What is becoming of multilateralism?
Today's regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) body's 48th Extraordinary Session is facing a challenge to its legitimacy and influence. Hosted in Kampala by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the meeting of heads of state and government is set to tackle ongoing armed conflict in Sudan and the diplomatic fallout from the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, among other topics. But in the space of just a couple of days, Sudanese and Ethiopian delegations withdrew from participating, albeit for radically different reasons. Their withdrawal, and regional leaders’ inability to chart a path through the Sudanese war, speaks to a broader dilemma of multilateral institutions in the Horn of Africa amid the rise of Gulf influence in an increasingly multi-polar world.
On Tuesday 16 January, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry announced that it had withdrawn from the summit in protest over the invitation of Rapid Support Force (RSF) leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti.' The statement alleged that IGAD had set a "dangerous precedent" by inviting the paramilitary commander, who has signalled that he will attend. An Ethiopian statement, meanwhile, cited scheduling conflicts to explain its absence from today's meeting. The absence of two key governments from this Extraordinary Summit, when disputes in which they are involved are central to the agenda, will likely undermine IGAD's ability to fully engage with both issues effectively.
The withdrawal of the Republic of Sudan, and thereby the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), is a blow to the regional bloc, which has sought a ceasefire between the army and its former paramilitary allies. It is a blow to all those looking beyond temporary ceasefires. Unlike the limited scope of the Jeddah process, led by the US and Saudi Arabia, IGAD was positioned to utilise its political framework to facilitate a meeting between Hemedti and SAF Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan that could pave the way for a sustainable ceasefire.
At the same time, the African Union (AU) finally appointed a high-level panel to work to resolve the Sudanese armed conflict. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, has been appointed as Chair, with the former Ugandan Vice President Speciosa Wandira-Kazibiwe and former head of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia Francisco Madeira completing the three-person panel. The appointment of the panel should be cautiously welcomed, and may help to get peace efforts back on track. Yet the creation of another negotiating track could further muddy crowded diplomatic endeavours on Sudan. It is also unclear how the panel relates to the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy to Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, or the still unnamed IGAD Special Representative. Mix-and-match peace efforts appear to have allowed the SAF and RSF to continue to engage how and when they like, making promises on humanitarian access that are quickly broken. But even if the negotiating body is forced to change, again, IGAD’s framing of the Sudanese conflict should not be abandoned as it best reflects the political realities of the war.
It seems neither IGAD nor the AU holds the sway they once did. A central reason is that governments in the Horn are increasingly searching for financial support from assertive Gulf powers, to pursue their domestic agendas. In recent years, these powers, largely Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, have sought to secure influence and national security interests in their regional backyard, with major implications.
Countries, not just in the Horn, are increasingly dismissive of international norms and institutions meant to ameliorate the excesses of autocracies and wayward governments. Multilateral institutions like the AU are finding themselves in a bind, deriving their authority and legitimacy from sovereign states that no longer abide, or even pay lip service to, their most fundamental principles. The founding documents of the AU in the early 2000s emerged out of a post-colonial era marked by internecine warfare, famine and failed states. But the haphazard application of AU principles today has undermined their value. Illiberal multilateralism and political paralysis now arguably define the continent's predominant organisation.
It would be wrong, however, to dismiss the significance of IGAD, which still represents the best hope for multilateralism in the Horn. Armed conflict in Sudan and fallout from the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU aren't the only topics on the agenda today. Two IGAD members, Kenya and Uganda, are grappling over Nairobi's refusal to license a Ugandan-owned oil marketer to manage Kampala's fuel imports. On 28 December, Uganda filed a lawsuit against Kenya to force it to allow the Uganda National Oil Corporation a local license. Ugandan President Museveni and Kenyan President Ruto are scheduled to meet on the sidelines of the summit to hopefully end the increasingly costly dispute. Moreover, IGAD's summit today is not the flashpoint of struggling multilateralism, but rather a continuation of global challenges over the past decade. IGAD should refrain from forceful pronouncements on either side of the conflicts on the agenda in Entebbe. In the absence of key members, any resolution risks being perceived as biased, undermining the credibility and authority of the organisation. Instead, IGAD should eschew such politicisation, reinforcing the organisation's status as a platform for collective, consensus-based action and taking concrete measures to empower the Secretariat as a neutral, professional platform for dispute resolution.
Still, there needs to be an honest appraisal of shifting power across the Horn. Pretending that politics today is business as usual only undermines the relevance and influence of important bodies like the AU and IGAD. Only with clear-sighted analysis that the world is warming, war is proliferating, and accepted international norms are being ignored can these bodies reposition themselves to serve the populations of their member states.
By the Horn Edition team
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