Elections in South Sudan: Time is running out
South Sudan's elections scheduled for December 2024 are fast approaching-- and already face several major crises. In recent weeks, influential politicians, including First Vice-President Riek Machar, have signalled their intention not to contest the repeatedly delayed national elections-- the country's first since independence in 2011. The failure to draft and approve a provisional constitution, unify the country's splintered military forces, and deep political schisms are coming to a head, with the prospect of peaceful and credible democratic elections appearing increasingly unlikely. South Sudanese activist Edmund Yakani has dismissed the government's talk that elections will occur by 2024's end as a "joke."
December's elections were meant to be the conclusion of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Signed in 2018 by the principal belligerents of the civil war that left 400,000 people dead and millions displaced, the peace agreement's implementation has been lacklustre at best. Elections were originally scheduled to be held by August 2022, but South Sudanese President Salva Kiir announced a two-year delay before the agreement's expiry. This extension was to allow, according to Kiir, to "plant the seeds of South Sudan's elections."
Many months have since passed though, with the preparations for the elections still marked by infighting and obstruction. Kiir's party, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), has been repeatedly accused of deliberately undermining the implementation of the R-ARCSS. Key pieces of legislation, including the National Security Service Bill, the Public Finance Management and Accountability Bill, and the National Audit Chamber Bill, have yet to be enacted. Moreover, the institutions responsible for the December elections, including the National Elections Commission, National Constitutional Review Committee, and Political Parties Council, are far from ready, having only been reconstituted in November 2023. These bodies are facing immense and daunting workloads on a limited budget. On 16 February in Addis Ababa, the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan urged for the "redoubling" of efforts to find the necessary resources to enable the constitutional and electoral committees to fulfil their mandates.
In just a few months, these bodies are expected to conduct a national census in a country where millions are displaced, delineate new constituency boundaries, define voter eligibility, and establish regulations for governing the elections. These are weighty endeavours in any country, let alone in South Sudan, where critical political buy-in is so absent. South Sudan's politicians, of whom many command influential armed groups, have shown a repeated willingness to undermine their country's peace and development to ensure their own political future. There are concerns that the instability that the polls may trigger could tip the country back into a protracted conflict, possibly over Dinka-Nuer ethnic lines.
Senior opposition leaders have signalled that they would prefer further extensions to the transitional period over a fraught and destabilising vote. While Kiir has stated his intention to run for president, a position he has held for over a decade, Machar appears to have significant doubts about the viability of the December polls. In a letter to Kiir in early February, Machar highlighted his concerns about the outstanding elements of the revitalised peace agreement. Days later, Machar's party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), announced its decision to withdraw from the December election. At a press conference in Juba, SPLM-IO Deputy Chair Oyet Nathaniel Perino said that the preparations for a "peaceful, transparent, democratic, free, fair, and credible" election have not been met.
Whether the SPLM-IO intends to follow through with its threat remains to be seen, but if it does, the elections face the prospect of being contested without the country's main opposition. Other prominent South Sudanese opposition figures, including Lam Akol and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance led by Josephine Lague, have also called for postponements to the elections. Further delays, though, cannot compel South Sudan's stakeholders to realise the R-ARCSS. This is perhaps why an anonymous US State Department official recently briefed that US sanctions could be on the table if the polls are delayed again or violence erupts.
While armed violence has subsided from the height of the armed conflict between 2013-2018, it persists in large parts of the country. Ethnic-based armed militias routinely attack rural villages and towns, looting cattle and pillaging homes. In turn, cyclical ethnic violence and continuing instability have prevented South Sudan's over 2 million internally displaced persons from returning home. And since the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, over 400,000 South Sudanese refugees have been forced to return to their homeland. The immense poverty and displacement facing South Sudan's population alone make it an extraordinarily challenging electoral environment.
There remains overwhelming civilian support in South Sudan for democratic elections despite the fact that violence is likely on the horizon. Credible, democratic elections would be an extraordinary feat. Sadly, the history of the world's youngest nation suggests this will not be the case. The closer South Sudan edges towards elections, the more political jockeying and manoeuvring by key elites will increase, and the threat of renewed violence will grow. While there are several months to go before the vote, with so much to do, time is quickly running out to lay the groundwork for a potentially historic vote.
By the Horn Edition team
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