Issue No. 404

Published 12 Jun 2022

Amid rising conflict and displacement, local perspectives on refugee protection and migration governance are critical

Published on 12 Jun 2022 26:07 min

 Amid rising conflict and displacement, local perspectives on refugee protection and migration governance are critical 

Between 9 and 10 June, the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, a consortium bringing together researchers and academics at the University of Manchester, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), and Sahan, hosted a conference in Nairobi on migrants and refugee protection. The event occurred amid increasing displacement around the globe in general and much closer to home in Africa in particular. Drought and conflict have driven population movements – both voluntary and forced – across international borders, ranging from Somalia, where nearly quarter of a million people are currently facing starvation, to displacement caused by the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, to the eastern DRC, where a resurgent M-23 is creating regional tensions. Throughout all these conflict zones, the debate around effective international migration governance, including the protection of migrants and refugees, could not be timelier and more urgent. 

One of the panels during the REF conference discussed the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which, together with the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact for Refugees, was designed to offer greater inclusion and protection of migrants and forcibly displaced persons. One question that arose asked to what extent are such international conventions and policies intertwined with local perspectives regarding how people on the move, whether documented or undocumented, interact with multiple, local level actors? Posed differently, how do local administrators, from border guards to immigration officials, adapt international, regional, and national legislation, policies, and conventions so as to respond to the local needs and contexts of borderland regions? This is a critical point to consider, as it is often these local contexts – as they operate at borders and borderland regions – that produce the conditions that either create risks or offer protection to people on the move. Such contexts, and the conditions they create, apply to virtually any group of migrants or refugees, and the reasons why they are trying to cross international borders: whether they are fleeing conflict, poverty, resource scarcity, famine, or adverse environmental conditions; and whether are looking for asylum, employment, pasture for their livestock, trading opportunities, or the need to maintain kinship networks across borders. 

At the Mandera Triangle – the tri-border area between Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia – different forms of cross-border movement and international migration occur every day. These involve members of local communities, undocumented migrants, irregular economic migrants, trafficked and smuggled migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The Mandera Triangle is also a key node in the migration routes for those attempting to reach locations outside of Africa. It is one of the main conduits along what is known as the ‘Southern Route,’ which is heavily utilised by Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis. For these migrants, their journey commences on the Kenya-Ethiopia border (including Mandera County and Moyale), from where they travel down the eastern corridor via Kenya and onwards to South Africa and beyond. The Mandera Triangle, especially via Dollow Ado woreda (district) in Ethiopia, is also known as a transit zone for the ‘Eastern Route’ into Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This route often leads migrants into Somaliland, mostly via Tog Wajaale and other border towns, through Hargeisa,  Burao, Erigavo, Las Anod, and into the Puntland town of Garowe and eventually the port city of Bosaaso. From Bosaaso, they cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and onward to their intended destination, whether it is the Middle East or Europe.

In addition to tensions that in 2020 spilled over into Mandera County from the Gedo region of Somalia, involving fighting between Jubaland forces and forces of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – at the time under the administration of former president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo) – the Mandera Triangle has experienced multiple forms of hostilities marking other conflict zones in Africa. The conflict between Jubaland and FGS forces, which on a few occasions drew in Kenyan forces, did not just cause displacement but also led to tighter controls at the Kenya-Somalia border. This tense situation, worsened by the emergence and spread of COVID-19, meant that interactions between people on the move, the local/host community, and local administrators were marred by a lack of trust and a lack of transparency, ultimately creating risks and protection issues for migrants.

But migration experiences throughout the Mandera Triangle, as well as many other borderland regions in Africa, are not only marked by risks. They also feature a series of local accommodations, facilitations, and compromises that occur within a complex web of interactions and negotiations between migrants and local authorities, civil society and non-governmental organisations, village elders, local/host communities, and smuggling networks. Beyond the refugee camps that often fall under the jurisdiction of international refugee governance institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), many displaced people and migrants often create their own networks to facilitate their movement to safer locations, or into areas with less adverse conditions.

Understanding the numerous accommodations made during these multiple interactions among local/host communities, border guards, local administrators, militia leaders and village elders provides a pathway for local perspectives to inform the policy discourse around effective and rights-based international migration governance. But an understanding of the constantly evolving   processes by which people on the move navigate and negotiate borders can also potentially influence local and regional policy discussions. Either way, the goal should be to strike a balance between mollifying states’ legitimate concerns in borderland areas such as the Mandera Triangle and finding a safer and more humane approach to meeting the specific needs of people who are impacted by mixed migration flows.

The Somali Wire Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 966
A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound
The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.


24:38 min read 16 Jul
Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Scroll