A geopolitical glasnost in the offing?
Somalia is on the cusp of a potentially major realignment in its foreign relations, one likely to relieve tensions and smooth relations with its immediate neighbours while also recalibrating Somalia’s foreign policy with regional states, especially in the Middle East.
This week marks one month since Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was elected president of Somalia. He was sworn in last week at a colourful ceremony at Afisyoone Tent, inside Mogadishu’s ‘green zone.’ The inauguration was attended by the presidents of Djibouti and Kenya, the prime ministers of Ethiopia and Egypt and foreign ministers from Gulf states, perhaps most notably Saudi Arabia. The high level representation from the Middle East suggests renewed interest in Somalia and competition to influence the direction of the HSM administration.
In his speech, the president pledged to pursue a pragmatic and “moderate” foreign policy founded on the principles of mutual respect. He also made it clear that Somalia would not be drawn into the geopolitical rivalries that now characterise relations between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. Inviting both the Ethiopian and Egyptian prime ministers, as well as the foreign ministers of the UAE and Qatar, was deliberate, intended to drive home this quest for a more balanced and less partisan relationship.
The choice of the word “moderate” is interesting in the context of a presidential speech. It is a clear recognition of the harm done by the Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo administration. The Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) government’s toxic hypernationalism, conspiratorial narrative, and aggressive rhetoric against traditional neighbours only served to stoke regional tensions.
Eritrea was the only state in the Horn not to have not congratulated HSM on his election and did not send a delegation to his inauguration. This is not surprising. HSM has been critical of the Tripartite Alliance and Farmaajo’s dalliance with the Eritrean leader Isayas Afewerki. HSM also believes that Asmara exerts negative peer pressure on Mogadishu. Afewerki is sending a message of hostility that does not augur well for future negotiations to bring back thousands of Somali soldiers “stranded” in Eritrea.
Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed put on a nice show at Afisyoone. His attempt at speaking a bit of Somali was not entirely successful and somewhat garbled, but it did elicit laughter from HSM. The president was also shown placing his right hand over his heart every time Abiy referred to him – a sign of acknowledgement and friendship. Their chemistry appeared to be good.
The HSM transition team invited the leadership of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) who is now alienated from both the regional Somali government in Ethiopia led by Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar’ as well as the federal government in Addis. Mustafa Omer was at the event but was not given a chance to speak. One view is that this was simply down to protocol. If he had been allowed to speak, then other federal presidents who were present would have had to be given a chance as well. This would have made the ceremony inordinately lengthy and unwieldy.
Sources say Mustafa Omer was incensed by the presence of the ONLF delegation and protested to the HSM transition team. The reply he got was that the ONLF represents a legitimate Somali voice and had historically participated in Somali inaugurations.
Abiy, by contrast, has no strong opposition to the ONLF. In fact, he may have been relishing Mustafa’s discomfort at the function. Mustafa is accused of mismanaging federal funds as well cultivating links with right-wing Amhara figures opposed to Abiy.
Addis is now keen to distance itself from the Somali regional leader and build new partnerships. Abiy probably sees elements in the ONLF or, as most analysts suggest, Ahmed Shide (now Ethiopian Finance Minister), as the man to groom.
A key beneficiary of the new HSM foreign policy glasnost appears to be Kenya. The Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, got a rousing welcome when he took to the podium at Afisyoone. He heaped effusive praises on the new Somali president and portrayed Kenya and Somalia as inseparable twins. At side meetings, the Kenyan president appealed to HSM to lift the ban on khat (miraa) from Kenya.
The khat trade has, in recent years, been a major source of friction between Nairobi and Mogadishu. Farmaajo banned the import of khat from Kenya at the start of the pandemic in March 2020, citing COVID-19 restrictions. But imports from Ethiopia continued, allowing Farmaajo and his family to gain control over the khat trade and monopolise its distribution within Somalia. By locking out Kenya and letting Ethiopia to exclusively dominate the khat market in Somalia, Farmaajo not only endeared himself to Ethiopia but aimed to advance the goals of economic integration and preferential trade envisaged under the Tripartite Alliance.
The resumption of the export of Kenyan khat to Somalia is well-timed. It boosts the chances of Kenyatta’s anointed heir, Raila Odinga, garnering more support in the vote rich Mt. Kenya region. The bulk of miraa is grown in Meru County; another variety of Kenyan khat, called muguka, is grown in Embu County. Both are part of the Mt. Kenya region. There are also reports this week Kenya Airways may soon start direct flights between Nairobi and Mogadishu.
Nairobi is angling for some future structured talks to bring an amicable and consensual resolution to the maritime dispute. Hassan Sheikh is the president who took Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). While he is open to ideas of ending the stalemate through negotiations, he will have to be careful in cutting any deal with Kenya that could be perceived as “selling out.” HSM will be amenable to a deal that safeguards Somalia’s national interests and upholds the ICJ verdict. That is not an easy proposition.
Inaugurations are highly stage-managed affairs, where the attendees all do their best to project bonhomie and offer platitudes reaffirming brotherhood and unshakeable bonds. But the presence of various political figures and senior officials – and, in Eritrea’s case, their absence – provides some important indications of Somalia’s likely trajectory under the new HSM administration.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.