Destruction in Sudan's Forgotten War
A year of armed conflict and destruction in Sudan is fast approaching. Since violence erupted on 15 April 2023, the war has been principally fought between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). With international attention overwhelmingly focused on Gaza and Ukraine, the world's largest humanitarian crisis continues to spiral as the war spreads further, with El Fasher in North Darfur now under threat. Indiscriminate violence, widespread looting, aid restrictions, sexual violence, mass displacement, and severe food shortages have exacted an unbearable humanitarian toll. It has become, as described by a senior United Nations official, "truly the stuff of nightmares."
At the beginning of 2024, the RSF was on the front foot– politically and militarily. It had seized swathes of central Sudan in December 2023, routing poorly-trained recruits in Wad Madani and elsewhere before RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' embarked on a regional tour in a bid to repair his tarnished image. The imminent collapse of the SAF and an RSF march on the army's stronghold in Port Sudan were being touted as military officials refused to negotiate with their paramilitary rivals. In recent weeks, though, following an injection of Mohajer-6 drones from Iran, the SAF wrested control of the symbolic National Radio and Television Corporation complex in Omdurman from the RSF. The arrival of yet another Middle Eastern power into the armed conflict further complicates the complex geo-strategic dynamics being played out in Sudan. Still, while the RSF has been forced to withdraw from parts of Khartoum and Omdurman, it is gaining ground in El Fasher, North Darfur's regional capital. SAF has continued striking RSF positions on the city's outskirts amid growing fears that violence could soon engulf El Fasher.
The change in fortunes of the two belligerents has made hopes of a ceasefire even more distant. The SAF command has been emboldened by its recent string of victories after losing ground for the best part of a year, as well as the recent promise of Minni Minnawi's Sudanese Liberation Army joining them. Before Ramadan, Lieutenant General Yasir Al-Atta, deputy commander of the Sudanese army, rebuffed calls for a ceasefire during the holy month, continuing to attach unachievable conditions for any truce. These conditions include the withdrawal of RSF from occupied cities in Darfur and Kordofan, their departure from Khartoum, and the handover of "looted items." Recent comments by senior military officials have been even more hardline, rejecting any possibility of a return to a power-sharing military-civilian government. SAF Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, sensing victory over the RSF in Khartoum, is seemingly intent on re-establishing military control under the guise of "technocratic government".
There's currently little hope for any ceasefire in Sudan, with neither Hemedti nor al-Burhan seriously interested in halting their forces. The US Special Envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, announced on 26 March that the US is pushing for peace negotiations in Sudan to resume by 18 April. But whenever negotiations do appear to be imminent, the belligerents either refuse to participate, or the party that perceives itself as being in a position of strength tends to present unreasonable demands. In recent weeks, rumours of negotiations and talks in Switzerland, Libya, and Turkey have come and gone with no tangible results.
Nor is the spiralling humanitarian crisis convincing the RSF or SAF that a cessation of hostilities is urgent. Indeed, both sides have been repeatedly accused of weaponising food and humanitarian aid for their own purpose. Just this week, the RSF rejected a new aid route agreed upon by the army and United Nations agencies that would deliver relief into Darfur through SAF-controlled territory. For months, the army's Humanitarian Aid Commission had repeatedly refused to allow life-saving aid to cross the internal frontlines and from Chad into Darfur. Partial access has now been agreed upon, but with only 4% of the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan funded, it will only get so far.
With 11 million people displaced, harvests have been left to rot in fields and warehouses, and food supply chains have been entirely disrupted. The imminent dry season is sure to compound the growing risk of famine, with 18 million people already at risk of acute hunger and malnutrition-- 37% of Sudan's pre-war population. In the absence of large-scale international humanitarian aid delivery, community-led initiatives such as the Emergency Response Rooms have emerged to a degree of success. But these responses are a drop in the proverbial ocean to the amount of aid urgently required in the coming months. For many, it is already too late.
All the while, heinous human rights violations continue to be committed across the country, particularly by the RSF. An extensive nationwide communications blackout that lasted days in late February 2024, blamed on the RSF, proved calamitous for aid delivery into Khartoum. When telecommunications and the internet were eventually restored, though they still remain patchy or severed in Darfur, more reports of rape and sexual violence against women and girls emerged. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk has described sexual violence as a "defining – and despicable – characteristic of this crisis since the beginning." Although both sides have been accused of using rape and sexual violence as a tool of war, the RSF has been particularly associated with this in Darfur. The paramilitaries have also forcibly recruited child soldiers in the region, exploiting the 'faza'a' custom that calls on communities to demonstrate support in times of crisis.
Overshadowed by the crisis in Gaza, Sudan's belligerents and their international backers have avoided concerted international pressure and scrutiny. For instance, repeated obstructing of humanitarian aid delivery, illegal under International Humanitarian Law, has barely elicited a response. It is not to deny the horrors of Gaza and Ukraine to insist that a similar humanitarian standard and political attention should be paid to Sudan. The arrival of the US special envoy has been welcomed, but with so many competing peace tracks, the belligerents have been able to shop around for their preferred venue and rely on support from their international backers. Still, even though the domestic and international complications of the conflict are immense, the total collapse of Sudan is surely not in the interests of the SAF's and RSF's various African and Arab allies. If talks are to resume in Jeddah in the coming weeks, a key element will be convincing the Gulf capitals with leverage over the warring parties to come to the table with productive proposals.
By the Horn Edition team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Delegates from Somalia's influential Darood clan family are currently gathering in Nairobi, Kenya, for a crucial "pre-conference" planning session. Driven largely by clan chiefs, the meeting is designed to formulate a unified strategy and coordinate responses to ‘fundamental issues’ (arrimo masiiri ah) within Somalia, principally centre-periphery tensions and the future of federalism. The anticipated culmination of these talks is a comprehensive Pan-Darood congress in Garowe. This development represents a rare and significant intervention, serving as a clear indicator of accelerating political polarisation and fragmentation.
Technicians and engineers have long been familiar with a paradoxical problem: how the repair of a specific defect often triggers a secondary malfunction. "Repair-induced malfunction" is a widely recognised dilemma across technical professions, with awareness and mitigation deeply woven into standard training.
I stand before you today with profound respect and appreciation for the sacrifices the sons and daughters of your countries have made in the AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM missions to help their African brothers and sisters in Somalia fight the scourge of Al-Shabaab, open and maintain critical trade routes, and help in the state-building process of Somalia.
Somalia’s opposition - frustrated by months of stagnant dialogue - has for the first time proposed a transitional mechanism to break the country's protracted political deadlock. In an open letter addressed to a crucial extraordinary summit of African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) which opened on Wednesday in Kampala, the Somali Future Council (SFC) said that a new transitional governance arrangement was vital and necessary and is hoping the initiative will gain traction among regional actors who have boots on the ground and share a vested interest in a durable political settlement.
In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).