Them’s the Breaks: Puntland’s President Deni must move beyond electoral defeat to help build Somalia’s federation
Deadly clashes erupted in Puntland’s port city of Bosaaso on Monday after two units of the regional security forces clashed. The latest casualty figures say the Puntland Security Force (PSF) lost six members, while the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) lost nine. Over 30 other troops drawn from the two units are said to be injured, some seriously.
Clashes between rival units are becoming endemic in Puntland and reflect the general security and political deterioration in the region The immediate trigger of the latest skirmish is a power play by regional President Sa’id Abdullahi Deni and his rivals. As Deni’s opponents capitalise on the federal election outcome to press their advantage, Deni is struggling to recover from the failure of his presidential campaign, and seeking to reassert his authority over Puntland’s fractured political landscape.
Early Monday morning a plane carrying the Deputy Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament, Sa’adiyo Yasin, from the minority Arab Mohamud Salah clan, was turned back from the airport. The regional government claims the Deputy Speaker bypassed the regional government, failed to obtain clearance for a shipment of relief aid, and declined to liaise with the Puntland government on security. The Deputy Speaker claims there was nothing untoward in her visit and the provocation was caused by the other side. Her supporters insist the meeting was cleared with the Puntland Vice President’s Office.
The issue here is not who is right and who is wrong. Fundamentally, the political consensus model that has underpinned Puntland’s relatively robust governance is badly frayed. Deni’s federal ambitions and over-investment in national political contestation has sucked the region into a maelstrom of destabilising dynamics and currents.
The governing Union of Peace and Development (UPD), to which the Deputy Speaker belongs, is keen to consolidate national power. Sa’adiyo is for all intents and purposes doing what all political party leaders do – pressing home advantage, by expanding UPD’s regional influence.
Deni’s last-minute support was crucial in the victory of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) on 15 May. During the last round of voting, Deni was torn between throwing his support behind HSM or backing the unpopular incumbent Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe reportedly took Deni aside and warned him, “our bond will be severed forever” if he threw his weight behind Farmaajo.
Deni is disappointed he was not appointed Prime Minister by Hassan Sheikh, despite intense lobbying for the position. He also feels Jubaland is getting more attention than Puntland, and Kismayo’s fortunes seem to be waxing while those of Garowe appear, for the moment, to be waning.
For much of the last five years, relations between Mogadishu and Garowe have been poor, prone to periodic and sudden spikes in acute tensions. Farmaajo played a divisive game in Puntland. He played the Warsangeli, the Dhulbahante against the dominant Majerteen. But even more destabilising, he drove wedges between the three dominant Majerteen subclans.
To counter Mogadishu, Garowe also invested in its own form of divisive politics. Deni moved against the Diyaano family and the PSF, first established with US assistance in 2002. Deni’s pretext was that the existence of this structure of security ‘outside sovereign command’ was a threat to regional stability. He also alleged that the Diyaano family had stakes in illegal real estate and the grey economy – charges he could have equally levelled at the Puntland Maritime Police Force and possibly other security agencies as well. In a bid to bring the PSF to heel, he ordered changes to the command, which triggered the worst bout of fighting to date and further unrest in the region earlier this year.
Clan chiefs seem increasingly discontented with Deni’s political assertiveness. They prefer a negotiated settlement and remain crucial in quickly suppressing violence. However, as casualties from these periodic flare-ups mount, a different dynamic is likely to kick in: the vendetta. In the absence of a robust system of court marshal and accountability, the risks of violence taking on a life of its own is real.
Deni is brooding; he is not hiding the fact he wants to return to the politics of trench warfare with Mogadishu. But that carries tremendous risks for him and for the new government. If he were able to assess the situation objectively, he would realise he has a like-minded leader in Mogadishu, someone keen to advance federalism and address many of the challenges at the core of perennial centre-periphery tensions. If Deni is interested in reclaiming Puntland’s mantle as the ‘mother’ of Somali federalism, now is the opportunity to do that.
If Deni chooses not to reconcile with the FGS, the risk of him becoming a political spoiler is real. He can join forces with disgruntled regional leaders – Abdi Kariye Qoorqoor of Galmudug State and Abdiasis Laftagareen of South West State – to make life difficult for the HSM administration. That would be unfortunate because, apart from transient disaffection with the electoral outcome, the Puntland leader shares very little in common with those leaders.
Deni is an immensely gifted politician; he has an important future if he plays his cards right. Instead of wasting time and energy on petty domestic fights to muzzle the opposition and lock out rivals, Deni should look to the future, swallow his disappointment, and join with HSM in bringing Somalia’s federal architecture to completion.
The Somali Wire Team
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