Hemedti’s New Year tour
The New Year has not brought any respite for Sudan, the country's 68th since its independence on 1 January 1956. Violence continues to spread, with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) marking several major gains in central Sudan in recent weeks as its commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti,' has sought to recast his image in a tour of sub-Saharan Africa. Absent for several months in 2023, reportedly due to injury, the savvy political operator is back and attempting to seize the momentum from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
Rather than his usual combat fatigues, Hemedti donned suits and adopted the language of a wannabe statesman in his tour of South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and Djibotui. The red carpet was rolled out for the former Janjaweed commander in a transparent attempt to reform Hemedti's damaged international reputation. In Rwanda, his tour even included a trip to Kigali's Genocide Memorial and some prepared platitudes about preventing future atrocities. Considering that senior UN officials have repeatedly warned that the RSF's prosecution of the ongoing conflict likely amounts to war crimes, Hemedti's gall is breathtaking.
It was just two months ago that RSF forces killed hundreds of predominantly Masalit civilians in the Ardamata suburb of El Geniena in West Darfur. The precise number of casualties is unknown, but local monitoring groups in Chad have estimated that between 1,300 and 2,000 people were massacred in early November. At least 8,000 people fled the violence, with many targeted again en route to Chad. More recently, pro-democracy resistance committees in Wad Madani charged the RSF with killing hundreds of civilians after it seized the city in mid-December 2023. RSF fighters also appear to have destroyed Sudan's well-respected Gezira University in the city.
A couple of weeks later, in Addis, Hemedti held a well-publicised meeting with the civil coalition led by former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the Civil Front for Democracy (Taqaddum). The meeting and the subsequent ‘Addis Ababa Declaration’ on 2 January have proven controversial. While a sustainable ceasefire and eventual peace clearly will not happen without the advancing RSF, the declaration goes well beyond a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access. It lays out security sector and political reform, as well as stipulates cooperation with the United Nations Human Rights Council investigation into human rights violations. The RSF also agreed to release 451 prisoners through the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Though elements of the declaration might be welcomed in isolation, the RSF appears to have little intention of fulfilling it. It was intended to force the SAF into a corner, sufficiently unpalatable that it would likely be rejected out of hand and subsequently allow Hemedti to claim he was seeking peace. But while Hemedti clasped hands in various African capitals, his lieutenants revealed that the RSF intends to seize yet more territory. Last week, Hemedti's aide, Nizar Saeed Ahmed, said that the RSF would expand operations while fighting continued, including states that had not yet seen conflict. It is clear that legitimising Hemedti in his public relations campaign will bring him no closer to calling off his marauding troops.
As the conflict expands, the more ethnicised and intractable it becomes, particularly with the SAF and the RSF continuing their policies of military recruitment along ethnic lines. El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, now faces the imminent prospect of RSF seizing the city, with rumours of a negotiated withdrawal of the SAF garrison stationed there. A coalition of armed forces from Juba Peace Agreement signatories are holding a fragile peace, but many fear that it will not last much longer. This will likely spell further massacres and sexual violence targeting Darfur's minorities, as well as triggering another mass exodus of civilians.
For many Sudanese civilian leaders, the image of Hamdok shaking hands with Hemedti has proven aggravating. Public sentiment is hard to measure during wartime. Still, it is clear that Taqaddum no longer enjoys the support it once had, particularly to cut a deal with Hemedti without significant civilian backing. The optics of the meeting have proven complicated for Hamdok and his allies, with some viewing it as a confirmation that elements of his coalition are generally supportive of the RSF. Hamdok is now seeking to drum up wider support for the Addis declaration, renewing his calls for an "urgent meeting" with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, as well as political parties. The SAF, however, is sticking by its demand that the RSF withdraw from all urban areas before ceasefire negotiations happen.
The declaration is also unlikely to gain much traction, with the proposed meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti still distant. An Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) official has revealed that there is still no firm date for their meeting, increasing speculation that neither man is seriously seeking to reach a ceasefire deal. The RSF is propped up on a predatory war economy centred on looting and exploitation that sustains the Hemedti family conglomerate 'al-Junayd.' On the other hand, the SAF has lost significant military and political ground in recent weeks, and does not want to negotiate from its weakened position. The loss of Wad Madani, yet another regional capital and the second largest city in Sudan, to the RSF has been chastening. And al-Burhan, clearly frustrated by the VIP treatment Hemedti received on his recent tour, has insisted that the SAF will continue fighting.
As much as Hemedti casts himself as a leader in waiting of Sudan and a champion of democracy, the RSF's deep unpopularity should not be underestimated. And though a ceasefire clearly is not achievable without the consent of the RSF, repeating the same failed diplomatic manoeuvres of welcoming Hemedti's comments without holding him to his promises of humanitarian access and safeguarding civilians perpetuates the current stalemate.
The SAF and RSF's key international backers, namely Egpyt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, still hold sway over the warring forces. Yet concerted pressure from the US on these states does not appear forthcoming, with Washington seemingly reluctant to wield the influence it holds in Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Riyadh. If 2024 is to spell an end to the armed conflict in Sudan, and there is little suggestion that it will, these countries will need to be brought into the IGAD track. Though the process has stalled in recent weeks with al-Burhan accusing of RSF bias, it still represents the best chance of reaching a path towards a more durable ceasefire, particularly if Hemedti and al-Burhan can compelled to come to the table.
by the Horn Edition team
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