Somalia’s new president seeks peace at home and abroad
On Thursday, Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (HSM), will be formally inaugurated in Mogadishu in a ceremony to be attended by foreign dignitaries. The new slogan of HSM’s supporters is “Soomaali heshiis ah, dunidana heshiis la ah”– which loosely translates as “Somalis at peace with one another and at peace with the world”.
The phrase encapsulates the new feeling and spirit of amity that now characterises Mogadishu. Many people describe a dramatic change in the atmosphere of the city since Hassan Sheikh was elected. Mogadishu is calmer, says one resident. An unusual lull in Al-Shabaab attacks has come as a welcome respite and is also contributing to the new upbeat mood. Nevertheless, a heavy security presence and many of the curbs on freedom of movement have not diminished; likely even to be ramped up in the inauguration week.
There is no doubt the end of one of Somalia’s most fractious and bitterly divisive elections, in itself, will have a calming effect. The anticipated spike in Al-Shabaab attacks have not occurred. But the group is almost certain to be in planning phase for launching “spectaculars” to drive home its message of continued resistance. The Farmaajo government spent five years studiously avoiding any serious military confrontation with Al-Shabaab.
Throughout this week delegates from regional states have been arriving in Mogadishu. Djibouti’s Ismael Omar Guelleh, Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia
are among the key heads of state and government expected to attend the inauguration. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also believed to be planning to deploy high-level officials to telegraph their intent to peel away Mogadishu from the Qatar/Turkey axis. While Gulf and Middle Eastern rivalries and tensions have significantly subsided, the intense competition for Somalia between the Saudi/Emirati coalition and the Qatari bloc is far from diminished. The UAE ambassador has in recent days held a number of senior-level meetings, including two with Hassan Sheikh. The new administration is aware that it may forfeit Qatari budgetary support and other monies usually given as grants to pay salaries of the army and the civil service. Abu Dhabi is said to be considering appeals for help from the new leadership in Mogadishu. It is also likely we will see re-engagement of Emirati charities in Somalia.
Hassan Sheikh has a real chance to harness greater international support. In Brussels the EU is debating internally how to support his government; the EU two years ago froze budgetary support for Somalia in protest against the protracted electoral crisis. A resumption of the support seems to be on the cards. Washington also appears well disposed towards Hassan Sheikh and is likely to be forward leaning. Last week the US carried out a drone strike, the first since HSM took office. The Biden administration earlier reversed a decision by Donald Trump to pull out American troops from Somalia. US Special Forces will resume a persistent presence in Somalia, providing ‘train and equip’ programmes.
It is always difficult to read PM Abiy Ahmed’s calculations, but the soft words deployed by both Mogadishu and Addis suggest that both sides are eager to maintain cordial relations. Eritrea, however, is unlikely to join the chorus of regional and international support for Hassan Sheikh. Asmara may actually be the one regional outlier determined to give the new Somali president a hard time.
President Hassan Sheikh has travelled to both South West State and to Galmudug to reinforce the message of amity. The president is keen to woo back Abdi Kariye “Qoor Qoor” and Abdiaziz Laftagareen – two strong allies of ex-president Farmaajo. Opponents of the two regional presidents who support HSM want a quick settling of scores. In SWS, especially, Laftagareen is up for re-election and there is a clamour in the region to off-ramp him. In Mogadishu, Digil and Mirifle politicians, among them Speaker Aden Madoobe, favour a release of Mukhtar Robow and a process to bring him back into politics. There is speculation Robow may be released in the coming weeks. Laftagareen has little choice. If he plays hardball and attempts to foment a crisis, he only makes his exit assured and faster. If he displays political maturity, he may survive for a little while but not in the long-term. He has antagonised and alienated too many powerful vested interests that are now working to see him ousted.
HSM needs a period of calm and can ill-afford a new crisis in Galmudug and SWS; that in part explains why he chose to make trips there after just days in office. He also is keen to avoid pursuing the same strategy of centralised control as his predecessor. His key priority now is to mend ties with Qoor Qoor and Laftagareen. His preference is to give them an opportunity to cooperate with his government and not to play obstructionist politics. If, however they opt to challenge him, they should expect deft action to remove them – probably through early elections.
HSM also faces a potential challenge from the powerful Salafi movement Al-I’tisaam, which acted as Somalia’s de facto ruling party under Farmaajo. Al-I’tisaam has long been a pervasive presence in the Somali social, commercial, and religious spheres, but under the tutelage of Farmaajo’s eminence grise, Fahad Yasin, the group was offered a taste of political power and the prospect of eventually taking control of government. Under HSM, Al-I’tisaam is likely to find itself tolerated as an Islamist movement but marginalised from active politics. One of the group’s senior figures, Sheikh Ali Wejis, has publicly welcomed HSM’s election and signalled support for his administration, but it remains to be seen how Al-I’tisaam as a whole will react to this decline in its fortunes.
The HSM administration is sincere in its desire to pursue a more accommodative consensual style of politics and most Somalis seem to welcome this new, constructive style of leadership. But the depth and breadth of opposition to Hassan Sheikh should not be underestimated: poor political losers, entrenched financial interests, clan chauvinists and Salafi activists all bear grudges about their sudden loss of stature. HSM’s preferred strategy for a new ‘Pax Somalia’ is founded on co-optation and co-operation with potential opposition forces, but more than a little coercion and confrontation is likely to be unavoidable in the pursuit of that aim.
The Somali Wire Team
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