Get down to business quick, Mr President
Somalia’s new administration is taking too long to settle down. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has not appeared before parliament for its endorsement of his nomination. It is likely that he will take a month, at least, to form his cabinet. The president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), jetted off to the UAE for a weeklong trip. Crucial positions in the intelligence service, NISA, have not been filled. The leadership of the army and police remain unchanged. The old regime’s nomenklatura are still running the show. Time is running out for the HSM administration and there doesn’t seem to be any sense of hurry. This is disconcerting.
To be fair to the president, the situation is fiendishly complex and it is understandable that he would want to proceed with caution and think through appointments carefully. Early on, HSM decided not to be bound by the 4.5 power sharing formula. This freed his hand and allowed him to consolidate his Peace and Development Party and reward his Damul Jadiid support base. But he is aware that he cannot stretch this further. Doing so will alienate friends that have been crucial to his win, especially Puntland President Sa’id Abdullahi Deni.
The trip to the UAE is crucial. HSM needed to reach out to allies quickly to obtain desperately needed emergency assistance to run the government. The pledge by the Emiratis to extend full support is definitely positive news. It did not help, however, that during the first few days the president was incommunicado and invisible. The Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) troll army had a field day. They fed unhealthy speculation about an alleged secret trip to Israel or spread rumours about the ill health of the president and members of his staff. PM Hamza’s “courtesy call” on ex-President Mohammed Abdullahi may have played well on the street but the photo op looked clumsy and disingenuous. Farmaajo looked somewhat startled; he may have put on his formal suit rather hastily. Hamza leaned forward in his seat and looked discomforted. In the public mind, the HSM administration’s quest for feel-good photo ops looks somewhat suspicious, if not dubious, in the context of a nation now starring a famine in the face – possibly worse than that of 2011, in which more than a quarter of a million Somalis died.
Somalia’s drought situation is now grave. Speaking on BBC on Thursday evening, Jan Egeland of the Norwegian Refugee Council warned that the situation in Somalia could be catastrophic. He had visited Baidoa, the epicentre of the humanitarian crisis, where over 300 children have been admitted to hospital suffering from acute malnutrition. Aid agencies are warning that – similar to 2011 – over 250,000 people could die unless there is urgent international assistance.
HSM did well to appoint Abdirahman Abdishakur as Special Envoy for the Drought Response. The envoy has been busy touring all the badly hit areas that are accessible to the government. He has also been prolific in his meetings with donors and mobilisation drives. Of all the officials appointed so far, Abdirahman Abdishakur appears to be the most active. But, given the magnitude of the crisis, this is a whole-of-government effort – ideally with the president also involved in the heavy lifting.
The president has a narrow window to fix things. His honeymoon period is shorter than the one accorded to his predecessors. He does not have the luxury of extended foreign travels. His adversaries already smell disarray and weakness – something that could portend trouble ahead.
HSM is an inclusive politician and he may be angling for more time and negotiations to get the ideal, balanced administration. But the longer he takes to do that, the greater the prospects of local and international unease.
A lot of speculation has dwelled on power struggles and internal frictions within the HSM team and the delicate dance within the Islamist movement. At this stage, Sahan would not dwell too much on this. Suffice to say, Islamist factionalism is a factor and remains a dynamic that is very much in play. Islamist political factions have jostled for influence and power for two decades. That is likely to intensify with Hassan Sheikh in power.
HSM probably wants to move fast. He must therefore not further delay in setting up a full administration, since that will exacerbate Somalia’s crises and play into the hands of sceptics who are already saying HSM could prove worse than Farmaajo.
The Somali Wire Team
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