What Went Unsaid: Kenya at COP28
Kenyan delegates attended this year's Conference of the Parties (COP) in Dubai with much at stake. Severe El Nino-related flooding in Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, and Tana River counties has recently displaced more than 136,000 people. Rising sea levels threaten coastal counties and the city of Mombasa, which already faces freshwater supply and salinisation challenges. And small subsistence farms - and the women that largely cultivate them - could face lower agricultural yields as temperatures rise and water supplies fall.
Kenyan delegates highlighted these struggles alongside discussions of funding for 'loss and damages.' Noticeably absent from COP discourse, however, was climate's role in stoking many of Kenya's internal, cross-county conflicts over scarce natural resources. The causal links between climate and conflict are tenuous, and academic literature leans towards climate more often being one of many factors stirring conflict. This is indeed the case for Kenya-- intercounty disputes are highly politicised and aren't a new phenomenon. Still, a growing number of the country's intercounty border disputes have climate and resource-based components should not have been overlooked at this year's COP. Kenya's experience should act as a cautionary tale about the necessity of proper resource management and effective conflict resolution in the face of intensifying climate threats.
County divisions along ethnic and sub-ethnic lines have created ripe conditions for resource-based disputes. When these disputes turn violent, it is often because perpetrators see resource accumulation in zero-sum terms. Wafula Okumu, Executive Director of The Borders Institute, and Paul Kibiwott, former Commissioner for Kenya's Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, point to more than 40 ongoing border disputes between counties in no small part because of "mismanagement of intercounty resources."
These dangerous overlaps between ethno-political interests and deteriorating climate conditions have aggravated intercounty violence stretching from coastal counties to Lake Victoria. Incidents have occurred along the border of Garissa and Tana River, Kisumu and Kericho, Isiolo and Meru, Turkana and Samburu, among others. The fighting can be characterised as armed ethnic clashes over territorial claims, cattle raiding, and targeted attacks against civilians and infrastructure.
Climate's role in inciting this cross-border violence comes in largely two forms. The first centres on climate-induced mobility and migration. Resource-dependent pastoralists moving their livestock to new grazing areas amidst uncertain climatic conditions often do so onto sedentary farmlands or the historical grazing lands of other ethnic groups. While moving livestock, Orma pastoralists in Tana River County, for example, have been reported to clash with Pokomo agro-pastoralists. Likewise, Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana pastoralists migrating to Laikipia County for grazing land have increasingly engaged in violent and retaliatory cattle rustling.
The second form includes the politicisation of territorial boundaries, land grabbing, and resource access. Alongside common criminals, politicians often co-opt cross-border violence for personal benefit. They may use their office to authorise favourable resource extraction rights for themselves or their allies, or strategically campaign on narratives villainising 'rival' ethnic groups for 'stealing' their constituent's rightful land. Neither strategy addresses issues of resource scarcity – it only approaches the problem with a harmful winner-take-all solution.
This need not be the case. A government-backed plan to rehabilitate and expand the Cheparkule Water Pan intends to mitigate violent clashes between the Turkana and Pokot. Dubbed a "peace dam," the project's managing director, Sammy Naporos, said, "We shall no longer have conflicts and clashes because of resource-based feuding and water scarcity… We want to end competition over shared resources." Member of Parliament Peter Lochakapong has made equally confident statements about the project's potential to restore peace between the two counties.
Apart from infrastructure development, county-led efforts have proved to be successful contributions towards peacebuilding. In a recent cattle rustling dispute between Migori and Narok Counties, local elders and ad-hoc peace committees invoked the local Awendo and Tarime Peace Accords as frameworks for peace. In the same vein, members of Babukusu, Iteso, and Sabaot communities across Western Kenya rely on the Mabanga Peace Accord to demarcate land, reduce tribal politics, and ensure equal distribution of county resources and political power.
Climate's role in generating Kenya's cross-border disputes had little chance of being raised in Dubai - Kenyan delegates were far more concerned with securing financing for a loss and damages fund, and in any case, they would have been cautious about discussing the politicisation of violent conflicts. That does not mean the issue has gone overlooked in Kenya itself though. At both the county and national levels, there have clearly been creative attempts to prevent and resolve resource-based challenges. It is exactly these attempts, and the consequences of ignoring them, that should attract attention at future COPs and other climate-centered forums.
By the Horn Edition team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
In a landmark ruling last week, five senior judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court declared incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) May 2026 term extension unlawful and held that Parliament’s mandate had expired in April 2026, thereby rendering Villa Somalia’s "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) electoral process illegal and its outcome invalid. Consequently, the judges directed all Somali political parties to agree on a new electoral framework within 30 days and conduct a credible poll within 90 days.
Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.