Issue No. 418

Published 04 Jul 2022

Is HSM going too far in embracing former Farmaajo supporters?

Published on 04 Jul 2022 25:07 min

Is HSM going too far in embracing former Farmaajo supporters?

The new Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) administration, in a bid to cement its credibility as a “reconciliation” government, is going easy on members of the former ruling party, Nabad iyo Nolool (N&N). But by embracing crude and unreformed N&N and allowing incoherent messaging, the HSM government risks getting undermined and side-tracked at a very early stage in its tenure. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre on Sunday named his advisory team, which included some high-profile former regime supporters. His appointments elicited sharp criticism from prominent supporters of HSM in the diaspora. Adan Abdulle, a Somali-American, who has been one of the strongest critics of the Farmaajo regime, said on his Twitter feed: “Nabad iyo Nolol continues its remarkable comeback amidst the transition confusion.”

There seems to be an apparent strategy to peel away N&N and assimilate them rather than purge them. This is fine and understandable to some extent. HSM owes his election victory to a broad array of forces, including former supporters of N&N. There is an argument that the PM’s appointments must be designed in such a way as to mollify these constituents. The cabinet is yet to be named and it will need broad parliamentary support and endorsement. Hamza needs to reassure N&N constituencies rather than spook them ahead of the endorsement procedure.

The PM has in recent days engaged in unhelpful rhetoric which has fed wild speculation about his and his bosses’ vision of Somalia. His comments on ATMIS female officers, especially, were unfortunate and ill-advised. Hamza’s gaffe aside, there is a need to give the new administration a clear direction and a clear messaging discipline. It is also conceivable the new government is putting some dubious or grey figures in its administration, purposely, to fend off charges it has centralised power.

Coinciding with the uncertainty and controversy over the rationale of the new appointments, the HSM administration took two bold steps over the weekend to signal its intent to reform the state. It recalled all diplomatic passports issued to “undeserving” people and promised new stringent guidelines: hundreds of Somalis have in the last five years been given diplomatic passports, most of them N&N core supporters. The government also announced it will license two international banks – Banque Misr of Egypt and Ziraat Katilim of Turkey. The aim seems to be to strengthen Somalia’s tentative relinking with the international financial system. It may also be aimed – as some sources suggest – to break the monopoly of the Al-I’tisaam, which controls an array of hawalas and the only large bank operating across Somalia.

Reversing or rolling back five years of disastrous domestic and foreign policies is not going to be easy or quick. In the current state of unclarity it is easy to misread appointments and make big assumptions. It is highly likely the regime is in a “tactical phase” and needs time to craft a good strategy to disempower N&N.

However, the HSM government cannot afford to make lapses. It ought to be very direct and clear in its aims from the start. A policy of “national accommodation” is fine; needed, even. But it must not come at the expense of strategic reform. The government needs to move with speed to consolidate its vision and policies. It needs to signal on that it is different from N&N and intends to move the country in a new direction.

N&N is an amorphous and broad movement. It is not monolithic. There are some of its adherents, who are amenable to reform and changing their hardline positions. But its core believers have an ideological worldview – mixing exaggerated nationalism with support for an authoritarian state-building. The latter category must not be allowed to be anywhere near power. Including “core N&N” in the administration could foment more problems than it resolves.

Once the president is back from his foreign trips, he will need to establish a clear line of messaging and direction for his government. HSM is a good communicator. He is usually economical, calm and not prone to impulsive and unscripted rhetoric. He must enforce that style and disabuse his team from making off-the-cuff, impromptu comments that are unhelpful.

We know a few things about the new government and what it wants to achieve. HSM has signalled he wants to be a hands-on president and intends to be involved in policy formulation and implementation. To cement his brand, imbue a character to his administration, and instill discipline, HSM will need to take full charge sooner rather than later. If he fails to do that and delegates too much to the inexperienced new PM, there is a real risk of confusion. It is unfortunate that many supporters of HSM are becoming disillusioned very quickly. HSM and his team must pick these signals of public unease and respond as quickly as possible instead of ignoring them, otherwise the cost of failure and public alienation will be too high.

The Somali Wire Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll