Issue No.1 3

A Vision of the Red Sea 

Cast your mind back to July 2018. After 20 years of deep animosity, Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopia's new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are penning a "joint declaration of peace and friendship" in Asmara. Resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict brings Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019; Isaias' nomination is conspicuously absent. Some sanctions are lifted on Eritrea, and a security pact is signed between the two countries.
 
Fast forward to today when the alliance, which brought destruction to Tigray and much of northern Ethiopia, lies in tatters, and the spectre of armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has reared its head once again. Since October 2023, regional concerns that the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) will seek to annex a seaport or strip of coastline on the Red Sea have drastically risen. On 14 October, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called Ethiopian access to the sea a "matter of existence" for the country. In subsequent speeches, while affirming that Ethiopia has "no plans for invasion," he, and other Ethiopian politicians, have pressed home dubious historical, economic and anthropological arguments for the country’s right to sea access. Abiy has further hinted that Ethiopia's neighbours could not deny the country's right to the Red Sea.
 
The federal government has staked its claim on several grounds. Federal politicians have referenced historical Ethiopian control of Massawa and Assab, and in November, Abiy quoted the famous 19th-century Ethiopian leader Ras Alula, saying that the Red Sea was the country's "natural boundary." Territorial and anthropological claims by Ethiopian Afar have also been revived. Most prominent has been repeated economic arguments centred on overwhelming reliance on import-export through Djibouti's ports since the 1990s. With Ethiopia's population swelling past 120 million in 2021, government officials have argued that it urgently needs independent port access to develop economically.
 
A lot hinges on how the FGE envisions "access." While there may be some support for Ethiopia to reach an economic access agreement, as previously developed regarding the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, no country will willingly gift territory to Ethiopia.
 
What has not been publicly voiced may be partially driving this sudden turn is Abiy's vision of himself as the leader who will transform Ethiopia into a superpower. Restoring the country's access to the Red Sea would establish Abiy in the pantheon of epic Ethiopian leaders, akin to Menelik II and his defeat of the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.
 
Internal reaction to Abiy’s vision has been decidedly mixed. Though the Oromo do not have a clear historical claim to a coastline, many support independent Ethiopian access to a seaport. In contrast, Amhara elite, who have long agitated for the restoration of Ethiopian territory on the Red Sea, oppose the current campaign, both because of increasingly close ties with Eritrea and open distrust of Addis. Meanwhile, civilians and elite in Tigray oppose any resumption of armed conflict that might drag the deeply fragile region back into the destruction of 2020-22. And many harbour understandable grievances towards and suspicions about Isaias and may even support regime change in Asmara.
 
The steady stream of rhetoric and mixed messaging from Ethiopia has spooked the country's neighbours. Eritrea, once a pariah, has seemingly returned to the regional fold, with Isaias yet again seeking to insert himself as king maker. In November 2023, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appointed Omar Idris as the country's first Ambassador to Eritrea, another sign of closer relations. Even Djibouti, with its historically frosty relations with Asmara, has begun to re-engage with the old dictator. If Ethiopia does attempt to seize a neighbouring port, it could bring Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti into alliance.
 
Divisions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Abiy's vision of sea access, are not the only disturbing forces at play on the Red Sea today. The turmoil of armed conflict in Sudan is roiling alliances and dynamics, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia increasingly seeking to gain power on the Red Sea. While the UAE maintains relations with the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia is forging alliances with Egypt, Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). And Egpyt is set on denying Ethiopia access to the sea.
 
During the Saudi-Africa summit in early November, the list of Isaias' meetings was indicative of this shifting landscape, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Chairman of Sudan's warring Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The two blocs now forming across the Horn and the Gulf could easily tip into wider conflict if Ethiopia attempts to seize a Red Sea port.
 
In a region with numerous, often violently, competing claims for border areas and coastal territory, compromising territorial integrity would be a grave mistake. Since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, territorial integrity and sovereignty have been sacrosanct in preventing external meddling in domestic affairs across the continent. In the Horn of Africa alone, the Ilemi Triangle, Al-Fashaga and Abyei border areas are all contested, with the disputes showing little sign of abating. An Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea on the grounds of securing sea access or restoring historic Afar lands would surely open up a regional Pandora's box of additional competing territorial claims.
 
Not only that, but Ethiopia could become a regional and international pariah. As Ethiopia has been gradually welcomed back into the international community following the horrors of the Tigray War, Abiy’s vision could have disastrous consequences that the FGE has not yet considered. The recent development agreement signed with Germany could evaporate, and access to the US African Growth and Opportunity Act, revoked in January 2022, would likely not be reinstated. Ethiopia’s struggling economy would undoubtedly fall further, pushing more of its people into poverty. And the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia and Fano militia in Amhara would likely capitalise on a distracted Addis and weakened Ethiopian National Defence Force.
 
Ethiopia was once the Horn of Africa's anchor state-- militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, if it chooses to attempt to annex land from Eritrea, or any other neighbouring state, it will prove itself instead to be the destabilising spoiler. Pursuing economic integration and regional cooperation is far more likely to achieve Ethiopia's developmental aspirations than another costly war. Further armed conflict is the last thing the Horn needs. Calmer heads must prevail and steer those looking towards another war away from the shores of the Red Sea.

By the Horn Edition Team