Issue No. 411

Published 23 Jun 2022

The rise of fake news in Somalia and its risk to the government

Published on 23 Jun 2022 21:38 min

The rise of fake news in Somalia and its risk to the government 

Traditionally, Somali society has been an oral one, in which information was passed by word of mouth. There is a Somali saying, dhagaxna meel dhow dhawaqna meel dheer: actions reach a short distance while words can travel very far, very quickly. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database, in 2010 there were only about 640,000 mobile phone users in Somalia. A decade later, there were around 8.8 million mobile phone users. Nearly 22% of these users – 1.9 million people – were estimated to have internet access. As internet access has increased, the number of Somalis using social media platforms has increased in lockstep, resulting in substantiaål annual growth of social media platform users. Studies have found that 13% of Somalia’s total population – more than two million people – are active users of social media, a number which continues to increase each year.

Rising internet access is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it improves access to services such as education, with universities and schools, offering educational platforms through the internet. Various economic sectors are thriving thanks to internet connectivity; Somalia’s money transfer companies and banks rely on internet access to offer their services. There is no doubt that the internet has been a major catalyst for development and improved the standard of living for millions of Somalis. 

But there are many downsides to the internet, one of which is dis/misinformation (the difference being that disinformation is deliberately false and misleading; misinformation is just incidentally so) and the manipulation of public opinion. And the problem is hardly limited to Somalia; globally, dis/misinformation (often simply called ‘fake news’) has achieved pandemic proportions. And it is Åspecially rife in the political sphere.

In Somalia’s recent election, both the government and the opposition used social media to promote themselves and disparage their opponents, often by disseminating is/misinformation. While such behaviour is nothing new in politics, whether in Somalia or anywhere else, what was novel was the industrial scale of the effort. 

Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo campaigned for president in 2017 as an opposition figure. As one of the weaker candidates, he used his Tayo Political Party (TPP) to engage the youth, deploying nationalistic rhetoric. Behind the scenes, Farmaajo was the only candidate to create a formal social media campaign team, employing proper social media metrics and performance tracking measurements. His social media team started to create troll accounts with paid advertisements on social media platforms. Soon, Farmaajo’s nationalistic messages started to appear on every social media user’s account. 

After winning the presidency, Farmaajo realised how crucial social media had been for his victory. He kept his social media team intact and continued to use social media platforms to craft the image of his administration or to attack opponents. As the public became aware of how much the administration was leaning on the media – and especially social media – to shape reality, they nicknamed it igu sawir: a ‘photo opportunity.’

The culture of dis/misinformation continued, but it was often insidious and frequently went unnoticed as it percolated into the public’s consciousness, even as the faltering regime ramped-up its efforts to manipulate perceptions and opinion. Farmaajo allocated additional funding for and assigned members of his inner circles to oversee the social media propaganda machine he had created. And, increasingly, they sought to control traditional media as well, either by co-optation or censorship, including outright repression, as journalists were harassed and arrested, and their outlets threatened with closure. Access journalism became one of the few ways for media outlets to get inside Villa Somalia.

During periods of crisis, Farmaajo used the media and social media to divert public attention. For example, in 2018, the UN SRSG Nicholas Haysom questioned the misconduct of the UN-funded police against protesters, after demonstrations broke out in Baidoa following the government’s arrest of Mukhtar Robow, a former Al-Shabaab deputy leader and a South West State presidential candidate. Security forces killed around 15 people and arrested more than 300. Farmaajo’s government declared Haysom PNG and expelled him. Putting their propaganda machine into high gear, they were able to shift the narrative away from what had happened in South West State and redirect it against Haysom’s supposed violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. Haysom, and not Robow or the dead protestors, became the dominant story. This quickly became the Farmaajo administration’s default crisis-management playbook: stir up nationalist sentiment, find a target for it, divert attention from the actual issue. If they could control the narrative, then facts were largely irrelevant.Despite losing his bid for re-election, Farmaajo’s social media team still remains intact, led by a former Villa Somalia spokesman and other figures. The troll farms they built up over five years still exist, too, based not just in Somalia but among the Somali diaspora in Kenya, Turkey, Europe, and North America. Many of them continue to be paid thousands of dollars each month for their work. And they have been busy earning their money of late.

They started the “Thank you, Mr. President” campaign to raise funds to buy Farmaajo a mansion in Mogadishu. They have amplified interviews given by two former NISA directors to pro-Farmaajo media outlets, in which one of the officials, Fahad Yasin, made outlandish, unsubstantiated accusations against members of the new administration. Most recently, when members of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s delegation to the UAE tested positive for Covid-19 this week, they churned out dis/misinformation, claiming that HSM had Covid-19 and was being kept in isolation by the Emiratis or that the whole thing was a ruse and HSM had secretly flown to Israel to normalise Somali Israeli relations. 

If anything, pro-Farmaajo social media is even more dangerous now. Freed from having to expend time and effort defending the former president, they have gone on offense. Those on the receiving end of their brickbats have to decide whether to ignore them or address their false claims. For example, it was only last night that, facing a torrent of dis/misinformation about HSM’s health, Villa Somalia published photos of him meeting the UAE president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed.

Reliable sources have told Sahan that the money raised for Farmaajo’s mansion will instead be invested in local businesses and used to fund his social media campaign. It is time for HSM’s government, together with the platforms that give them a voice, to deal with the scourge of social media trolls, while respecting constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 

The Somali Wire  Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll