Get down to business quick, Mr President
Somalia’s new administration is taking too long to settle down. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has not appeared before parliament for its endorsement of his nomination. It is likely that he will take a month, at least, to form his cabinet. The president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), jetted off to the UAE for a weeklong trip. Crucial positions in the intelligence service, NISA, have not been filled. The leadership of the army and police remain unchanged. The old regime’s nomenklatura are still running the show. Time is running out for the HSM administration and there doesn’t seem to be any sense of hurry. This is disconcerting.
To be fair to the president, the situation is fiendishly complex and it is understandable that he would want to proceed with caution and think through appointments carefully. Early on, HSM decided not to be bound by the 4.5 power sharing formula. This freed his hand and allowed him to consolidate his Peace and Development Party and reward his Damul Jadiid support base. But he is aware that he cannot stretch this further. Doing so will alienate friends that have been crucial to his win, especially Puntland President Sa’id Abdullahi Deni.
The trip to the UAE is crucial. HSM needed to reach out to allies quickly to obtain desperately needed emergency assistance to run the government. The pledge by the Emiratis to extend full support is definitely positive news. It did not help, however, that during the first few days the president was incommunicado and invisible. The Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) troll army had a field day. They fed unhealthy speculation about an alleged secret trip to Israel or spread rumours about the ill health of the president and members of his staff. PM Hamza’s “courtesy call” on ex-President Mohammed Abdullahi may have played well on the street but the photo op looked clumsy and disingenuous. Farmaajo looked somewhat startled; he may have put on his formal suit rather hastily. Hamza leaned forward in his seat and looked discomforted. In the public mind, the HSM administration’s quest for feel-good photo ops looks somewhat suspicious, if not dubious, in the context of a nation now starring a famine in the face – possibly worse than that of 2011, in which more than a quarter of a million Somalis died.
Somalia’s drought situation is now grave. Speaking on BBC on Thursday evening, Jan Egeland of the Norwegian Refugee Council warned that the situation in Somalia could be catastrophic. He had visited Baidoa, the epicentre of the humanitarian crisis, where over 300 children have been admitted to hospital suffering from acute malnutrition. Aid agencies are warning that – similar to 2011 – over 250,000 people could die unless there is urgent international assistance.
HSM did well to appoint Abdirahman Abdishakur as Special Envoy for the Drought Response. The envoy has been busy touring all the badly hit areas that are accessible to the government. He has also been prolific in his meetings with donors and mobilisation drives. Of all the officials appointed so far, Abdirahman Abdishakur appears to be the most active. But, given the magnitude of the crisis, this is a whole-of-government effort – ideally with the president also involved in the heavy lifting.
The president has a narrow window to fix things. His honeymoon period is shorter than the one accorded to his predecessors. He does not have the luxury of extended foreign travels. His adversaries already smell disarray and weakness – something that could portend trouble ahead.
HSM is an inclusive politician and he may be angling for more time and negotiations to get the ideal, balanced administration. But the longer he takes to do that, the greater the prospects of local and international unease.
A lot of speculation has dwelled on power struggles and internal frictions within the HSM team and the delicate dance within the Islamist movement. At this stage, Sahan would not dwell too much on this. Suffice to say, Islamist factionalism is a factor and remains a dynamic that is very much in play. Islamist political factions have jostled for influence and power for two decades. That is likely to intensify with Hassan Sheikh in power.
HSM probably wants to move fast. He must therefore not further delay in setting up a full administration, since that will exacerbate Somalia’s crises and play into the hands of sceptics who are already saying HSM could prove worse than Farmaajo.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.