Issue No.9

Published 02 Nov 2023

War with Eritrea would not just be over Assab

Published on 02 Nov 2023 11:11 min
War with Eritrea would not just be over Assab
 
Exactly one year after the signing of the Pretoria Accord that ended the Tigray War, Ethiopia is again teetering on the edge of large-scale armed conflict, and this one would have even graver implications for the highly-populated Horn state as well as the wider sub-region.
 
While there is yet no firm evidence of imminent war, a series of recent developments suggest the possibility that armed confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is now higher than at any time in the last year.
 
Tensions between the two neighbours are escalating, and there is some evidence that Ethiopia may be rearming. Open-source flight tracking shows a surge in flights to Ethiopia from the Gulf involving a cargo plane shuttling between military airports over the last week.
 
During Ethiopia’s recent Army Day Parade, Addis showcased its latest high-tech military acquisitions. Among these were new multiple rocket launch and tactical ballistic missile platforms as well as two new types of electronic warfare systems - one to jam aircraft navigation and targeting systems, and one ground-based radar and communications intelligence system. The army also showed off its new field guns and rocket systems,  which included short-range ballistic missiles, and self-propelled howitzers.
 
Also, the Ethiopian Prime Minister toured Afar State in the far north on the border with Eritrea, presumably looking for ways to counter Eritrean influence in the region. Asmara has operated training camps for allied Afar militias, and Afar State is strategic to any war with Eritrea. And the military airport of Semera is a particularly important combat drone hub. Afar also straddles a vital trade and transport corridor. While state media portrayed the Prime Minister’s visit as largely about development, it is almost certain he had other motives for visiting Afar. He may be seeking to rebuild ties with a coalition of Afar rebel groups currently part of the Eritrean opposition. The PM also met a large delegation of Afar elders.
 
Over the last few weeks, Abiy Ahmed also ratcheted up his Red Sea rhetoric, arguing Ethiopia’s case for access to a port as a matter of urgency. The PM called the issue existential but noted that Addis would prefer dialogue and negotiations over the use of force. He appeared before the Ethiopian Parliament to ask MPs to back his endeavour. Ethiopian State TV and other official media outlets have since been running special programmes on the Red Sea. The PM’s rhetoric spooked Ethiopia’s neighbours and elicited a rare rebuke from Asmara, which termed it “excessive.”  
 
This fixation with the Red Sea may be a deliberate strategy by Addis to force a crisis with Asmara to resolve other outstanding issues. It is improbable that a Red Sea port would be a genuine casus belli.
 
Since  November 2022, tensions have been rising between Asmara and Addis over a host of issues, mostly related to the outcome of the Tigray War. Eritrea failed to back the Pretoria Accord, angered by Abiy’s decision not to ‘finish the job’ by overthrowing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and taking full control of the region. Eritrea thereafter dug in its heels in Tigray, refused to withdraw its troops from key areas like Western Tigray, obstructed African Union monitors, and generally undermined the Abiy administration’s attempts to gain credibility there.
 
Then, shortly before the outbreak of fighting in Amhara State in April 2023, Eritrea sent its spy chief Abraha Kassa and senior military chiefs to try to mend relations in the region and to intercede on behalf of the Amhara militia factions, most allied with Eritrea. The delegation managed some good photo ops to convey camaraderie and bonhomie but failed to dissuade Abiy from going hard after the Fano militia.
 
A number of foreign states have in recent months been making discreet attempts to mediate between Addis and Asmara. One is even believed to have brokered a private meeting between Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afewerki in Cairo in July. But such efforts have reportedly produced no improvement to date.
 
PM Abiy and President Isaias have served as strong allies to one another in the past. They could conceivably still rekindle their friendship and find a negotiated path forward-- perhaps allowing Addis access to the Red Sea and a comprehensive peace settlement in exchange for Asmara’s regional economic integration. But if recent history is a guide, it is reasonable to assume the worst-case scenario could be the most likely scenario –- yet another war in the Horn.

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