Issue No. 28

Published 28 Mar 2024

Destruction in Sudan's Forgotten War

Published on 28 Mar 2024 16:12 min

Destruction in Sudan's Forgotten War

A year of armed conflict and destruction in Sudan is fast approaching. Since violence erupted on 15 April 2023, the war has been principally fought between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). With international attention overwhelmingly focused on Gaza and Ukraine, the world's largest humanitarian crisis continues to spiral as the war spreads further, with El Fasher in North Darfur now under threat. Indiscriminate violence, widespread looting, aid restrictions, sexual violence, mass displacement, and severe food shortages have exacted an unbearable humanitarian toll. It has become, as described by a senior United Nations official, "truly the stuff of nightmares."
 
At the beginning of 2024, the RSF was on the front foot– politically and militarily. It had seized swathes of central Sudan in December 2023, routing poorly-trained recruits in Wad Madani and elsewhere before RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' embarked on a regional tour in a bid to repair his tarnished image. The imminent collapse of the SAF and an RSF march on the army's stronghold in Port Sudan were being touted as military officials refused to negotiate with their paramilitary rivals. In recent weeks, though, following an injection of Mohajer-6 drones from Iran, the SAF wrested control of the symbolic National Radio and Television Corporation complex in Omdurman from the RSF. The arrival of yet another Middle Eastern power into the armed conflict further complicates the complex geo-strategic dynamics being played out in Sudan. Still, while the RSF has been forced to withdraw from parts of Khartoum and Omdurman, it is gaining ground in El Fasher, North Darfur's regional capital. SAF has continued striking RSF positions on the city's outskirts amid growing fears that violence could soon engulf El Fasher.
 
The change in fortunes of the two belligerents has made hopes of a ceasefire even more distant. The SAF command has been emboldened by its recent string of victories after losing ground for the best part of a year, as well as the recent promise of Minni Minnawi's Sudanese Liberation Army joining them. Before Ramadan, Lieutenant General Yasir Al-Atta, deputy commander of the Sudanese army, rebuffed calls for a ceasefire during the holy month, continuing to attach unachievable conditions for any truce. These conditions include the withdrawal of RSF from occupied cities in Darfur and Kordofan, their departure from Khartoum, and the handover of "looted items." Recent comments by senior military officials have been even more hardline, rejecting any possibility of a return to a power-sharing military-civilian government. SAF Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, sensing victory over the RSF in Khartoum, is seemingly intent on re-establishing military control under the guise of "technocratic government".
 
There's currently little hope for any ceasefire in Sudan, with neither Hemedti nor al-Burhan seriously interested in halting their forces. The US Special Envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, announced on 26 March that the US is pushing for peace negotiations in Sudan to resume by 18 April. But whenever negotiations do appear to be imminent, the belligerents either refuse to participate, or the party that perceives itself as being in a position of strength tends to present unreasonable demands. In recent weeks, rumours of negotiations and talks in Switzerland, Libya, and Turkey have come and gone with no tangible results.
 
Nor is the spiralling humanitarian crisis convincing the RSF or SAF that a cessation of hostilities is urgent. Indeed, both sides have been repeatedly accused of weaponising food and humanitarian aid for their own purpose. Just this week, the RSF rejected a new aid route agreed upon by the army and United Nations agencies that would deliver relief into Darfur through SAF-controlled territory. For months, the army's Humanitarian Aid Commission had repeatedly refused to allow life-saving aid to cross the internal frontlines and from Chad into Darfur. Partial access has now been agreed upon, but with only 4% of the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan funded, it will only get so far.
 
With 11 million people displaced, harvests have been left to rot in fields and warehouses, and food supply chains have been entirely disrupted. The imminent dry season is sure to compound the growing risk of famine, with 18 million people already at risk of acute hunger and malnutrition-- 37% of Sudan's pre-war population. In the absence of large-scale international humanitarian aid delivery, community-led initiatives such as the Emergency Response Rooms have emerged to a degree of success. But these responses are a drop in the proverbial ocean to the amount of aid urgently required in the coming months. For many, it is already too late.
 
All the while, heinous human rights violations continue to be committed across the country, particularly by the RSF. An extensive nationwide communications blackout that lasted days in late February 2024, blamed on the RSF, proved calamitous for aid delivery into Khartoum. When telecommunications and the internet were eventually restored, though they still remain patchy or severed in Darfur, more reports of rape and sexual violence against women and girls emerged. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk has described sexual violence as a "defining – and despicable – characteristic of this crisis since the beginning." Although both sides have been accused of using rape and sexual violence as a tool of war, the RSF has been particularly associated with this in Darfur. The paramilitaries have also forcibly recruited child soldiers in the region, exploiting the 'faza'a' custom that calls on communities to demonstrate support in times of crisis.
 
Overshadowed by the crisis in Gaza, Sudan's belligerents and their international backers have avoided concerted international pressure and scrutiny. For instance, repeated obstructing of humanitarian aid delivery, illegal under International Humanitarian Law, has barely elicited a response. It is not to deny the horrors of Gaza and Ukraine to insist that a similar humanitarian standard and political attention should be paid to Sudan. The arrival of the US special envoy has been welcomed, but with so many competing peace tracks, the belligerents have been able to shop around for their preferred venue and rely on support from their international backers. Still, even though the domestic and international complications of the conflict are immense, the total collapse of Sudan is surely not in the interests of the SAF's and RSF's various African and Arab allies. If talks are to resume in Jeddah in the coming weeks, a key element will be convincing the Gulf capitals with leverage over the warring parties to come to the table with productive proposals.

By the Horn Edition team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Scroll