Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottoman Diplomacy in Sudan
Mediation in the Sudan war may soon become the latest theatre in which an increasingly assertive and independent Türkiye inserts itself. Fresh from its major geopolitical coup in Syria, with its allied Islamist rebel forces toppling Iranian-backed dictator Bashar al-Assad, as well as the negotiated Somalia-Ethiopia 'Ankara Declaration,' Türkiye then offered to reconcile the "differences between Sudan and the UAE" in December. With Abu Dhabi and now senior Sudanese military officials tentatively accepting the offer, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman foreign policy across the Middle East and Red Sea arena appears to be going from strength to strength.
In the immediate days following the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, Erdoğan spoke with both Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Commander General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohamed Dagalo 'Hemedti' separately and urged that "brotherly blood should not be shed in Sudan." The calls fell on deaf ears, and over 20 months later, the war in Sudan has wrought immense destruction to the country, killing tens of thousands of people and displacing millions. Ankara was also among the first to offer to mediate between the two principal belligerents, though it was not included in the US-Saudi-led Jeddah track that has repeatedly failed to halt the fighting or facilitate humanitarian aid delivery. Despite the immense humanitarian catastrophe and famine unfurling in Sudan, there remain no public plans for further talks under these auspices amid the political transition in Washington.
While ostensibly neutral, since April 2023, Ankara has unsurprisingly largely fallen behind the Sudanese military, hosting al-Burhan in Ankara twice and dispatching some munitions to the SAF. The latest offer to host talks between the UAE and Sudan frames the conflict as one between two sovereign states-- rather than warring generals or a legitimate government and a rogue rebel force. The SAF has repeatedly accused Abu Dhabi of being the RSF's puppet master, and though the UAE has denied supporting the paramilitaries, several Emirati soldiers were killed in a military airstrike in Nyala last year. The extent of the UAE's support and the scale of its influence within the paramilitary's leadership has been debated, but the Gulf state has come under some pressure to wield its influence over the RSF. Ankara's invitation of Sudan and the UAE for talks is arguably a tacit acceptance of this framing of the conflict rather than one of the RSF and SAF as two equals.
Both al-Burhan and military-appointed Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef have reacted positively to Türkiye's offer in the New Year. Following a meeting between al-Burhan and Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Burhanettin Duran in Port Sudan on 4 January, Youssef stated that "Sudan needs brothers and friends like Türkiye," and the initiative could "lead to real efforts to achieve peace in Sudan." Whether the talks can make any headway remains to be seen, and there are several major obstacles to progress towards any significant ceasefire, not least that neither SAF nor RSF have shown serious indication they are currently prepared to negotiate for different reasons. Though the conditions for a broad and coherent peace settlement remain overwhelmingly absent, these talks could go someway to limiting the flood of weapons into Sudan and establish some parameters for future Emirati engagement. Moreover, it is worth looking at Ankara's own interests and historical relationship with Sudan in the context of any future negotiations and its increasingly muscular foreign policy.
Between 1820 and 1885, Sudan was nominally included within the Ottoman Empire, though administered largely by Egyptians, with the period often referred to as 'the Turkiyya' by Sudanese. Though known as the period of Turkish rule, Constantinople actually projected far less influence into Sudan than Cairo or London in the 19th century and only in the 21st century became a major player in Khartoum's politics. Still, one helpful lens to understand today's conflict emerged during Sudan's state formation in the 19th century, where frontier capitalists and mercenaries backed by capital from Europe, the Middle East, Türkiye, and Egypt established empires of plunder across the Sahel. It formed the predatory, exploitative dynamics from the Riverain to Sudan's peripheries that have dominated ever since. Much like today, the pillaging of Sudan's resources, be it livestock, gold, or people, resulted in immense humanitarian consequences. Though the scale of the violence today dwarfs what has come before, armed conflict has been the norm-- not the exception-- in Sudan's history.
Ottoman and modern-day Türkiye's particular interest has lain not just in Sudan's arable land but also in its strategic position on the Red Sea. The Ottomans ruled parts of Somalia and modern-day Yemen from the 16th century onwards, historic ties that both Ankara and Mogadishu have been keen to emphasise in recent months. And again, influence over the Red Sea, and by extension, the littoral administrations on both sides of the waterway, has become one of the defining features of the region's politics, now principally being fought over by Gulf states as well as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.
It was also during the Ottoman period that the Turks came to control the port of Suakin, located just 50 km to the north of Port Sudan, with much of the city's buildings constructed from rock coral. As part of Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman foreign policy, Ankara negotiated a 99-year lease of Suakin Island with the former Omar al-Bashir regime to rehabilitate the port city, with work beginning in January 2018. This agreement served several purposes for Türkiye, not least the renovation of a formerly glorious city in the Ottoman Empire by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIDA).
Yet just a couple of months after the work began, Khartoum and Doha signed another parallel agreement– that the Qataris would invest USD 4bn to develop Suakin's port, with Türkiye also reportedly interested in establishing a furtive military foothold. At that time, the close alliance between the Islamist bedfellows of Ankara and Doha provoked concern within the Gulf and Egypt amid the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis that erupted in 2017. Then, it was Riyadh and Abu Dhabi attempting to isolate Qatar, but it is the Saudi-Emirati schism that since emerged which is playing out destructively across Sudan today. The recently thawing relations between Egypt and Türkiye are also significant, with both siding with the SAF and looking to counterbalance the Iranian influence with the military.
Türkiye's relationship with Sudan has encompassed more than just neo-Ottoman nostalgia in recent years; it has also included important economic and ideological dimensions. Following the collapse of the al-Bashir government in 2019, several prominent regime figures fled to Türkiye, including the notorious former Foreign Minister and influential Islamist Ali Ahmed Karti. Erdoğan's own political party, the Justice and Development Party, is Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated and has shown no qualms about engaging with Islamist political actors in a host of countries.
Economically, Turkish businesses had also become significant in Khartoum, particularly after reciprocal visits by Erdoğan to Khartoum and al-Bashir to Istanbul in December 2017 and May 2018, respectively. During these visits, the two presidents pledged to raise bilateral trade to USD 1bn and signed a dozen cooperation agreements, including concerning agriculture and oil. These improving trade ties largely continued amidst the domestic political fallout from the October 2021 coup and deteriorating SAF-RSF relations, though Ankara retreated somewhat politically. By April 2023, thousands of Turkish citizens were living in Khartoum, often working in furniture and design businesses serving the country's middle classes. Ankara's interest in reviving several energy and mining projects that had stalled prior to the war may also be somewhat motivating the latest engagement with SAF.
The proposed SAF-UAE talks are the latest prime example of how Ankara is seeking to position itself as a pre-eminent independent political force in the Horn of Africa. Steered by Erdoğan, it is highly personalised and has combined Türkiye's political, military, and economic clout with significant consequences. But Ankara's geopolitical influence is not infinite, and Erdoğan's own popularity at home has also waned. Leaving this aside and regarding the mediation offer in Sudan, it is critical that if they do go ahead, it does not simply become another peace track that crowds the mediation space and allows the SAF to continue avoiding engaging seriously in ceasefire discussions. Pressure should be applied to SAF and the UAE to address humanitarian concerns and civilian protection, but these are unlikely to be the main considerations for either party or Ankara. Nor will the question of human rights or a democratic transition likely be on the table, with the Emirati's support for the RSF and economic ties probably dominating any talks. Ultimately, Türkiye’s mediation offer in Sudan serves less as a genuine path to peace and more as a strategic manoeuvre to consolidate its influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
By the Horn Edition Team
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