Can HSM become the democratic ‘strongman’ Somalia needs?
Over the weekend, the Somali parliament endorsed Hamza Abdi Barre as Somalia’s new prime minister. All the 220 MPs who were present voted in support of the new premier. With this step, the PM is now constitutionally mandated to set up his cabinet. There is intense speculation on what kind of a leader Hamza will be and what kind of government he will form. His long and close ties to President Hassan Sheikh Mahmud certainly confer great advantages and benefits, but could also render him toothless - a rubber stamp premier. How the new PM will find the balance between acting as an independent system of checks and balances while providing loyal service and advice to the president is yet to be seen.
President Hassan Sheikh returned from the UAE around the same time and announced he had contracted COVID-19. The mysterious silence over the president’s weeklong itinerary can now be explained by the disarray caused by the illness. The president tweeted that he will self-isolate and work from home, adding that he felt fine, for now. It is also believed some members of his close staff may have also caught the disease.
The COVID-19 disruption aside, there is a general impression and a distinct sense the new administration is somewhat adrift. The energy and zeal witnessed in the first weeks seem to have dissipated. Maybe this is a temporary system glitch and not necessarily a harbinger of dysfunction to come.
HSM has built a big retinue of advisers and gatekeepers to manage him. This is not healthy. Weeks of intense infighting and power tussles have reportedly delayed the urgent tasks of filling key government posts as well the job of forming a new cabinet. With the president likely to be out of action for two weeks or possibly more, we are looking at the prospect of further delays in the appointment of a new administration.
Immediate former President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo argued and believed in the notion of a strong authoritarian leader to manage the country. His supporters proclaimed that the country needed a strongman. Up to a point, this is correct. Somalia no doubt needs a strong and effective leader. But brute strength alone and the power to coerce and control and subdue Somalia is not what will stabilise the country. Strong leadership is primarily a function of democratic conviction, ideals and a constitutional order. Hassan Sheikh, therefore, has the potential to steer the country on a democratic path, rebuild the system of consensus politics that has underpinned every political progress since 2000. Strong leadership does not preclude a consensual style.
On whether the new president has what it takes to become a strong leader or even wants to be a strong leader, the jury is still out. There is an opinion gaining traction which holds that HSM is incorrigibly “weak”, instinctively an appeaser and therefore someone likely to be overtaken by powerful factions within Somalia’s Islamist movement keen to assert control.
The inability to move against former regime members has upset many well-meaning Somalis who welcomed HSM. The Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) power structure is still intact. PM Hamza’s unfortunate photo op with Farmaajo days before his confirmation has simply reinforced the perception HSM offers “continuity” and not “rupture” with past. Even the latest bid by the Attorney-General to question Finance Minister Abdirahman Duale Beyle over the finances of the former administration has failed to generate interest, because it is perceived as half-hearted; likely made to stem growing rumblings of discontent from HSM’s own support base.
Leadership is not simply about consensus. It is also about a disciplined focus on your own strategic goals and moving swiftly to achieve them. How you strike that balance is determined by experience and the political context. HSM certainly has the latitude and the experience to become both accommodative and partisan; to push for consensus, engage rivals, work towards creating a big tent, while at the same time pursuing efforts to implement his strategic goals. The complaint against HSM one hears from close supporters is that he is not pushing his agenda vigorously or even accommodating rivals; the perception is that he is bogged down and not moving in any direction.
Hoping that the president will get well soon and PM Hamza will move quickly in forming a cabinet, the prospect remains good to overcome these hurdles. HSM needs to move ruthlessly and cut out the army of nondescript influence peddlers and gatekeepers who have quickly festered around the edges of his presidency. He needs to create one focal point and a lean coterie for engagement and decision-making. Unless HSM does that, his presidency will become asphyxiated and smothered to death very quickly.
The Somali Wire Team
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