Fahad’s dance of the seven veils
Somalia’s 10th president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), was inaugurated yesterday, but the celebrations were plagued by the spectre of Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) and the players of the previous administration. In a clear attempt to steal the limelight of the inauguration, two former National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) directors general, Fahad Yasin and his successor, Yassin Farey, took the rare step of giving interviews to journalists over the past few days.
Of the two, the interview that attracted the most attention was Fahad Yasin’s, which he gave to an internet-based Somali news channel, Galyan Media. The entire session has yet to be made public; in keeping with Fahad’s determination to eclipse HSM’s inauguration and first days in office, the stage-managed interview will be drip-fed to the public in instalments over the course of a week or so. The first short teaser, however, has already gone viral, showing Fahad affirming that he was a senior member of the Salafi jihadist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam (AIAI) and has ever since remained a committed Salafi.
Despite Fahad’s pride in his Al-Itihaad past, he studiously concealed his ideological and organisational affiliation with the jihadist group during his time in public office. Perhaps that’s because AIAI is a specially designated global terrorist organisation, affiliated to al-Qaeda which, according to Stanford University, received funds, training, and logistical support from the group – including three million dollars from Osama Bin Laden himself. AIAI was responsible for multiple terrorist attacks in Somalia, Yemen, and Ethiopia, and several of its members were linked to al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The group was ultimately defeated in early 1997 by the Ethiopian army, but its remnants went on to form Al-Shabaab and the little-known Salafi group Al-I’tisaam b’il Kitaab wa Sunna – an Islamist movement in which Fahad Yasin continues to play a leading role, despite his awkward attempts to dodge the question during his interview.
Fahad’s concealment of his ideological affiliation was motivated by more than a desire to distance himself from a defunct terrorist group: it allowed him to pursue an undeclared political agenda from within the heart of Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) and, in so doing, represented a flagrant conflict of interest. Although AlI’tisaam is not an actively anti-government group, it spurns secular government and its fundamentalist creed at best tolerates constitutional rule as a transient evil to be patiently endured. Not surprisingly, his powerful positions as presidential chief of staff and, subsequently, director general of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and national security advisor, Fahad diligently set about dismantling the architecture of constitutional rule and democratic norms. Indeed, in his media interview, he implied that NISA was second only to the presidency in terms of executive power and the embodiment of Somalia’s sovereignty – an institutional reflection of his totalitarian ideology.
What Fahad did not mention in the first instalment of his media appearance was NISA’s counterterrorism role and the fight against Al-Shabaab. This omission is consistent with the FGS’s utter failure, between 2017 and 2022, to conduct offensive operations against the jihadist group. During the final year of Farmaajo’s tenure, the line between NISA and Al-Shabaab became so blurred as to be indistinguishable, with both of them assailing the same targets: Somalia’s opposition leaders and its Federal Member States (FMSs). Perhaps more will be revealed about Fahad’s views on Al-Shabaab during subsequent instalments, but the fact that Somalia’s former spy chief chose not to mention the nation’s principal terrorist group even once during a forty-minute conversation speaks volumes about his personal and political priorities.
Fahad’s concealment of his Salafi affiliation while in office also casts one of the greatest fiascos of Farmaajo’s presidency as a patent abuse of power. In 2021, FGS troops, including special forces and paramilitaries operating under Fahad’s orders, assaulted the stronghold of a Sufi militia known as Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in Galmudug state, killing over 120 people. At the time, the operation might have been plausibly justified as a cack-handed offensive against an anti-Shabaab ally on the grounds that ASWJ defied government authority. But the undisguised animosity between Sufis and Salafis has been a fixture of Somalia’s religious landscape since the early 1990s, and Fahad clearly felt no compunction about using state power to massacre his theological rivals. And two senior Al-I’tisaam clerics, Sheikhs Bashir Salaad and Hassan Dahir Aweys (Aweys is also a former leader of AIAI and AlShabaab) publicly endorsed the campaign against ASWJ, reinforcing the ideological content of the government’s actions.
Since Fahad’s interview basically amounts to a televised confession, the most striking aspect is the degree to which he went out of his way to deny any linkages to Qatar, other than his employment with the Al Jazeera news network in the late 2000s. Fahad’s reliance on Qatari funding to build NISA’s infrastructure, including an unaccountable, non-statutory armed force known as Duufaan (‘Hurricane’), and to finance extensive patronage networks that served to centralise and monopolise state power, is an open secret. Fahad’s own subordinates routinely bragged to friends in Mogadishu’s coffee shops about the suitcases of cash they carried on his behalf from Doha, and the investments his cronies have made in cities like Nairobi and Istanbul to launder their off-budget earnings. But since serving as an agent of influence of a foreign power – especially while holding high government office – is arguably a treasonable offence, punishable under Article 189 of Somalia’s penal code, Fahad has good reason to vigorously deny it.
As Fahad continues to reveal more secrets during his televised dance of the seven veils, more fascinating revelations will no doubt come to light. But his well rehearsed and pre-recorded manifesto is also likely to raise new questions about this enigmatic figure. For a start, if – as he claims – Fahad is so proud of his Salafi credentials and his Al-Itihaad past, why did he go to such lengths to conceal them during his time in office? And why continue to obfuscate his affiliation with the Al-I’tisaam movement? Why not address the existential threat posed by Al-Shabaab to the Somali state up front and head on?
At least one of the answers to these questions is already blatantly obvious: Fahad has no intent of retiring and he intends to stay relevant in Somali politics. Watch this space.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.