The Aid Suspension Fallout
The sudden suspension of US foreign aid is already having major reverberations around the Horn of Africa. Just days after Donald Trump's inauguration for his second non-consecutive term, a sweeping 90-day pause to foreign assistance was announced by the State Department– now led by Marco Rubio. The decision has been ostensibly motivated by an effort to cut 'waste,' end 'woke' programming, and align foreign aid to perceived American interests. Dozens of USAID officials have been dismissed, pulled back to Washington, or placed on indefinite leave. Hundreds of programmes have been suspended, ranging from mine clearance to protecting human rights defenders to elements of HIV/AIDS prevention in sub-Saharan Africa. Only military aid to Israel and Egypt, as well as emergency food programmes, have been exempted.
It has certainly lain down the gauntlet--marking one of the most violent diplomatic about-turns in living memory. Since World War II, almost without interruption, the US has underpinned the Bretton Woods system and the international development order in the era of Pax Americana, backed by the world's largest economy and military. The US has continued to provide, by some distance, the most significant funding for humanitarian assistance and development programming. For instance, in 2024, the US provided USD 2.49bn to the UNHCR, making up around 20% of the agency's total budget. The Horn, too, is particularly dependent on Washington's funding. The US is the largest humanitarian and developmental assistance provider for nearly every nation in the region, including Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia.
Much of this aid may be restored in the coming weeks as the laborious task of reviewing all programmes and whether they align with a poorly prescribed 'America First' nationalist ideology is undertaken. What has been stated, though, is that anything related to the green energy transition and climate crisis, which the Horn is highly vulnerable to, as well as gender and family planning, is unlikely to be restored. Programmes are still able to apply for waivers for funding to be continued, and some have been approved, but these are few and far between, and the scale of the suspension remains immense. The speed at which the Trump administration has moved– and its apparent ease with the innumerable consequences of the suspension-- encapsulates the new government's agenda. Overnight, the US has upended the awkward foreign policy of the departed Biden administration, which preached human rights to Moscow while continuing to arm Israel. It was nevertheless the pre-eminent financier of development through traditional channels.
In turn, the US's dramatic retreat from the development space signifies a shift towards a far more conspicuous international realpolitik, with 'American interests' at its heart. For Marco Rubio, in a press statement on 22 January, this was centred around three questions, "Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?" No US taxpayer's dollars will go towards anything that does not align with these vague principles, but it can be presumed that funding for civil society groups or democratic organisations is unlikely to be restored. Instead, Steve Witkoff– the new Middle East envoy– has already stated that reviving the Abraham Accords is one of its top foreign policy priorities. This was the normalisation of relations between a number of Arab countries, including Sudan, though never ratified, and Israel during the first Trump administration. Other objectives include a more forceful anti-China stance and resolving the rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, as was the case during the first Trump administration, many of the foreign policy priorities in the next four years could appear on a whim.
There are plenty of critiques of the international aid system and the US's contribution to it, including issues of dependence and bureaucratisation. It is not solely out of the goodness of the US's heart that the humanitarian and development programmes have been sustained. It has provided immense soft power, kept countries within the American orbit, and aligned with Washington's foreign policy agendas, including the War on Terror post-2001. There are also domestic interests at play, such as the surplus grain from Kansas farmers supplying the World Food Programme. But it is also true that many of these programmes have done an immense amount of good around the world, feeding, educating, and housing millions of people.
Few programmes or organisations can easily weather a 90-day budget suspension, particularly in the harsh development funding environment. Key personnel are likely to be lost with programmes and organisations already shuttering operations, unsure when or if their support will be restored from USAID. And the brutal suspension comes amid a broader trend of European nations also cutting or freezing their foreign aid budgets.
In Kenya, despite the elevation of the East African country to a 'Major Non-NATO Ally', the suspension is also expected to hit businesses. Deals on renewables and promises of a supported green energy transition after the visit of President William Ruto to Washington in 2024 are likely to be slashed or not renewed-- hitting an already struggling economy. Kenya and others in sub-Saharan Africa are also certain to be impacted by the sweeping changes to family planning and healthcare programmes.
Somalia's federal government, meanwhile, is also highly dependent on US largesse, with two countries agreeing on a USD 68.5 million development assistance grant last October, intended to address a host of issues, including governance reforms, health, education, and the empowerment of women and youth. The Republican party is expected to be less sympathetic to the USD billions that have been sunk into Somalia and the limited progress to show for it. For Ethiopia, the consequences are also expected to be significant– with the country receiving USD 1.2bn in assistance in 2024, the most in Africa. That includes USD 118 million for food security, USD 85 million for health programmes, and USD 67 million for agriculture.
Beijing and Moscow are both waiting in the wings for any further withdrawal of the US influence from the African continent. Their modus operandi may be different, but both China and Russia are motivated by a desire to undermine US supremacy and the efficacy of sanctions against their regimes. This, too, remains in the interest of nominal US allies, including the UAE, which is part of the BRICS multilateral coalition posing a challenge to the liberal international order. The suspension should also be placed into the broader context of a retreating US that has ceded significant decision-making and interest in the Horn to its favoured allies in the Gulf, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The suspension of aid is the latest piece of the roiling shifts to an increasingly multi-polar world. The dust has yet to settle, but the consequences are already being keenly felt by communities and left projects scrambling across the Horn.
By the Horn Edition Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.