Turkey, Somalia and the HSM government
By sheer coincidence, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) landed in Turkey on the same day news agencies were reporting the bleakest set of statistics on the Turkish economy. Prices of food items rose to their highest levels in 24 years. Inflation hit a record high in over two decades – at 78.62%; in 1998 inflation stood at 80.4%. The Turkish lira continues to plummet and is now worth half what it was worth a year ago.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s single-minded pursuit of unorthodox economics has compounded Turkey's woes. The president continues to force his country’s central bank to cut interest rates in a bid to contain runaway inflation when the sound and time-tested convention is to increase interest rates. The president, a devout Muslim, is opposed to interest rates. His experiment at using interest cuts to cool inflation has proved counterproductive and disastrous.
The economic and financial distress in the last three years has, to some extent, mellowed Erdogan and catalysed the détente with the Saudi/Emirati axis. The Qataris have been a lifeline for the Turkish strongman. In August 2018, Qatar announced it was pumping $15bn dollars into the Turkish financial and banking system, partly, to shore up the lira. Qatar is now a major investor in Turkey. Earlier this year, Erdogan visited Abu Dhabi in a landmark visit, the first in nearly two decades. The aim, among other things, is to seek financial help from Arab Gulf powers to stave off further economic crises.
The fundamental structures of the Turkish economy are sound and healthy. The country has a vibrant, dynamic and innovative free market system. The damage done by Erdogan may be too fatal to prevent a serious downturn, but few doubt the capacity of Turkey to rebound – assuming, of course, the country finds its way back to fiscal and economic orthodoxy.
The Turkish strongman’s strong projection of power and influence in recent years was powered by a strong economy and a robust private sector. The escalating crisis is bound to see Turkey reduce its “soft power” stakes abroad and instead leverage its sophisticated military and scientific capability. In Ethiopia, Libya and in the Caucasus, Turkish-made drones tilted the military balance of power in favour of allies. Turkish-made APCs are now being bought by a number of African states; Kenya in 2021 procured 118 Hizir APCs at a cost of $70m. In a recent interview, Erdogan boasted that everywhere he went, including Africa, leaders asked him to supply the best-selling Bayraktar TB2 bomber drones. Last week, Djibouti became the latest Horn state to unveil its fleet of TB2s. The Red Sea state showed off its new lethal toys at the annual Independence Day parade.
HSM is the architect of the Turkey-Somalia strategic partnership. It was during his tenure 2012-2017 that Turkey deepened its ties with the Horn of Africa state and took over the management of Mogadishu’s port and international airport. He remains fond of Turkey and sees it as a model. His Union of Peace and Development (UPD) party mimics to some extent Turkey’s governing AKP. The distinct mix of mild Islamism, modernity and developmentalism remains a commonly-shared trait that may act as a kind of ideological glue.
The Somali leader is coming to Turkey at an awkward moment. Ankara has been extremely generous to Somalia over the years, especially in times of hardship. Despite its current problems, it remains a wealthy country. Conceivably, it can still help, especially in the areas of healthcare and relief. On budgetary support, it is hard to see how that could be feasible.
HSM is not going to Turkey to ask for financial and economic assistance. The president is keen to revamp his military and security services and is aware that he may need Turkish support and buy-in into some of his plans. Turkish training and military support have in recent years come with drawbacks. Units trained by Ankara have been accused of disdain for human rights, political partisanship and clientelism. It is possible the president may seek to reorient Turkish training to make it conform with his vision of an inclusive, federal and democratic system.
Turkish military hardware may also be another item on the agenda. Somali specialists have long chafed at the quality and specification of Turkish supplied combat kits, some of which are not inter-operable and deemed ill-suited for a country like Somalia.
Turkey is still an important actor in Somalia. It is pragmatic and tends to modify its policies to maintain cordial relations with whoever is in charge at Villa Somalia. That much cannot be said for Qatar. It is almost certain we will see continuity in Turkish-Somalia relations.
HSM and his people say they want qualitatively different ties with foreign nations, one based on respect, genuine partnership, moderation and mutual benefit. Time will tell whether Ankara will accommodate Somali concerns and modify its policies and conduct.
The Somali Wire Team
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