Issue No. 7

On 17 October, Sudan reached a grim 6-month anniversary of relentless armed conflict. Since April, millions have been displaced, both within Sudan's borders and beyond, creating an acute humanitarian exigency. The armed conflict has exacted an appalling human toll, with thousands dying in the conflagrations largely between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). With the conflict's expansion and increasing fragmentation, there is little sign of the violence abating. In light of this, it is important to examine the coming months to discern some potential outcomes of this ongoing armed conflict.
 
The foremost scenario under consideration is the triumph of the SAF over the RSF, a prospect substantiated by several factors. Notably, the SAF has managed to maintain a significantly higher level of cohesion and strategic alignment than the RSF. Moreover, the SAF has retained some of the structures and legitimacy of the central government, holding onto a more formal network of regional and international relationships than the RSF. In recent weeks, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, at the helm of the SAF, has undertaken a series of diplomatic overtures, including missions to neighbouring nations and an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September.
 
There is also growing horror, within Sudan and the international community, at the RSF's use of brutal violence in this armed conflict, particularly in Darfur. This sentiment is partially fuelling the military's recent rallying of citizens, enlisting thousands into new battalions across the country. The SAF is also seeking to attract low-level RSF members and other armed opposition groups to its fold as well as influential political factions, including many of the inner circle of toppled Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir.
 
The RSF also continues to draw support from its allies, such as significant weapon caches from the UAE. None of its supporters, however, can tilt the balance of power and provide sufficient fighting forces to significantly change the conflict's trajectory. But whether the military's defeat of RSF can translate into lasting stability will remain to be seen.
 
The next scenario to consider is where the RSF consolidates its grip on territory in western and central Sudan, which, at this juncture, appears far less probable than a SAF triumph. The RSF, however, still commands over 120,000 fighters as well as control over its gold mines and trafficking networks, though their production and profitability have declined since the outbreak of violence. It is still conceivable that the RSF could seize parts of Sudan, and claim victory if it can take Khartoum.
 
While SAF has managed to persevere in the capital, it still faces a shortage of infantry, a role the RSF previously filled. And the RSF is also better adapted for the urban warfare that has played out in Khartoum. Many of its fighters accrued combat experience fighting in the Yemen War at the behest of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
 
Nevertheless, several challenges loom large for the RSF. The commander of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo' Hemedti,' has been largely absent from the political scene since the outbreak of conflict in April, barring a handful of appearances. His apparent absence and the fractured nature of the RSF in Darfur and elsewhere threaten to undermine the paramilitary group. The RSF is also facing substantial hardware restraints, including a limited supply of ammunition and anti-aircraft missiles.
 
While the RSF and other militias may be able to sustain themselves independently, seizing control of the nation will likely prove elusive. Consequently, the RSF may continue seeking limited clashes with SAF forces, leveraging these battles to emphasise their political and security relevance—especially in Khartoum, Kordofan, and Darfur for some time.
 
The third scenario, and the most optimistic, would see Sudan's conflict ending through a political settlement where the SAF and the RSF agree to conclude hostilities. The nature of this settlement could range from a return to the antebellum status to a power-sharing agreement with civilian political leaders. At this moment, however, both seem unlikely, with the SAF and RSF intent on destroying the other and Sudan's democratic movement sidelined and fractious.
 
Sudan's past conflicts have found partial closure through political settlements, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that largely concluded the Second Sudanese Civil War. This followed over two decades of brutal conflict; however, a scenario one hardly wants to envisage today. Importantly, a broad international consensus exists for stopping the current armed conflict. But clarifying and investing in a single peace process is now essential to draw the reluctant major parties back to the negotiating table. IGAD could serve as the body behind which neighbouring countries unite with a common position.
 
Under the final scenario, as the armed conflict drags on, the SAF and RSF fail to defeat each other and fragment, external actors become embroiled in the conflict, and a full-blown civil war emerges. The ethnic cleansing and destruction of Darfur spread through the country, and pull in other armed groups into the violence. Other, yet unseen, paramilitary and armed ethnic parties may materialise and alter the course of the conflict.
 
Despite the ensuing conflict, certain factors mitigate against this dire outcome. Prevailing political norms and the cultural practices of political elites have historically channelled conflicts toward sporadic localised conflicts rather than widespread, engulfing turmoil. Sudan's history shows instances of ethnic and regional-based rebellions that never led to state collapse. But the dragging in of Khartoum may change this dynamic.
 
The future of Sudan remains deeply uncertain, and the current conflict's trajectory is far from clear. At this moment, while it appears a SAF victory is the most likely outcome of the war, the history of Sudan's wars suggests little chance of decisive victory and many more months of brutal conflict. What is clear, however, is the Sudanese people's immense suffering and the urgent need to provide far greater support for them. A coherent and viable peace process must also be the priority of the international community to halt the horrors unfurling in Khartoum, Darfur, and across the country.