Issue No. 4

 
The conflict in Sudan is entering its 6th month. And as the fighting continues and spreads across the country, the risk of the conflict fragmenting further grows. While the battlelines in and around Khartoum are generally drawn along territory controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), elsewhere, armed clashes and violence have taken on stark ethnic and tribal dimensions. As the conflict has dragged on, the SAF and RSF have turned to other armed groups to shore up their positions as they expend vast quantities of weapons, money and personnel. But many of these alliances are fragile and may collapse or divide if these militia sense a change in the war’s direction or violently seek their own seat at the eventual negotiating table.
 
The eruption of violence in Khartoum on 15 April was a sharp change from the periphery-based conflict that has characterised post-independence Sudan. But it was not long before familiar trends emerged. Shortly after the conflict began, signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) from 2020 began to mobilise. Several Darfur-based armed groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement under Minni Minnawi, the governor of Darfur, formed a joint force ostensibly to protect civilians and escort humanitarian convoys.
 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- North (SPLM-N), a legacy of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Army, has also reared its head just three years after the armed group signed a peace agreement. Led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, it has clashed with the SAF in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State after vowing to free the region from “military occupation” in June. Fighting has continued, and the SPLM-N has captured several towns and oil fields in South Kordofan. In recent weeks, however, reports have surfaced that the SAF met with SPLM-N, offering several guarantees in return for military support, including limiting the role of Islamists from government institutions.
 
New armed militia are also emerging from the chaos, with significant variations between their makeup and ideological affiliation. In September, a new group called the ‘Sudanese Popular Resistance Factions’ declared its aim to “liberate Khartoum” from the RSF and released several videos of its fighters near Omdurman. While its name resembles the resistance committees that helped topple Omar al-Bashir in the 2019 Revolution, this militia shares seemingly little with the non-violent civilian resistance networks.
 
The fracturing has not been limited to western Sudan and Khartoum, however. On 18 September, armed clashes between SAF soldiers and fighters from local Beja militias broke out. While the confrontations soon subsided and Port Sudan still serves as a hub for humanitarian coordination and Sudan’s military officials, the incident demonstrated how the conflict is reigniting historical divisions.
 
The recruitment tactics of the SAF and particularly the RSF are also heralding the return of ethnic and tribal conflict. The SAF has begun recruiting heavily from groups in eastern Sudan following Hemedti’s threats to expand the combat’s theatre. The SAF secured the support of leaders from the Hausa ethnic group, who reportedly pledged 50,000 fighters. Several armed Islamist groups are also reportedly fighting alongside the SAF in Khartoum and elsewhere.
 
The RSF is also far from a uniform body, accentuated by its return to its Janjaweed roots. It has recruited and mobilised thousands of fighters from Arab militias and tribal leaders in Darfur and Kordofan. RSF fighters often overlap with Arab militias, such as the Salamat and Beni Halba forces, who were deployed to Khartoum in August. But this brings its own complications for the paramilitary group, with reports of RSF units fighting each other along tribal lines.
 
The grim mobilisation of these Arab militias has driven a resurgence of ethnic-based attacks in Darfur, particularly targeting members of the Masalit tribe. El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, saw thousands brutally killed between April and June. Hundreds of thousands have been driven from their homes. With old faultlines and genocidal tactics resurfacing in Darfur, the prospect of the region’s total collapse, as happened in 2003-04, is growing ever more likely.
  
The fragmented nature of Sudan’s security architecture is the legacy of Omar al-Bashir’s attempts to ‘coup-proof’ his regime. Halting the fighting is a daunting enough task, and it is being made infinitely more complex by the splintering armed factions. So far, the peace initiatives have been largely lacklustre and self-interested. Each temporary ceasefire, largely negotiated by Saudi Arabia and the United States in Jeddah, has been broken. Forming a single, coherent peace initiative and halting the guns must be the international community's priority, but there should be no doubt about the magnitude of the task. Who should be at the table when these talks eventually happen presents another threat entirely.