Get ready for a hands-on Hassan Sheikh
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on Wednesday appointed Hamza Abdi Barre, a 48-year-old MP from Jubaland, as his prime minister, ending weeks of intense speculation and jostling by clan and political elites to influence the choice. The news has been generally well-received across Somalia and parliament is expected to endorse the new PM quickly in a day or two.
In making his appointment, HSM is not just rewarding loyalty and consolidating his own political party, but it seems he is also signalling an intent to become a hands-on president, one determined to stamp his vision and policy imprimatur on Somalia in the next four years. Hamza, a man he has mentored and groomed for close to 25 years, and with whom he has developed a strong bond and trusted relationship, allows the president to focus more on his strategic goals and less on what his number two might be scheming and plotting.
Hamza’s name was kept a well-guarded secret until two days ago. HSM’s team strategically tossed one prominent name into the public domain each week to test public opinion and to put the media off the scent. Hamza was educated in Malaysia at an Islamic university where he obtained an MBA. He is the first Ogadeen to hold the post of PM, marking a new departure from the established pattern of selecting the president and the prime minister from the Majerteen and the Marehaan clans of the Darood. He belongs to the Reer Abdille sub-clan of Mohamed Zubeyr, a powerful sub-clan of the Ogadeen with influence in Kenya and Ethiopia.
Hamza is a long-time associate of HSM and they pursued similar interests in strengthening private university education in Somalia. The prime minister designate served as secretary-general of HSM’s party, the Peace and Development Party (PDP) from 2012 to 2017; the party has since been rebranded and is now called the Union of Peace and Development. He is a close ally of the current president of Jubaland, Ahmed Madoobe (also from the Reer Abdille), having served as chairman of the state electoral commission.
By picking Hamza, HSM rewards both Jubaland and Madoobe specifically for his support in the polls. It also reflects the president’s renewed commitment to mend relations with the federal member states. Having someone from the periphery at the centre of power in politics in Mogadishu helps reinforce his message about rebuilding the federation. On the flipside, HSM risks inflaming clan discontent in Jubaland because we now have an anomalous situation in which both a regional president (Madoobe) and a prime minister are all from the same sub-sub clan of the Ogadeen.
HSM seems intent on ‘modifying’ the 4.5 power-sharing agreement and, in so doing, he is going against convention. He allegedly defied calls to pick his PM from Puntland. He picked a long-time party stalwart to cement the grip of his UPD party – in a way, a progressively subversive move to strengthen multiparty politics. Understood from that perspective, HSM is telling fellow Somalis to get accustomed to having a party in power.
4.5 formula purists will chafe at the ‘subversion’ of the system by HSM. He could mollify discontent by spreading the cabinet positions more evenly across the various clans. It is therefore likely we will see big portfolios of the defence, interior, finance and foreign affairs ministries going to the major clans that feel unhappy with the choice of PM.
For the first time, all the top leaders of Somalia are non-diaspora Somalis. This is significant and marks a major reversal of a what had become a trend; for two decades, diaspora politicians have been gaining in influence and power. HSM and his colleagues are beneficiaries of a mild anti-diaspora dynamic in politics that also chimes with the public mood.
Both HSM and his PM have roots in the Islamist movement. This is not unique. Many politicians in Somalia of their generation have similar backgrounds. The battle for political power in Somalia over the last 20 years has essentially been between rival Islamist factions. HSM’s Islamist vision is ecumenical, moderate, and pragmatic. His goals are not to establish an Islamic state but a vaguely defined Islamic order based on political pluralism and constitutionalism. The president is known to be suspicious of hardline Islamist groups and the threat they pose to the stability of Somalia. It therefore makes sense to view HSM not as a crude purveyor of some radical Islamist agenda but as a counterweight and a bulwark against more militant strains of Islamism. He ought to be seen as an ally and not treated with suspicion because of his mild Islamist tendencies.
The appointment of the new PM has gone down well in Kenya, where the Ogadeen clan wields major influence. The new PM could potentially help improve relations between Mogadishu and Nairobi, which still remain brittle. This week saw another spike in tensions when Kenya bungled protocol by hoisting the Somaliland flag – inadvertently – at a diplomatic reception in Nairobi. This caused Somalia’s envoy to Kenya, Mohamud Ahmed Nur ‘Tarzan,’ to walk out in protest. HSM calculates that having an Ogadeen PM with influence in Kenya will come in handy in the future. With Ethiopia staggering under the weight of its many domestic problems, Kenya is well poised to assume the role of regional hegemon in the Horn. It is a wise decision by HSM to set the stage for an eventual rapprochement by putting together a team that can support him in rebuilding bilateral relations with Kenya, after the nadir they reached under his predecessor.
The Somali Wire Team
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