Issue No. 409

Published 21 Jun 2022

Somaliland’s political impasse and the risk of backsliding

Published on 21 Jun 2022 23:13 min

Somaliland’s political impasse and the risk of backsliding

Somaliland, generally seen as a beacon of democracy and whose stable security situation is in contrast to the much more fragile one in Somalia, is facing an unusual reversal. A long running dispute between the ruling party, Kulmiye, and the two opposition parties, Wadani and UCID, has now spilled over into political violence and threatens to get much worse. And, indeed, recent events in Hargeisa seem to justify the surprising turn of events, with Somalia being praised for its stability while expressions of concern are offered to Somaliland. Celebratory gunfire in Mogadishu as the new government takes over is in contrast to live rounds fired at protestors in Hargeisa.

The current political situation in Somaliland marks one of the most volatile periods in Somaliland’s history; it is certainly the most fraught period since the violence that followed the 2017 presidential elections. Then, similar to now, one of the opposition presidential candidates, Wadani’s Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro), accused President Muse Bihi Abdi and his Kulmiye party of attempting to rig the outcome of the presidential election in their favour. At least seven deaths were recorded in the civil disruption that ensued and some 18 security force members were injured.

The opposition parties now again accuse President Bihi of “anti-democratic tendencies”: of trying to delay elections, currently scheduled for 13 November, by scuttling the electoral commission and registering new political associations prior to November, and of denying the opposition and its supporters their constitutional rights to peacefully protest. Bihi’s administration counters that it is the opposition which is trying to instigate a political crisis by making accusations that President Bihi intends to delay elections and extend his term beyond November. They also accuse the opposition of fomenting violence by holding demonstrations despite the interior ministry’s rejection of their request. The interior minister acknowledged that freedom of assembly is a constitutional right but faulted the opposition parties for failing to have met the legal criteria for organising demonstrations, such as making the request in person.

The impasse, and the possibility of prolonged instability over the next few months, threatens to undo much of the progress achieved under the current administration. The Somaliland Partnership Act, which requires the State Department to regularly update Congress on US engagement with Somaliland and, together with the Defence Department, to conduct a feasibility study regarding the establishment of a partnership between the US and Somaliland, was recently approved by the US House of Congress. The act’s passage earlier this month followed several diplomatic milestones between the US and Somaliland: in December 2021, a US congressional staff delegation visited Hargeisa. In March, President Bihi visited the US and met with senior officials in the Biden administration. And in May, the US ambassador to Somalia and the head of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) visited Hargeisa. 

President Bihi’s administration has also made substantial diplomatic progress with Kenya and has generally avoided getting entangled in the regional unrest emanating from Ethiopia and Eritrea. In addition, the ruling party conducted peaceful and transparent parliamentary and local elections in May, ending more than a decade of electoral paralysis since the last parliamentary elections were held in 2005. That the opposition won a majority of seats in parliament and in the municipal races was widely seen as a sign of Somaliland’s  political maturity.

Underlying the political events currently occurring in Somaliland are constitutional issues related to the modalities of the national election. Somaliland’s constitution limits the number of legally registered political parties (xisbi) to three at any one time. The ruling party and the opposition disagree over whether new political associations (urur) should be allowed to register in advance of the November presidential election. Newly registered political associations would then compete for the right to become one of the three political parties, which could potentially result in one of the existing parties being dissolved and barred from contesting the presidency. With the presidential election slated for 13 November and the mandate of the current parties due to expire on 28 November (Somaliland’s electoral laws allow new political associations to be formed once every ten years; the last time it occurred was on 28 November 2012), the disagreement centres over the sequence of events.

This week, Muse Bihi decided to move ahead with registering new political associations and yesterday the Commission for Registration of Political Organisations announced that the registration was now open. This threatens to disrupt ongoing talks between the parties being mediated by traditional elders and other actors, which were announced after violence between police and demonstrators occurred on 9 June, in which 10 protestors were injured. If the disagreement is not fully resolved, the opposition parties might re-mobilise their supporters and resume demonstrations; there is the possibility that they might resort to other means of organised violence. The government is sure to respond to any  illegal demonstrations in a similar fashion to 9 June. 

Also yesterday, Somaliland’s parliament voted for the seven National Electoral Commission (NEC) members whose names President Bihi submitted to the parliament for approval, after the previous NEC collapsed following the resignation of its members. By law, the president and his ruling party nominate three members, the Upper House (Guurti) of the Somaliland parliament nominates two members, while the two opposition parties each nominate one member. Parliament rejected two of Kulmiye’s three nominees and one of the Guurti’s two nominees. The result of the voting indicates that a protracted, bitter struggle between Kulmiye and the opposition parties over the NEC’s composition is likely; similar disagreements were one reason why parliamentary elections were delayed for so long.

Amid these political disputes, a disagreement between two religious groups in Somaliland recently emerged after Sheikh Berberaawi, a prominent Salafist cleric, took to social media to accuse the Al-I’tisaam group of being ideologically close to (“born of”) Al-Shabaab. The sheikh went on to say that Al-I’tisaam and Al-Shabaab seek power through similar ways, the main difference being that Al-I’tisaam lacks Al-Shabaab’s military power and is just biding its time. Al-I’tisaam’s spokesman vehemently denied the accusation, calling it disgusting and accusing Berberaawi of character assassination. He vowed to sue the sheikh and take him to court. 

The current political trendlines in Somaliland are not encouraging; they have obvious security implications, as the security apparatus becomes increasingly distracted and pulled into quelling political disputes. Additional outbreaks of violence will only increase divisions. So, too, will increasing political polarisation between the parties and their supporters, increasing the likelihood that accusations of trying to delay elections will become a fait accompli as November approaches. The success of Somaliland’s peace, security, and prosperity, which until recently never looked as promising, is increasingly at risk.

The Somali Wire Team

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