Issue No. 421

Published 07 Jul 2022

Pre-empting a power struggle

Published on 07 Jul 2022 21:46 min

 Pre-empting a power struggle

Next week, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will mark two months since he was elected. His chosen Prime Minster Hamza Abdi Barre will have served almost one month.

In public, relations between the two leaders so far appear cordial and warm. But that could change once they conclude naming a new cabinet and the new government gets down to work. There is reason to be cautious, since there is an inherent instability in the Somali power structure. The current hybrid model that shares executive power between the president and the prime minister has great capacity for generating friction; in large part, this is because the provisional constitution has not sufficiently deconflicted executive roles and functions properly.

Since the first transitional government was established in Arta, Djibouti, Somalia has had five presidents and 15 prime ministers. Statistically and on average, this works out to about three prime ministers for every president in a four-year term. The average political life span of a Somali PM is 15 months. Several reasons explain why presidents and prime ministers, who often start cordially, later fall out against each other. The most significant of these is ambiguity in the Provisional Constitution and a lack of a clear distinction of powers between the two executives. While the president can appoint a prime minister, he cannot sack him by decree; instead, he must submit a vote of no confidence against the him to parliament for consideration.

Presidents Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (in his first term) each had three prime ministers. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo had two, His successor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has appointed Hamza Abdi Barre as his prime minister. No president has ever selected a prime minister that he has not hand-picked. Unlike in some countries where the prime minister can come through a power-sharing arrangement among different political parties, Somalia's president nominates the prime minister of his choice. The only requirements are adherence to the 4.5 clan formula and a vote (a formality) by the parliament.

So why do Somalia's presidents and their prime ministers fall out? One reason is the aforementioned ambiguity of the constitution. In the provisional constitution, under Articles 90 and 100, the respective responsibilities and powers of the president and the prime minister are stipulated. But, Articles 90 and 100 also give the president and prime minister ambiguous and redundant power controls.

The two offices of the prime minister and the president can at times have overlapping roles and responsibilities. This ad-hoc overlap is the genesis of rifts between the technical teams of the two offices. In addition to a lack of clear roles, most technocrats are appointed for political reasons, not for their expertise; and they often behave like politicians. Some become territorial, and they stoke and feed off of conflict. Conflicts related to these technical teams can simmer for long periods before later being escalated to the core staff of the president and the prime minister. With lack of clarity over standard operating procedures, both dig in their heels and political trench warfare ensues. Backing down or compromise is seen as a form of weakness. Eventually, the prime minister is removed through a no confidence vote in parliament, or compelled to resign for fear of the ignominy of such a vote.

In addition, the Council of Ministers is appointed by the prime minister, but in consultation with the president. Some members assume positions knowing well they  owe their allegiance to the president. These divided loyalties often generate tensions and foster divisions. Lack of respect for the chain of command is widespread. If the prime minister tries to discipline a minister, the president often blocks the reprimand by defending his friends.

Also, Somalia does not have a functioning Constitutional Court. Disagreements between the government branches and their principals are mostly resolved through negotiation. When negotiation reaches a dead end, goodwill dries up and a fierce power struggle ensues. The only institution left to arbitrate is the parliament. However, instead, legislators often see power struggles as an opportunity to cash in and make money from the antagonists. As a result, core issues behind the original dispute are lost.

A key driver of these clashes arises when a prime minister begins to exhibit presidential aspirations. The president sees this as hostile and quickly puts up barricades, creating an actual rift between the two.  Related, because the prime minister is in charge of the electoral process, the president often expects the prime minister to favour him. Failure to do so has also led to major fallouts.

The relationship between the political centre represented by the federal government and periphery in the form of the Federal Member States (FMSs) is also contentious; this too has ignited tensions between the president and the prime minister. This has especially been true during FMS elections. Conflict becomes unavoidable if the two leaders do not share a common policy toward these elections. 

How can President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre avoid falling into another of these never-ending political deadlocks in Somalia? Appointing mature, knowledgeable political and technocratic experts to government positions would be a good starting point. Such appointments are likely to assist in depoliticising the government, and encouraging dialogue in the event of frictions between the two offices.

President Mohamud and the Prime Minister Barre should also be encouraged to revisit the constitutional provisions on power-sharing, and to press for changes that will provide clarity on their respective roles, and boost stability within the Government of Somalia. Together with judicial reform, including empowering the Constitutional Court, such changes could turn out to befit the tenure and legacy of both leaders.

The Somali Wire Team

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