Issue No. 65

Published 23 Jan 2025

The Abyei Dispute Resurfaces-- Again

Published on 23 Jan 2025 21:54 min

The Abyei Dispute Resurfaces-- Again

On 6 January, South Sudan's First Vice President, Riek Machar, received a report from the Administrative Assembly of Abyei. The report-- presented by the region's Chief Administrator Dr Chol Deng Alak-- was an endorsement of a boycotted referendum in 2013, which showed overwhelming support by the Ngok Dinka majority for Abyei's integration into South Sudan. Promising to deliver it to the executive and parliament, Machar has signalled that despite having initially condemned the plebiscite, Juba may now use it to justify formally integrating the oil-rich region. With Sudan mired in a civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Juba appears to be capitalising on its neighbour's vacuum.

Abyei's status has long been a flashpoint in the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. While historically occupied by the agro-pastoralist and animistic Ngok Dinka, the Misseriya Arab Muslim community, part of the nomadic transnational Baggarat, have also spent half the year grazing their cattle in the Bahr river basin for decades. Since the colonial occupation of Sudan, these two communities have been associated with the 'north' and 'south' of the country, but the withdrawal of the British in 1956 left the status of Abyei unresolved. During the First Sudanese Civil War (1956-72), the Ngok Dinka became firmly aligned with the rebel Anyanya movement in the south and the Misseriya with Khartoum. State-sponsored retaliatory massacres and violence-- particularly against the Ngok Dinka-- played a major role in the deterioration of inter-communal relations. At the end of the war, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement included a clause offering a referendum to resolve the contested status of Abyei, but it was never held.

Decades later, another referendum to resolve the 'Abyei question' was outlined in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that resolved the Second Sudanese Civil War. However, wrangling over the area, its borders, and oil production would continue for several years, coming to a head in 2007-2008 and threatening to derail the national peace process amid eruptions of significant violence. Eventually, a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague on the borders of Abyei was agreed upon by both Khartoum and the SPLM in 2009, and a demilitarised zone had to be implemented by the UN in 2011. The only international peacekeepers currently in Sudan today are deployed in Abyei. In the interim, Abyei would be officially part of both Sudan and South Sudan, with the Abyei Area Administration overseeing it. Though this was only intended to be a temporary measure, the status remains unchanged.

The CPA referendum on Abyei- whether it be part of South Kordofan or Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan- was originally to be held concurrently with the South Sudanese independence referendum in January 2011, but this was also delayed. Disagreements between Khartoum and Juba authorities were mainly concerned about whether the Misseriya tribe should be allowed to participate. After the successful independence referendum, the African Union proposed holding the Abyei referendum in October 2013 and excluding the Misseriya, but this was also derailed by threats by the Omar al-Bashir regime.

Nevertheless, a non-binding referendum in October 2013 was conducted, with the Ngok Dinka-- the only group to vote-- overwhelmingly backing independence from Sudan and integration with South Sudan. This was also, in part, a result of the redrawn Abyei borders in 2009 that excluded Misseriya communities. The plebiscite was boycotted by the Arab tribe and lacked endorsement from the African Union, the United Nations, Sudan, and South Sudan, and was subsequently deemed invalid. At the time, Juba faced its own challenges, including political instability that erupted into civil war just two months after the referendum.

Since then, disagreements over voter eligibility, geopolitical rivalries, and local violence have repeatedly derailed the process of resolving the administering of Abyei. The region's strategic importance as an oil-rich territory has further complicated efforts to reach a permanent resolution, leaving the roughly 120,000 residents of Abyei unrepresented and trapped in cyclical conflict. Fighting between the Twic and Ngok Dinka militias remains a major issue, as the latter insist they should control the entirety of Abyei. The lack of a demarcated border between Abyei and the Twic lands is a particular problem, and tensions have spilt over into significant inter-communal violence. Dozens have been killed in the intermittent violence of recent months.

Efforts to resolve Abyei's status through dialogue have also remained stagnant. For nearly 14 years, the UN-backed process aimed at fostering cooperation between Juba and Khartoum has been stymied by mutual distrust and periodic violence. Abyei's communities, mired in poverty despite the region's oil wealth, have borne the brunt of this impasse. Essentially stateless and vulnerable, the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities face constant threats from inter-communal clashes.

With Sudan embroiled in conflict, Abyei's Dinka majority likely view this moment as an opportunity to realise their long-standing goal of integration with South Sudan. For Juba, this aligns with its own strategic interests, as Abyei's oil reserves, though depleted, could provide much-needed revenue for the cash-strapped government. Yet Diffra is the only active oil field in Abyei and is under the Sudanese army's control. Oil transport has only just resumed from South Sudan after nearly a year of disruption to the arterial Greater Nile Oil Pipeline that runs to Port Sudan through Abyei. Though SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan travelled to Juba in December to discuss oil cooperation with the Salva Kiir government, among other issues, Abyei's resource wealth may present a tempting target for Juba. 

Machar's acceptance of the 2013 referendum reflects a calculated policy shift driven by both immediate political/financial concerns and long-term strategic goals. However, any move for formal integration without careful consensus between all stakeholders is likely to sharpen faultlines and further destabilise the volatile region. Reaching that consensus with Khartoum in ruins, the Misseriya comprising a core constituency of the RSF against the army, and deteriorating SAF-Juba relations over recent targeted violence towards South Sudanese in Gezira is no small demand. With stakes so high, a referendum rejected over a decade ago should not be used as the basis for integrating one of the most historically contentious regions. Juba would be better placed to focus its energies on resolving and shoring up the numerous and tense agreements that comprise its fragile governing coalition.

By the Horn Edition Team 

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