Issue No. 21

Mass displacement and limited responses

The causes of human displacement are myriad and complex. So often, reasons overlap, be they related to climate insecurity that propels economic and/or food insecurity, armed conflict, or economic fragility. The key takeaway is a sense of desperation that pushes individuals and families to uproot from their homes. Regional and federal administrations across the Horn of Africa are struggling to respond effectively to the swelling numbers of refugees and IDPs, and the undercurrents that drive social instability.

Across the region, displacement levels continue to surge. In Ethiopia, according to the International Organisation for Migration, over 3.5 million people are internally displaced, including over one million ethnic Tigrayans driven from western Tigray. Refugees account for another one million people, largely Sudanese and South Sudanese, who are sheltered in sprawling camps in western Ethiopia, particularly in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Since April 2023, more than 100,000 Sudanese have crossed into Ethiopia, including close to 47,000 refugees and asylum seekers. 

Unsurprisingly, Sudan's number of total displaced dwarfs its neighbours. From a total population of roughly 50 million, 9 million are internally displaced, and 1.7 million have been forced to flee to neighbouring countries, particularly South Sudan and Chad. On average, 1,500 Sudanese people every day are crossing into South Sudan, with 500,000 already displaced there. The sheer numbers are placing immense pressure on an already impoverished nation and struggling government. Not known for supporting its own population, South Sudan is grappling with how to manage these influxes of vulnerable refugees.

Most large-scale support for refugees and internally displaced persons comes from international organisations, particularly the United Nations, but increasing budgetary constraints and proliferating conflict and humanitarian disasters have slashed its capacity. Yesterday, 7 February, the UN launched a campaign to raise over USD 4 billion to support the internally displaced in Sudan and Sudanese refugees, but the prospects of reaching even close to that goal are slim. Last year, USD 2.5 billion was requested, but the multilateral body reached just 43% of that goal.

Government support for displaced persons is rarely sufficient anywhere in the Horn, due to both lack of financial capacity and political will. Amid an unfriendly macroeconomic climate post-COVID-19 and the Russian armed conflict in Ukraine since 2022, a number of countries are facing bankruptcy if they have not declared it already. In December 2023, Ethiopia was forced to default on a USD 33 million bond payment, while economic damage done to Sudan is estimated to have reached USD 60 billion by September 2023. 

With as much as 10-20% of the country displaced, as in Sudan, a considerable percentage of the population is economically inactive. Fields are not being ploughed, businesses have been shuttered, and disposable income is limited, increasing dependence on international support. In turn, this often renders the displaced vulnerable to exploitation, such as by armed groups looking to recruit young men, and forcing them to travel from assigned camps in search of food or work. Like in Benishangul-Gumuz, this can drive cyclical violence between refugees and their host communities who seek to protect their resources. 

There is little hope that the Horn's populations' and governments' economic and financial woes will ease in 2024, or that they will be able to respond effectively to increasing numbers of displaced people. Armed conflict continues to spread across Sudan, with no sign of a ceasefire in the offing. Somalia faces the prospect of the African Union Transition Mission concluding its draw-down; with it, hundreds of millions of USD in security aid are likely to dry up. The precise impact of this is not yet known, but it is sure to be significant. And Ethiopia will likely be forced to devalue its currency to bring it in line with the black market, raising import-export costs. 

Nor is the region's overall mood conducive to sober economic and political reform. Continual sabre-rattling and a lack of multilateral engagement further undermine an ability and display an unwillingness to take on grave challenges. Livelihoods such as pastoralism are fast becoming unsustainable and pastoral areas uninhabitable, but there is still failure to face unpopular, long-term decisions. Food insecurity is of particular concern, with nearly every state in the Horn struggling to feed its citizens.

The ripple effects of mass human displacement are many, and not all are well understood. There is significant variation between and within countries, based on ethnic, religious, and gender composition of the displaced, how much support they receive from host countries, local and international organisations, and the reasons for their displacement, including armed conflict or natural disaster. What ties many of these elements together is an economic and political frailty that seeps into nations’ psyche and society. The vicious cycle of instability, environmental disaster, displacement, and armed conflict continues for the foreseeable future. How we collectively choose to address it, and the large numbers of people affected, is the question.

By the Horn Edition team