Can HSM become the democratic ‘strongman’ Somalia needs?
Over the weekend, the Somali parliament endorsed Hamza Abdi Barre as Somalia’s new prime minister. All the 220 MPs who were present voted in support of the new premier. With this step, the PM is now constitutionally mandated to set up his cabinet. There is intense speculation on what kind of a leader Hamza will be and what kind of government he will form. His long and close ties to President Hassan Sheikh Mahmud certainly confer great advantages and benefits, but could also render him toothless - a rubber stamp premier. How the new PM will find the balance between acting as an independent system of checks and balances while providing loyal service and advice to the president is yet to be seen.
President Hassan Sheikh returned from the UAE around the same time and announced he had contracted COVID-19. The mysterious silence over the president’s weeklong itinerary can now be explained by the disarray caused by the illness. The president tweeted that he will self-isolate and work from home, adding that he felt fine, for now. It is also believed some members of his close staff may have also caught the disease.
The COVID-19 disruption aside, there is a general impression and a distinct sense the new administration is somewhat adrift. The energy and zeal witnessed in the first weeks seem to have dissipated. Maybe this is a temporary system glitch and not necessarily a harbinger of dysfunction to come.
HSM has built a big retinue of advisers and gatekeepers to manage him. This is not healthy. Weeks of intense infighting and power tussles have reportedly delayed the urgent tasks of filling key government posts as well the job of forming a new cabinet. With the president likely to be out of action for two weeks or possibly more, we are looking at the prospect of further delays in the appointment of a new administration.
Immediate former President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo argued and believed in the notion of a strong authoritarian leader to manage the country. His supporters proclaimed that the country needed a strongman. Up to a point, this is correct. Somalia no doubt needs a strong and effective leader. But brute strength alone and the power to coerce and control and subdue Somalia is not what will stabilise the country. Strong leadership is primarily a function of democratic conviction, ideals and a constitutional order. Hassan Sheikh, therefore, has the potential to steer the country on a democratic path, rebuild the system of consensus politics that has underpinned every political progress since 2000. Strong leadership does not preclude a consensual style.
On whether the new president has what it takes to become a strong leader or even wants to be a strong leader, the jury is still out. There is an opinion gaining traction which holds that HSM is incorrigibly “weak”, instinctively an appeaser and therefore someone likely to be overtaken by powerful factions within Somalia’s Islamist movement keen to assert control.
The inability to move against former regime members has upset many well-meaning Somalis who welcomed HSM. The Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) power structure is still intact. PM Hamza’s unfortunate photo op with Farmaajo days before his confirmation has simply reinforced the perception HSM offers “continuity” and not “rupture” with past. Even the latest bid by the Attorney-General to question Finance Minister Abdirahman Duale Beyle over the finances of the former administration has failed to generate interest, because it is perceived as half-hearted; likely made to stem growing rumblings of discontent from HSM’s own support base.
Leadership is not simply about consensus. It is also about a disciplined focus on your own strategic goals and moving swiftly to achieve them. How you strike that balance is determined by experience and the political context. HSM certainly has the latitude and the experience to become both accommodative and partisan; to push for consensus, engage rivals, work towards creating a big tent, while at the same time pursuing efforts to implement his strategic goals. The complaint against HSM one hears from close supporters is that he is not pushing his agenda vigorously or even accommodating rivals; the perception is that he is bogged down and not moving in any direction.
Hoping that the president will get well soon and PM Hamza will move quickly in forming a cabinet, the prospect remains good to overcome these hurdles. HSM needs to move ruthlessly and cut out the army of nondescript influence peddlers and gatekeepers who have quickly festered around the edges of his presidency. He needs to create one focal point and a lean coterie for engagement and decision-making. Unless HSM does that, his presidency will become asphyxiated and smothered to death very quickly.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
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Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.