Kenyan police in Haiti: A sensible pause
The context of a multinational force with a complex mandate, a struggling state, and Kenyan security forces could easily refer to Somalia. This time, however, it also applies to Haiti. Gang violence and engrained poverty have plagued the country for years but rapidly escalated following the assassination of President Joveni Moïse in 2021. Over 350,000 people are internally displaced, with Haiti's public institutions in disarray or entirely broken. In 2023 alone, according to a UN report, over 4,789 people were murdered and 2,490 kidnapped, primarily by brutal criminal gangs that control 80% of the capital, Port-au-Prince.
In July 2023, Nairobi offered to deploy 1,000 police officers to the troubled Caribbean nation to lead a multinational force that would restore some stability. The United States has vocally backed Nairobi, offering to underwrite most of the deployment costs, and the United Nations Security Council approved the mission in October 2023. Months of court delays and domestic pressure in Kenya, however, delayed their arrival as Haiti slipped further into chaos. In late February 2024, Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry departed for Nairobi in a bid to reach an agreement for the forces to deploy to the Caribbean. His departure proved fatal for Henry's position; as soon as he departed, criminal gangs broke 4,000 inmates out of prison, marauded through the capital, and laid siege to the international airport. Under pressure and unable to return to Port-au-Prince, Henry resigned on 12 March.
The Kenyan government subsequently declared that the police officers would not be sent to Haiti until a new, transitional government was in place, at which point Nairobi would then reassess. With Haiti rupturing from within amid horrific scenes, 1,000 Kenyan police forces, albeit as part of a wider multinational force, increasingly seems like a drop in the bucket to restore stability. In 2023 alone, 1,600 Haitian police officers resigned. And those who remain have been accused of complicity in the violence and immense corruption. Indeed, two of the principal men leading the escalation of violence from differing gang factions, Jimmy 'Barbecue' Chérizier and Guy Phillippe, were former police officers. Haitian police have just 10,000 active personnel– far below the UN estimates that they will need around 26,000 to restore a degree of security.
The Kenyan military has plenty of experience in dealing with complex, asymmetric warzones in Somalia under the auspices of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), but the Haitian context is wildly different. It is the Kenyan police, not the Kenyan Defence Forces, that would deploy to Haiti, and while they do have a degree of experience in dealing with Nairobi's urban criminals, Haiti's patchwork and brutal gangs are at another level. The gangs are not the only armed forces Kenyan police would likely have to contend with-- vigilante paramilitaries are also notorious for their wanton violence. Nairobi would have to negotiate logistical and political support for their deployment half the way around the world, not a 90-minute flight to Somalia from Kenyan soil. The cultural differences are also hard to ignore. Somalia shares several similarities with Kenya, not least in terms of combating the scourge of Al-Shabaab. The cultural context is radically different in Haiti, with Creole and French as the predominant languages spoken. While Kenyan police officers have reportedly undergone language lessons, the nuances are complex and foreign.
The history of foreign deployments in Haiti is also a chequered one. Brazil, Canada, and the US have all sent security forces to Haiti since the 2000s with varying degrees of success. Washington's push for a country from the 'Global South' to lead the multinational deployment was partly a response to the controversies that had engulfed these operations. While the Brazil-led operations between 2004 and 2017 managed to pacify areas in Haiti, the nation's population grew increasingly dissatisfied with the government's inability to provide a decent quality of life. Attempts to train the perennially corrupt police force got nowhere, with the final nail in the coffin a devastating cholera outbreak that killed nearly 10,000 Haitians. While Kenya will likely receive global praise and domestic Haitian support upon deployment, embroiling itself in an immensely complex conflict with a difficult mandate and a limited one-year initial timeframe could expose it to backlash.
One of the UN stipulations in October 2023 for the multinational deployment was to build towards 'credible elections.' A tall ask in October, the prospect of credible elections is now a pipe dream, with polls having not been held since 2016. The resignation of the deeply unpopular Henry has done little to ameliorate the deteriorating security situation. 'Mission creep,' where operations are forced to grow to respond to unforeseen threats, could well be on the cards. All the more reason to reassess as Nairobi has chosen to do, take stock of a rapidly evolving situation and perhaps demand a more realistic mandate given the current context.
Kenyan President William Ruto has called the operation a "mission of humanity" and part of a wider reframing of Kenyan foreign policy to push for a more proactive role in the Global South. It is also part of the broader picture of deepening bilateral ties between the US and Kenya. Washington has increasingly relied on Kenya to bring a degree of stability to the Horn in recent years, with high-level visits of US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and First Lady Jill Biden taking place in 2023. President Ruto is also set to visit Washington in May 2024 for a state visit-- the first African leader to receive the honour since US President Joe Biden assumed office in 2021. With the US having now pledged another USD 100 million to the mission's coffers, the prospect of a significant influx of foreign exchange for Kenya is certainly attractive.
If Nairobi continues with the multinational mission once a transitional government is in place, the operation's elements could be tweaked to reflect the shifting context. For instance, rather than directly deploying into the current chaos of Port-au-Prince, Kenyan police officers could deploy into the city's environs in the first instance. Most critical, though, will be whether Nairobi can rely on a willing partner in whatever government or administration emerges in Haiti. Working with one that is in cahoots with the criminal gangs or uninterested in credible governance will only doom the mission before it has begun. Waiting and seeing, as Kenya has decided to do, rather than ploughing into the fire, is surely the correct course of action.
By the Horn Edition team
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