Is HSM going too far in embracing former Farmaajo supporters?
The new Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) administration, in a bid to cement its credibility as a “reconciliation” government, is going easy on members of the former ruling party, Nabad iyo Nolool (N&N). But by embracing crude and unreformed N&N and allowing incoherent messaging, the HSM government risks getting undermined and side-tracked at a very early stage in its tenure. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre on Sunday named his advisory team, which included some high-profile former regime supporters. His appointments elicited sharp criticism from prominent supporters of HSM in the diaspora. Adan Abdulle, a Somali-American, who has been one of the strongest critics of the Farmaajo regime, said on his Twitter feed: “Nabad iyo Nolol continues its remarkable comeback amidst the transition confusion.”
There seems to be an apparent strategy to peel away N&N and assimilate them rather than purge them. This is fine and understandable to some extent. HSM owes his election victory to a broad array of forces, including former supporters of N&N. There is an argument that the PM’s appointments must be designed in such a way as to mollify these constituents. The cabinet is yet to be named and it will need broad parliamentary support and endorsement. Hamza needs to reassure N&N constituencies rather than spook them ahead of the endorsement procedure.
The PM has in recent days engaged in unhelpful rhetoric which has fed wild speculation about his and his bosses’ vision of Somalia. His comments on ATMIS female officers, especially, were unfortunate and ill-advised. Hamza’s gaffe aside, there is a need to give the new administration a clear direction and a clear messaging discipline. It is also conceivable the new government is putting some dubious or grey figures in its administration, purposely, to fend off charges it has centralised power.
Coinciding with the uncertainty and controversy over the rationale of the new appointments, the HSM administration took two bold steps over the weekend to signal its intent to reform the state. It recalled all diplomatic passports issued to “undeserving” people and promised new stringent guidelines: hundreds of Somalis have in the last five years been given diplomatic passports, most of them N&N core supporters. The government also announced it will license two international banks – Banque Misr of Egypt and Ziraat Katilim of Turkey. The aim seems to be to strengthen Somalia’s tentative relinking with the international financial system. It may also be aimed – as some sources suggest – to break the monopoly of the Al-I’tisaam, which controls an array of hawalas and the only large bank operating across Somalia.
Reversing or rolling back five years of disastrous domestic and foreign policies is not going to be easy or quick. In the current state of unclarity it is easy to misread appointments and make big assumptions. It is highly likely the regime is in a “tactical phase” and needs time to craft a good strategy to disempower N&N.
However, the HSM government cannot afford to make lapses. It ought to be very direct and clear in its aims from the start. A policy of “national accommodation” is fine; needed, even. But it must not come at the expense of strategic reform. The government needs to move with speed to consolidate its vision and policies. It needs to signal on that it is different from N&N and intends to move the country in a new direction.
N&N is an amorphous and broad movement. It is not monolithic. There are some of its adherents, who are amenable to reform and changing their hardline positions. But its core believers have an ideological worldview – mixing exaggerated nationalism with support for an authoritarian state-building. The latter category must not be allowed to be anywhere near power. Including “core N&N” in the administration could foment more problems than it resolves.
Once the president is back from his foreign trips, he will need to establish a clear line of messaging and direction for his government. HSM is a good communicator. He is usually economical, calm and not prone to impulsive and unscripted rhetoric. He must enforce that style and disabuse his team from making off-the-cuff, impromptu comments that are unhelpful.
We know a few things about the new government and what it wants to achieve. HSM has signalled he wants to be a hands-on president and intends to be involved in policy formulation and implementation. To cement his brand, imbue a character to his administration, and instill discipline, HSM will need to take full charge sooner rather than later. If he fails to do that and delegates too much to the inexperienced new PM, there is a real risk of confusion. It is unfortunate that many supporters of HSM are becoming disillusioned very quickly. HSM and his team must pick these signals of public unease and respond as quickly as possible instead of ignoring them, otherwise the cost of failure and public alienation will be too high.
The Somali Wire Team
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