Issue No. 20

Regional Churn and the MoU

The diplomatic fallout from the New Year's Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland is showing little sign of abating, as public relations between Addis and Mogadishu have plummeted to their worst point in years. Rumours that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud might meet on the sidelines of Italy's Africa summit in Rome have come to nothing. Meanwhile, current and former politicians in Somalia continue to wield bellicose rhetoric, including former Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, who, in an interview this week, urged Somalis to prepare for a war of 'self-defence.' This rolling commentary is doing little to deter Ethiopia and Somaliland, who appear set on transforming the MoU into a "practical agreement."
 
While Eritrea and Egypt have thrown their weight behind Villa Somalia, Kenyan President William Ruto has stayed out of the fray. This does not mean, however, that Kenya is somehow isolated from the roiling politics around the MoU. The political, security and diplomatic fallout also threatens to mire the new 'anchor state' of the Horn.
 
Perhaps first to consider is the row's corrosive, destabilising impact on the region's geopolitics. Just days after the announcement of the MoU, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Asmara, where his now-close ally Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki offered full-throated support for Mogadishu. A resurgent Asmara should raise alarm bells for democratic Kenya, with Isaias still intent on undermining his perceived enemies. Though plenty of regional rhetoric is simply posturing, the public breakdown of relations between Addis and Mogadishu is seeping into critical areas of cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia. The most important of these, particularly for Kenya, is the joint operation to counter Al-Shabaab in a crucial year for Somalia.
 
Thankfully, calls for the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) to withdraw have subsided somewhat, with Villa Somalia aware of how calamitous their sudden removal would be for central and southern Somalia. Kenya too would be badly impacted by the withdrawal of thousands of ENDF soldiers with significant combat experience. The heavy ENDF presence along Somalia's borders has been critical in limiting the infiltration of Al-Shabaab into Ethiopia, and Kenya to an extent. If they were to withdraw, Al-Shabaab would likely seize these key buffer zones between the militant group and Somalia's neighbouring countries. This dynamic has already played out over much of 2023; as African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces have withdrawn, handing over bases to the Somali National Army (SNA), Al-Shabaab has moved in.
 
ENDF troops have become partially siloed in their bases, as communities in which they have been based turn against them. The inability to access local intelligence is disastrous for effective asymmetric warfare, and may yet expose the ENDF to greater Al-Shabaab attacks. Kenya is already struggling to contain penetration of its Somali border by the Kenyan wing of Al-Shabaab, Jaysh Ayman; the militant group is certain to take ready advantage of any emerging security vacuum in the coming months of ATMIS draw-down.
 
The gradual infiltration of ethnic Somali communities along the Kenya-Somalia border by Jaysh Ayman is growing amid inflamed 'Greater Somalia' discourse. Schools and mosques have been quietly built or financed by Al-Shabaab as the jihadist group has gradually built a presence in these disenfranchised communities. As Somali public sentiment sours against Ethiopia and irredentist support for 'Greater Somalia' grows, Al-Shabaab may be able to exploit another strain of anger in Kenya and Somalia.
 
Somalia's politicians are not the only ones to beat the drum of Somali nationalism and irredentism since the New Year. Some Kenyan politicians have broken ranks with the Ruto administration, lambasting Addis and the MoU. In mid-January, several lawmakers, including Eldas MP Adan Keynan, called on the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations to end the "blatant provocation" of the MoU. More alarming were the recent comments by Dadaab MP Farah Maalim at the inauguration of re-elected Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni. In language similar to that used by Al-Shabaab, he called Ethiopia a "historical enemy" of Somalia that has long sought to annex its land. It is, of course, a key tenet of representative democracy that Members of Parliament can voice their opinions on any number of topics, but this is undoubtedly adding fuel to the fire.
 
Certainly, Addis' territorial aspirations in a region with numerous contested boundaries are also alarming. In 2023, there were concerns that Ethiopia might attempt to forcibly seize the Eritrean port of Assab. Troop manoeuvres along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border and bellicose rhetoric came to nothing, but not before Addis had signalled its expansionist vision. The MoU with Somaliland may now satiate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's desire for sea access, but it has also triggered other irredentist ambitions in a region thick with competing territorial claims.
 
What should concern Nairobi more than the current diplomatic firestorm is the re-emergence of Qatar as a power broker in Mogadishu amid a faltering offensive against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia. It is unlikely that Qatar has abandoned its earlier aspirations of bringing Al-Shabaab, or its non-violent Salafist ideological affiliate Al-I'tisaam, into some form of power-sharing agreement. By framing itself as an interlocutor between Islamist militant groups and governments, like with Hamas and the Taliban before, it has inserted itself in the process of bringing extremist groups to the negotiating table. If this were to happen in Somalia, regional security would be heavily compromised in multiple ways.
 
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU has certainly generated plenty of churn. But Ethiopian khat is still being sold in Somalia's markets, diplomats are still in their appointed capitals, and ENDF soldiers are still patrolling their designated areas in Somalia. Nairobi and other regional capitals have trod an understandable line so far, but as calls for 'Greater Somalia' grow and the MoU begins to take a clearer shape, they may be forced to take a position.

By the Horn Edition team