Issue No. 411

Published 23 Jun 2022

The rise of fake news in Somalia and its risk to the government

Published on 23 Jun 2022 21:38 min

The rise of fake news in Somalia and its risk to the government 

Traditionally, Somali society has been an oral one, in which information was passed by word of mouth. There is a Somali saying, dhagaxna meel dhow dhawaqna meel dheer: actions reach a short distance while words can travel very far, very quickly. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database, in 2010 there were only about 640,000 mobile phone users in Somalia. A decade later, there were around 8.8 million mobile phone users. Nearly 22% of these users – 1.9 million people – were estimated to have internet access. As internet access has increased, the number of Somalis using social media platforms has increased in lockstep, resulting in substantiaål annual growth of social media platform users. Studies have found that 13% of Somalia’s total population – more than two million people – are active users of social media, a number which continues to increase each year.

Rising internet access is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it improves access to services such as education, with universities and schools, offering educational platforms through the internet. Various economic sectors are thriving thanks to internet connectivity; Somalia’s money transfer companies and banks rely on internet access to offer their services. There is no doubt that the internet has been a major catalyst for development and improved the standard of living for millions of Somalis. 

But there are many downsides to the internet, one of which is dis/misinformation (the difference being that disinformation is deliberately false and misleading; misinformation is just incidentally so) and the manipulation of public opinion. And the problem is hardly limited to Somalia; globally, dis/misinformation (often simply called ‘fake news’) has achieved pandemic proportions. And it is Åspecially rife in the political sphere.

In Somalia’s recent election, both the government and the opposition used social media to promote themselves and disparage their opponents, often by disseminating is/misinformation. While such behaviour is nothing new in politics, whether in Somalia or anywhere else, what was novel was the industrial scale of the effort. 

Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo campaigned for president in 2017 as an opposition figure. As one of the weaker candidates, he used his Tayo Political Party (TPP) to engage the youth, deploying nationalistic rhetoric. Behind the scenes, Farmaajo was the only candidate to create a formal social media campaign team, employing proper social media metrics and performance tracking measurements. His social media team started to create troll accounts with paid advertisements on social media platforms. Soon, Farmaajo’s nationalistic messages started to appear on every social media user’s account. 

After winning the presidency, Farmaajo realised how crucial social media had been for his victory. He kept his social media team intact and continued to use social media platforms to craft the image of his administration or to attack opponents. As the public became aware of how much the administration was leaning on the media – and especially social media – to shape reality, they nicknamed it igu sawir: a ‘photo opportunity.’

The culture of dis/misinformation continued, but it was often insidious and frequently went unnoticed as it percolated into the public’s consciousness, even as the faltering regime ramped-up its efforts to manipulate perceptions and opinion. Farmaajo allocated additional funding for and assigned members of his inner circles to oversee the social media propaganda machine he had created. And, increasingly, they sought to control traditional media as well, either by co-optation or censorship, including outright repression, as journalists were harassed and arrested, and their outlets threatened with closure. Access journalism became one of the few ways for media outlets to get inside Villa Somalia.

During periods of crisis, Farmaajo used the media and social media to divert public attention. For example, in 2018, the UN SRSG Nicholas Haysom questioned the misconduct of the UN-funded police against protesters, after demonstrations broke out in Baidoa following the government’s arrest of Mukhtar Robow, a former Al-Shabaab deputy leader and a South West State presidential candidate. Security forces killed around 15 people and arrested more than 300. Farmaajo’s government declared Haysom PNG and expelled him. Putting their propaganda machine into high gear, they were able to shift the narrative away from what had happened in South West State and redirect it against Haysom’s supposed violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. Haysom, and not Robow or the dead protestors, became the dominant story. This quickly became the Farmaajo administration’s default crisis-management playbook: stir up nationalist sentiment, find a target for it, divert attention from the actual issue. If they could control the narrative, then facts were largely irrelevant.Despite losing his bid for re-election, Farmaajo’s social media team still remains intact, led by a former Villa Somalia spokesman and other figures. The troll farms they built up over five years still exist, too, based not just in Somalia but among the Somali diaspora in Kenya, Turkey, Europe, and North America. Many of them continue to be paid thousands of dollars each month for their work. And they have been busy earning their money of late.

They started the “Thank you, Mr. President” campaign to raise funds to buy Farmaajo a mansion in Mogadishu. They have amplified interviews given by two former NISA directors to pro-Farmaajo media outlets, in which one of the officials, Fahad Yasin, made outlandish, unsubstantiated accusations against members of the new administration. Most recently, when members of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s delegation to the UAE tested positive for Covid-19 this week, they churned out dis/misinformation, claiming that HSM had Covid-19 and was being kept in isolation by the Emiratis or that the whole thing was a ruse and HSM had secretly flown to Israel to normalise Somali Israeli relations. 

If anything, pro-Farmaajo social media is even more dangerous now. Freed from having to expend time and effort defending the former president, they have gone on offense. Those on the receiving end of their brickbats have to decide whether to ignore them or address their false claims. For example, it was only last night that, facing a torrent of dis/misinformation about HSM’s health, Villa Somalia published photos of him meeting the UAE president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed.

Reliable sources have told Sahan that the money raised for Farmaajo’s mansion will instead be invested in local businesses and used to fund his social media campaign. It is time for HSM’s government, together with the platforms that give them a voice, to deal with the scourge of social media trolls, while respecting constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 

The Somali Wire  Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 966
A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound
The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.


24:38 min read 16 Jul
Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Scroll