Pre-empting a power struggle
Next week, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will mark two months since he was elected. His chosen Prime Minster Hamza Abdi Barre will have served almost one month.
In public, relations between the two leaders so far appear cordial and warm. But that could change once they conclude naming a new cabinet and the new government gets down to work. There is reason to be cautious, since there is an inherent instability in the Somali power structure. The current hybrid model that shares executive power between the president and the prime minister has great capacity for generating friction; in large part, this is because the provisional constitution has not sufficiently deconflicted executive roles and functions properly.
Since the first transitional government was established in Arta, Djibouti, Somalia has had five presidents and 15 prime ministers. Statistically and on average, this works out to about three prime ministers for every president in a four-year term. The average political life span of a Somali PM is 15 months. Several reasons explain why presidents and prime ministers, who often start cordially, later fall out against each other. The most significant of these is ambiguity in the Provisional Constitution and a lack of a clear distinction of powers between the two executives. While the president can appoint a prime minister, he cannot sack him by decree; instead, he must submit a vote of no confidence against the him to parliament for consideration.
Presidents Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (in his first term) each had three prime ministers. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo had two, His successor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has appointed Hamza Abdi Barre as his prime minister. No president has ever selected a prime minister that he has not hand-picked. Unlike in some countries where the prime minister can come through a power-sharing arrangement among different political parties, Somalia's president nominates the prime minister of his choice. The only requirements are adherence to the 4.5 clan formula and a vote (a formality) by the parliament.
So why do Somalia's presidents and their prime ministers fall out? One reason is the aforementioned ambiguity of the constitution. In the provisional constitution, under Articles 90 and 100, the respective responsibilities and powers of the president and the prime minister are stipulated. But, Articles 90 and 100 also give the president and prime minister ambiguous and redundant power controls.
The two offices of the prime minister and the president can at times have overlapping roles and responsibilities. This ad-hoc overlap is the genesis of rifts between the technical teams of the two offices. In addition to a lack of clear roles, most technocrats are appointed for political reasons, not for their expertise; and they often behave like politicians. Some become territorial, and they stoke and feed off of conflict. Conflicts related to these technical teams can simmer for long periods before later being escalated to the core staff of the president and the prime minister. With lack of clarity over standard operating procedures, both dig in their heels and political trench warfare ensues. Backing down or compromise is seen as a form of weakness. Eventually, the prime minister is removed through a no confidence vote in parliament, or compelled to resign for fear of the ignominy of such a vote.
In addition, the Council of Ministers is appointed by the prime minister, but in consultation with the president. Some members assume positions knowing well they owe their allegiance to the president. These divided loyalties often generate tensions and foster divisions. Lack of respect for the chain of command is widespread. If the prime minister tries to discipline a minister, the president often blocks the reprimand by defending his friends.
Also, Somalia does not have a functioning Constitutional Court. Disagreements between the government branches and their principals are mostly resolved through negotiation. When negotiation reaches a dead end, goodwill dries up and a fierce power struggle ensues. The only institution left to arbitrate is the parliament. However, instead, legislators often see power struggles as an opportunity to cash in and make money from the antagonists. As a result, core issues behind the original dispute are lost.
A key driver of these clashes arises when a prime minister begins to exhibit presidential aspirations. The president sees this as hostile and quickly puts up barricades, creating an actual rift between the two. Related, because the prime minister is in charge of the electoral process, the president often expects the prime minister to favour him. Failure to do so has also led to major fallouts.
The relationship between the political centre represented by the federal government and periphery in the form of the Federal Member States (FMSs) is also contentious; this too has ignited tensions between the president and the prime minister. This has especially been true during FMS elections. Conflict becomes unavoidable if the two leaders do not share a common policy toward these elections.
How can President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre avoid falling into another of these never-ending political deadlocks in Somalia? Appointing mature, knowledgeable political and technocratic experts to government positions would be a good starting point. Such appointments are likely to assist in depoliticising the government, and encouraging dialogue in the event of frictions between the two offices.
President Mohamud and the Prime Minister Barre should also be encouraged to revisit the constitutional provisions on power-sharing, and to press for changes that will provide clarity on their respective roles, and boost stability within the Government of Somalia. Together with judicial reform, including empowering the Constitutional Court, such changes could turn out to befit the tenure and legacy of both leaders.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.
Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.