somali Marine crew looked antiquated, while a table holding the carcasses of two engines, supposedly to teach marine mechanics, became the butt of Somali social media jokes. All of this contributed to suspicions that the Somali soldiers have indeed been held captive, put on display for HSM by the Eritrean dictator as a desperate face-saving gesture.

Likewise, in contrast with past meetings between Isaias and Farmaajo, there was little personal chemistry or warmth on display. Afewerki looked gaunt, unsmiling, even menacing – the latter accentuated by the difference in height between the two men. In one picture, both men are wearing masks and appear to be in some kind of heated conversation. Afewerki is famous for his temper and known to harangue his guests. Some years ago, he flipped his lid, and ranted and raved in the presence of a senior US official. The incident has become a cautionary tale in the US Foreign Service on dealing with the Eritrean leader. “Pulling off a calm meeting with Afewerki is a rare feat,” says one former US diplomat who has 'survived' multiple encounters with Eritrea’s ruler. On camera, at least, HSM managed to keep his cool.

Upon conclusion of HSM’s visit, the two sides produced a 7-point communique that resembles the headlines of the defunct ‘Tripartite Alliance’ agreement: a standard laundry list of vague, generic, and non-binding commitments that is conspicuous only in its silence over the issue of the missing troops. Afewerki can use it to claim that something was achieved. HSM can use it to demonstrate his commitment to the return of the missing recruits, and that he pledged no ransom – financial or otherwise - in exchange for their homecoming.

Upon his return to Mogadishu, HSM immediately met with some of the parents of the missing recruits to comfort and reassure them; he informed them that their sons were well, dedicated to serving their country, and that he had provided them with air time tokens to call their families. One mother responded that her son had already called that same day, telling her he was happy and grateful for the president’s visit.

What happens next is anybody’s guess. Even if Eritrea drops its demand for compensation, repatriating the remaining trainees will not be cheap. HSM’s government now needs to find willing partners to cover the costs of their transportation back to Somalia, as well as the medical and psycho-social care that many will no doubt need. Absorbing them into Somalia’s security forces will also entail significant costs, although it is questionable whether, after years of abuse and isolation, the trainees will be either willing or fit to serve. The Somali government should therefore also make contingency plans for their re-integration into civilian life.

HSM has started his term of office as a statesman, summoning the courage to embrace a presumed adversary in pursuit of the national interest. He was received, in exchange, with a cheap publicity stunt. Somalia must now await Eritrea’s actions in order to judge whether Isaias Afewerki is truly a friend or foe.

The Somali Wire Team

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