Issue No. 14

Eritrea: Anatomy of a Serial Destabiliser

Today's editorial in The Horn Edition is written by Medhane Tadesse.
 
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In the wake of destructive armed conflict in any country, one might expect a form of demilitarisation accompanied by economic and political reconstruction. Yet since the 1990s, the reverse has been true in Eritrea– a case of post-liberation militarisation and non-existent development since the Eritrean War of Independence. Today, the country is devoid of anything resembling normal life, with its regime unrivalled in its domestic and regional brutality. The short version is simply told, yet Eritrea remains one of the least understood places on earth.
 
One of the great mistakes of analysts, diplomats and policy-makers is viewing Eritrea as a conventional state. While it is easy to criticise African governments for corruption or autocracy, language fails to describe the grim case of Eritrea. From its inception as a liberation movement to assuming power in an independent state, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), now the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), has focused on accumulating wealth and power by acting as a spoiler on the regional scene.
 
Analysing Eritrea as if it is at risk of 'state collapse' in a post-Isaias Afwerki scenario is only one option. This happened long ago– there is no state worthy of collapse in Eritrea and no society noticeable enough to be destabilised. In a tightly controlled police state, the militarisation of life is broad and deep, with Eritrea more resembling an enormous prison camp than a country. And the status quo could continue into the future-- even if Isaias dies in office.
 
The country's economy is conspicuously unable to serve the basic needs of the Eritrean people, as it is dominated by PFDJ bosses and profiteering army officials. Mining royalties, informal transnational networks, and the regressive diaspora tax all feed the regime. But we still do not know some of the most basic information, such as whether or not the country has an official budget and where it invests its income. Meanwhile, its demography is collapsing, with tens of thousands of desperate youth fleeing Eritrea every year, risking their lives to escape into neighbouring countries.
 
Throughout much of the 2000s, Eritrea was perceived as a regional pariah. But the emergence of 'mid’ and ‘meddling powers' in the Gulf and Ethiopia’s changing role has altered the equation.
 
Though Eritrea has come out of diplomatic isolation in recent years, the basic foundations of its economic and security architecture have not been revised but rather reinforced. Its borders remain sealed, its predatory economy continues unabated, and its destabilising approach to regional politics has been demonstrated in the horrors of the Tigray War.
Eritrea's foreign policy can almost be called a 'grab-and-run' approach that is both self-enriching and self-interested. The country has slipped from one Middle Eastern power to the next, first Iran, then Qatar, then the UAE, and now Saudi Arabia. The administration avoids publicised and enforceable agreements as well as long-term bilateral relationships, preferring back-room deals that can be easily reneged upon.
 
The deepening fissures between Eritrea and Ethiopia today are in part due to the hit-and-run tactics of Isaias. The devastation of Tigray also came at enormous cost to Ethiopia's stability. Now Eritrea continues its support for the brutal Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano. Increasing jockeying on the Red Sea between Gulf powers also threatens to engulf the Horn, with Eritrea playing a key role in Saudi and Egyptian aspirations. But renewed competition between the two former allies, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwarki, for relevance and influence, is potentially calamitous.
 
The nature and conduct of the state of Eritrea have scarred communities and countries across the Horn of Africa. The lives lost, economic development foregone, and continual instability are impossible to quantify. The only way to limit Eritrea's destabilising influence in the Horn may be regime change. The emergence of an increasingly unified international opposition in the last year should be celebrated, but the tight grip the administration holds on Eritrea makes any likelihood of change in leadership unlikely in the immediate future.
 
So far, many of the regional and international responses to Eritrea, particularly Western, have tended to solidify, if not embolden, the regime. There is a tendency to underestimate the horrors inflicted or the danger posed by Isaias and his inner circle, partly due to a lack of information emerging from the country.
 
Any kind of pragmatic engagement with Asmara, and by extension, accommodation of the government’s criminal and totalitarian impulses, will only ensure the continued suffering of Eritrea’s population and the wider region. At its core, the regime thrives on the instability and chaos of its neighbours; no concessions alone can reign in Isaias.

Targeting the illicit funding flows that sustain the Eritrean regime must therefore become a priority for the international community. Drying them up could prove disastrous for Eritrea’s political economy. Also important are actions intended to restrain Gulf powers seeking influence in the affairs of the Horn. Let us at least try what few tools we have available to impact Eritrea, so that the Horn can have some cooling-off from the myriad conflicts and ongoing chaos consuming it.

Medhane Tadesse is a veteran political analyst and author who has on a variety of issues on the Horn. He is an academic expert on the governance of security, a visiting professor at African Leadership Center, Kings College London and Research Fellow on geopolitics at IMAF (Institut des Mondes Africains), IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement).