Issue No. 10

 A Long Road Ahead in Sudan
 

At the end of October, Sudan's two warring sides -- the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) -- resumed talks in Jeddah aimed at reaching a lasting humanitarian ceasefire. The outcome of the US-Saudi mediated talks was somewhat disappointing, but expected. While recommitments of previous promises to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access were offered, the two sides showed little interest in a ceasefire.
 
This was hardly surprising given the RSF's recent military successes in Darfur. On 26 October, the day talks were meant to start, the paramilitary group seized a key army base in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur and Sudan's second-largest city. In the following days, RSF forces captured SAF bases in Zalingei and El Geneina. In the latter's Ardamata suburb, scores of civilians were killed, and SAF soldiers were forced to retreat into Chad. The impact on civilians in Darfur has been horrific, with thousands displaced in the last week alone.
 
With the effective capture of Nyala, Zalingei, and El Geneina, the RSF consolidated its grip on Darfur and basically split the country in two. The RSF now dominates western Sudan to Khartoum, while the SAF controls the north and east of the country, including Port Sudan. Warnings of a Libya-like division of the country loom large.
 
In the days after armed conflict erupted in Khartoum on 15 April, the Jeddah talks, with their limited goals centred around 'silencing the guns,' were welcomed. However, repeated reneging on promises on both sides led to their temporary suspension in June. The RSF and SAF instead opted for a war that has laid waste to the historic capital, destroyed homes, clinics, markets and infrastructure, and caused untold human suffering across the country. In Darfur, the RSF and its allied Arab militias have razed dozens of villages and towns and driven hundreds of thousands of ethnic Massalit over the Chad border.
 
Raging conflict and widespread human rights violations have taken a dire toll. Nearly 6 million people have been displaced from their homes, and over 1.3 million Sudanese refugees are sheltering in neighbouring countries. The death toll is certainly higher than the 10,400 reported, and sexual violence, especially by the RSF, appears commonplace. Over half the country's population urgently needs aid, but humanitarian organisations have struggled to deliver it. Meanwhile, diseases like cholera are spreading; farming is interrupted, and food insecurity has dramatically increased.
 
This time, Saudi and US mediators – joined by IGAD and African Union representatives -- hoped the parties might finally see that there is no military solution and commit to a ceasefire. Indeed, most analysts argue there can be no military solution; Sudan is simply too vast, and neither side can subdue the entire nation. While the RSF may have plenty of foot soldiers, its appalling abuses against civilians, including atrocity crimes, have discredited them even as they ply pro-democracy rhetoric. The SAF, on the other hand, has gained some international credibility but may lack sufficient infantry.
 
Both sides may have reasons to bide their time. While the RSF has projected a pro-democracy message, it fundamentally remains a criminal family enterprise that is profiting off the destruction of Darfur. With its commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' seemingly incapacitated, and recent successes on the battlefield in Khartoum and Darfur, the RSF may be unable to halt its increasingly fragmented and predatory alliance. The SAF has also squandered opportunities by welcoming former regime loyalists into their ranks.
 
The resumption of the Jeddah talks does have some positive elements, particularly its emphasis on protecting civilians and humanitarian access. Its relevance, however, has dwindled since April as the conflict has deepened and fractured. With its scope remaining stuck on 'silencing the guns,' there is little suggestion that it has either the influence or the capacity to develop the necessary comprehensive political process. The destruction of Khartoum and Darfur has fundamentally changed the contours of this war, and any peace talks must reflect this tragic reality.
 
The regional landscape sustaining the war also needs to be addressed. It has long been clear that external actors are supplying weapons to their favoured side in violation of international arms embargos. Those invested in ending the war, including Sudan's neighbouring states and IGAD, should press these malign actors to end their support and expand arms sanctions. On the humanitarian front, the UN and major aid agencies need creative support for ramping up aid delivery for those inside Sudan, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan.
 
Another priority in the months ahead is to support, as much as possible, Sudanese civilians in building an inclusive and representative front. In the days before the Jeddah talks, various Sudanese civilian groups and leaders, including former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, met in Addis Ababa to take the first steps to form an anti-war, pro-democracy front.
 
It was a mixed success, with some important positions on the war and democracy hammered out. Some Sudanese civilians, however, accused it of perpetuating elitist Riverain dynamics and failing to include Darfuri voices, as well as exiled groups in Juba, Cairo, and Kampala. A unified civilian front that can exert influence over peace talks, in Jeddah or elsewhere, will be crucial to imagining and shaping a post-conflict Sudan. But the efforts must be genuinely inclusive and representative to stick.
 
Finally, any peace efforts should include support for accountability. On 11 October, the UN Human Rights Council authorised a fact-finding mechanism to investigate human rights abuses. This mechanism should be supported by investigations of the International Criminal Court, which has expanded jurisdiction in Darfur.
 
The inclusion of IGAD and African Union representatives in the Jeddah process is encouraging. Still, if the peace processes are to be effectively consolidated, they must not become the lowest common denominator. The peace talks need to dig deeper than humanitarian pauses and temporary ceasefires that the warring parties have rejected again. A political process that accounts for the complexities of Sudan, with a transition to civilian leadership at its heart, can begin to address the crises at the country's core.

By the Horn Edition Team