Pre-empting a power struggle
Next week, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will mark two months since he was elected. His chosen Prime Minster Hamza Abdi Barre will have served almost one month.
In public, relations between the two leaders so far appear cordial and warm. But that could change once they conclude naming a new cabinet and the new government gets down to work. There is reason to be cautious, since there is an inherent instability in the Somali power structure. The current hybrid model that shares executive power between the president and the prime minister has great capacity for generating friction; in large part, this is because the provisional constitution has not sufficiently deconflicted executive roles and functions properly.
Since the first transitional government was established in Arta, Djibouti, Somalia has had five presidents and 15 prime ministers. Statistically and on average, this works out to about three prime ministers for every president in a four-year term. The average political life span of a Somali PM is 15 months. Several reasons explain why presidents and prime ministers, who often start cordially, later fall out against each other. The most significant of these is ambiguity in the Provisional Constitution and a lack of a clear distinction of powers between the two executives. While the president can appoint a prime minister, he cannot sack him by decree; instead, he must submit a vote of no confidence against the him to parliament for consideration.
Presidents Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (in his first term) each had three prime ministers. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo had two, His successor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has appointed Hamza Abdi Barre as his prime minister. No president has ever selected a prime minister that he has not hand-picked. Unlike in some countries where the prime minister can come through a power-sharing arrangement among different political parties, Somalia's president nominates the prime minister of his choice. The only requirements are adherence to the 4.5 clan formula and a vote (a formality) by the parliament.
So why do Somalia's presidents and their prime ministers fall out? One reason is the aforementioned ambiguity of the constitution. In the provisional constitution, under Articles 90 and 100, the respective responsibilities and powers of the president and the prime minister are stipulated. But, Articles 90 and 100 also give the president and prime minister ambiguous and redundant power controls.
The two offices of the prime minister and the president can at times have overlapping roles and responsibilities. This ad-hoc overlap is the genesis of rifts between the technical teams of the two offices. In addition to a lack of clear roles, most technocrats are appointed for political reasons, not for their expertise; and they often behave like politicians. Some become territorial, and they stoke and feed off of conflict. Conflicts related to these technical teams can simmer for long periods before later being escalated to the core staff of the president and the prime minister. With lack of clarity over standard operating procedures, both dig in their heels and political trench warfare ensues. Backing down or compromise is seen as a form of weakness. Eventually, the prime minister is removed through a no confidence vote in parliament, or compelled to resign for fear of the ignominy of such a vote.
In addition, the Council of Ministers is appointed by the prime minister, but in consultation with the president. Some members assume positions knowing well they owe their allegiance to the president. These divided loyalties often generate tensions and foster divisions. Lack of respect for the chain of command is widespread. If the prime minister tries to discipline a minister, the president often blocks the reprimand by defending his friends.
Also, Somalia does not have a functioning Constitutional Court. Disagreements between the government branches and their principals are mostly resolved through negotiation. When negotiation reaches a dead end, goodwill dries up and a fierce power struggle ensues. The only institution left to arbitrate is the parliament. However, instead, legislators often see power struggles as an opportunity to cash in and make money from the antagonists. As a result, core issues behind the original dispute are lost.
A key driver of these clashes arises when a prime minister begins to exhibit presidential aspirations. The president sees this as hostile and quickly puts up barricades, creating an actual rift between the two. Related, because the prime minister is in charge of the electoral process, the president often expects the prime minister to favour him. Failure to do so has also led to major fallouts.
The relationship between the political centre represented by the federal government and periphery in the form of the Federal Member States (FMSs) is also contentious; this too has ignited tensions between the president and the prime minister. This has especially been true during FMS elections. Conflict becomes unavoidable if the two leaders do not share a common policy toward these elections.
How can President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre avoid falling into another of these never-ending political deadlocks in Somalia? Appointing mature, knowledgeable political and technocratic experts to government positions would be a good starting point. Such appointments are likely to assist in depoliticising the government, and encouraging dialogue in the event of frictions between the two offices.
President Mohamud and the Prime Minister Barre should also be encouraged to revisit the constitutional provisions on power-sharing, and to press for changes that will provide clarity on their respective roles, and boost stability within the Government of Somalia. Together with judicial reform, including empowering the Constitutional Court, such changes could turn out to befit the tenure and legacy of both leaders.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
Yesterday, 15 April, marked three years of brutal, grinding warfare between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Wholly neglected by a fading international community, many grim landmarks have been passed; another genocide in Darfur, the weaponisation of rape and starvation, another famine, or the desecration of Khartoum, El Fasher, and other major cities. And with no ceasefire or settlement in sight, the war has continued to swell, drawing in each neighbouring African country as tussling Middle Eastern powers grapple for the upper hand-- leaving Sudan in tatters.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Most nights in a number of dimly lit bars in Addis Ababa, one can hear a vibraphone hum over a syncopated bassline. The sprightly rhythm is unmistakably jazz, but the scales are Ethiopian; pentatonic, looping and melodic. Five decades after its pioneering by visionary musician Mulatu Astatke, Ethio-jazz remains in full swing, with its renaissance from the late 1990s persevering despite tough political and cultural conditions.