The counter-reform will not be televised
Somalia risks squandering its rare moment of hope. The promise of change expected under the leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) is in serious jeopardy. A powerful elite with vested interest in continuity is stealthily manoeuvring to emasculate the president, pre-empt change and continue business-as-usual.
Mapping this obscure force of the counter-reform is hazardous. It definitely includes former cabinet ministers and senior officers in the security services. Many have now rehatted as diehard HSM supporters. They assert tremendous influence over the amorphous and loose network of informal advisers who now form an iron curtain around the presidency. They are mostly affiliated to competing and rival Islamist factions. They are close to the ideology of the Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N). They proclaim fealty to “a strong and assertive” Somalia – often manifested in exaggerated shows of patriotism. Their view of federalism, at best, is ambivalent. Some could be minting money from peddling influence and leveraging their access to the president. In totality, this counter-reform network is at the core of the looming paralysis in Mogadishu.
The president’s reform agenda will no doubt be crippled, unless the head of atate and his smartest advisers realise the risks and move swiftly to change tack. For a start, the process of appointments to key posts now looks rigged. If posts are not allocated in the interest of centralising the ruling Union of Peace and Development (UPD) party control, it is dispersed in a specific direction to appease rival Islamist factions. Either way, merit ceases to matter and becomes irrelevant.
There is no suggestion this broad network is working based on a concrete blueprint. It is instead self-organising, leaderless and animated by a desire to maximise personal and factional gains -political and financial. There is a negatively opportunistic and predatory dynamic now directing appointments.
The N&N is now rejuvenated. Its members, who still wield influence and have vast resources, are regrouping. Some, among them, are now openly mulling over seizing back power through regional elections.
Politics in Somalia is increasingly elite-driven and factionalised. Clans assert less power. Islamist factions project more power and influence. These trends are now manifesting themselves even more. Intra-elite contestation drives political fragmentation and in the current context, thwarts the prospects for reform.
HSM is an intelligent leader. He at least seems to want to be different from his predecessor Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo. If he is sincere about that, then he must recognise the risks this network poses to his administration. In fact, his attempt to centralise and concentrate power in the hands of Dam ul-Jadiid may be partly driven by this apprehension. But he needs to do more.
Purging the N&N rump is urgent and necessary in order for Somalia to move forward. HSM also needs to be wary of N&N fellow travellers, who dominate the civil society, and who are now busy masquerading as supporters of “isbedeelka” (change). Many of these individuals generally subscribe to the N&N worldview, but do it in a cleverly disguised way that few can discern.
The president needs to be resolute. He first must dismantle the gatekeepers’ fiefdom and build a transparent and accountable system of access to the presidency. Second, he needs an independent system of analysis and policy innovation. Third, he must reward merit in picking men and women to fill crucial positions in the army, police and intelligence services.
Did we pin too much hope on HSM? Did we downplay the inherent paralysis and inertia of elite politics? Undoubtedly.
It is easy to be pessimistic and hard to brush aside the mounting sense of public unease in recent weeks. But there is no doubt that HSM means well for Somalia. He is an immensely gifted politician. He listens and takes counsel. He means well for the country. He is committed to federalism and constitutionalism. His mild Islamist inclinations are moderate and non- threatening to democratic values. He has moved to rebalance Somalia’s fraught relations with its neighbours. His slogan: "Somaali heshiis ah, dunidana heshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself, at peace with the world) has been interpreted by proponents of authoritarianism as weakness. Much of the current jostling and political ferment within N&N is predicated on the false assumption HSM can be muscled out or undermined with a bit of pressure.
There is no doubt HSM can achieve more progress in reforming the security sector, rebuilding the federation and completing the constitution. To do that he will need to urgently take strategic advice from friends and to show more resolve in degrading the malign destabilising power N&N exerts in Somalia.
Failure to do that will be to repeat Farmaajo’s disastrous five years all over again.
The Somalia Wire Team
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