Issue No. 404

 Amid rising conflict and displacement, local perspectives on refugee protection and migration governance are critical 

Between 9 and 10 June, the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, a consortium bringing together researchers and academics at the University of Manchester, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), and Sahan, hosted a conference in Nairobi on migrants and refugee protection. The event occurred amid increasing displacement around the globe in general and much closer to home in Africa in particular. Drought and conflict have driven population movements – both voluntary and forced – across international borders, ranging from Somalia, where nearly quarter of a million people are currently facing starvation, to displacement caused by the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, to the eastern DRC, where a resurgent M-23 is creating regional tensions. Throughout all these conflict zones, the debate around effective international migration governance, including the protection of migrants and refugees, could not be timelier and more urgent. 

One of the panels during the REF conference discussed the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which, together with the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact for Refugees, was designed to offer greater inclusion and protection of migrants and forcibly displaced persons. One question that arose asked to what extent are such international conventions and policies intertwined with local perspectives regarding how people on the move, whether documented or undocumented, interact with multiple, local level actors? Posed differently, how do local administrators, from border guards to immigration officials, adapt international, regional, and national legislation, policies, and conventions so as to respond to the local needs and contexts of borderland regions? This is a critical point to consider, as it is often these local contexts – as they operate at borders and borderland regions – that produce the conditions that either create risks or offer protection to people on the move. Such contexts, and the conditions they create, apply to virtually any group of migrants or refugees, and the reasons why they are trying to cross international borders: whether they are fleeing conflict, poverty, resource scarcity, famine, or adverse environmental conditions; and whether are looking for asylum, employment, pasture for their livestock, trading opportunities, or the need to maintain kinship networks across borders. 

At the Mandera Triangle – the tri-border area between Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia – different forms of cross-border movement and international migration occur every day. These involve members of local communities, undocumented migrants, irregular economic migrants, trafficked and smuggled migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The Mandera Triangle is also a key node in the migration routes for those attempting to reach locations outside of Africa. It is one of the main conduits along what is known as the ‘Southern Route,’ which is heavily utilised by Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis. For these migrants, their journey commences on the Kenya-Ethiopia border (including Mandera County and Moyale), from where they travel down the eastern corridor via Kenya and onwards to South Africa and beyond. The Mandera Triangle, especially via Dollow Ado woreda (district) in Ethiopia, is also known as a transit zone for the ‘Eastern Route’ into Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This route often leads migrants into Somaliland, mostly via Tog Wajaale and other border towns, through Hargeisa,  Burao, Erigavo, Las Anod, and into the Puntland town of Garowe and eventually the port city of Bosaaso. From Bosaaso, they cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and onward to their intended destination, whether it is the Middle East or Europe.

In addition to tensions that in 2020 spilled over into Mandera County from the Gedo region of Somalia, involving fighting between Jubaland forces and forces of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – at the time under the administration of former president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo) – the Mandera Triangle has experienced multiple forms of hostilities marking other conflict zones in Africa. The conflict between Jubaland and FGS forces, which on a few occasions drew in Kenyan forces, did not just cause displacement but also led to tighter controls at the Kenya-Somalia border. This tense situation, worsened by the emergence and spread of COVID-19, meant that interactions between people on the move, the local/host community, and local administrators were marred by a lack of trust and a lack of transparency, ultimately creating risks and protection issues for migrants.

But migration experiences throughout the Mandera Triangle, as well as many other borderland regions in Africa, are not only marked by risks. They also feature a series of local accommodations, facilitations, and compromises that occur within a complex web of interactions and negotiations between migrants and local authorities, civil society and non-governmental organisations, village elders, local/host communities, and smuggling networks. Beyond the refugee camps that often fall under the jurisdiction of international refugee governance institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), many displaced people and migrants often create their own networks to facilitate their movement to safer locations, or into areas with less adverse conditions.

Understanding the numerous accommodations made during these multiple interactions among local/host communities, border guards, local administrators, militia leaders and village elders provides a pathway for local perspectives to inform the policy discourse around effective and rights-based international migration governance. But an understanding of the constantly evolving   processes by which people on the move navigate and negotiate borders can also potentially influence local and regional policy discussions. Either way, the goal should be to strike a balance between mollifying states’ legitimate concerns in borderland areas such as the Mandera Triangle and finding a safer and more humane approach to meeting the specific needs of people who are impacted by mixed migration flows.

The Somali Wire Team