Issue No. 295

The Tigray war was not the first sign of a decayed international order, but it was undoubtedly one of the bloodiest. Ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, mass sexual violence, induced starvation, telecommunications blackout, mass killings, and more besides defined the war on the Tigrayan people, carried out by the Ethiopian government and its Eritrean allies and Amhara paramilitaries. At least 600,000 people perished in the two-year conflict between 2020 and 2022, and over 120,000 women and girls were estimated to have been raped. And over two and a half years since the fighting ceased, harrowing stories and reports continue to emerge almost every day from the conflict, only adding to the reams of evidence stacking up against particular soldiers, units, and commanders. However, under the current federal administration and with another conflict involving Asmara and Addis looming —this time against one another —such questions of justice and accountability appear more distant than ever before.

OPOV or not OPOV? That is the Shakespearean question upon which Somalia's political future would depend. But is it really? The question has consumed the country and commentators for months, but the very term itself-- 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV)-- does not begin to reflect the situation today. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) professed commitment to conduct OPOV elections for the federal parliament in May 2026 is both a disingenuous misnomer and a deft gesture of political sleight of hand. For a host of reasons, it is by now apparent to all concerned that an OPOV poll in Somalia is inconceivable under present circumstances. Even HSM has privately acknowledged as much. So why are we still talking about it?

Sequels are rarely as good as the original movie, and 'threequels' even less so. The ongoing Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF)-led and Somali National Army (SNA) offensive in Lower Shabelle is following the same tired plot as its predecessors, and as anticipated, it is playing out in a toe-curling fashion. First, there was the unsuccessful Operation Leopard Hunt-- to dislodge Al-Shabaab from several of the strategic 'bridge towns' of Lower Shabelle, namely Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle, then there was Operation Badbaadho, to again, clear the jihadists from the towns. And now, over five years on Badbaadho, we are seeing the same story play out in Operation Silent Storm, albeit with a greatly demoralised and degraded SNA.

On 30 June, Kenya's Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling affirming the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock to Muslim fathers. Amid ongoing debates about the relationship between religion and the state in Kenyan society today, the unanimous decision has thrown down a gauntlet to traditional interpretations of Islamic inheritance law, which typically deny estate rights to out-of-wedlock children. Intended to bring such statues in line with mainstream Kenyan law and better ensure these children's rights, it has triggered uproar in the Muslim community surrounding Kenya's pluralistic legal system.

In the 21st century alone, Palmyra, Tigray, the Buddhas of Bamiyan, Odessa, and Khartoum, and many more besides, have all borne witness to targeted cultural violence, wiping out centuries and millennia of worship, artefacts, and unique histories that can never be reclaimed. Some have been targeted for theological or religious reasons– such as the ancient sites in Palmyra by Daesh– or part of a broader genocidal attempt to stamp out a civilisation– as was the case in Tigray– or simply greed– like the looting of the Khartoum museums by the Rapid Support Forces. But in many cases, it denotes a rewriting of history, an attempt by a political movement or armed group to coerce and impose their particular vision for the country on the objects, buildings, and cultural identities that comprise it.

One has to hand it to the Somali Regional State (SRS) President, Mustafa Omer Agjar; in a country not without unpopular politicians, he has a striking ability to aggravate so many in a single stroke. Without warning, on 27 July, the Somali Regional State Council announced that 14 new woredas, four zonal administrations, and 25 municipal leadership offices were to be established. The outcry has been furious and immediate, with senior Oromo and Afar politicians voicing their displeasure at what they perceive as irredentism by the SRS in their regions. Overhauling administrative units along the Oromia-SRS boundary was always likely to prove highly contentious, but the host of changes has triggered major protests in several towns within the SRS as well. With a year out from elections, the much-loathed Agjar appears to be continuing to consolidate his position as regional president.

Last week, a new Somali federal state entitled "North Eastern State of Somalia" (NES) (Dowlad Goboleedka Waqooyi Bari Soomaaliya) was proclaimed and endorsed by Villa Somalia. The culmination of a months-long project directed by the Ministry of Interior, the transformation of the Laas Aanood-based SSC-Khaatumo administration into a supposed 'federal state'-- the first since Hirshabelle-- is being hailed by Somali nationalists as a victory against the 'secessionism' of Somaliland and Puntland's independence from Mogadishu. Though not in full control of either, NES is meant to encompass both Sool and Sanaag, and has been finally bulldozed into existence in the face of public opposition from Puntland, Somaliland, and much of the Warsangeli that the new state claims to represent. The cynical electoral politics of Mogadishu are pushing northern Somalia and Somaliland to the brink of conflict once again.

Two weeks go by, and at least one new maritime agreement on the Somali peninsula has reared its head, with another retaliatory pact to potentially soon follow. The first was between Taiwan and Somaliland, following Hargeisa's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Osman's visit to Taipei in late July, during which he secured a cooperation agreement between the coastguards of Taiwan and Somaliland. And the inevitable Beijing-Mogadishu response has now arrived, with the Chinese Embassy in Somalia announcing that it has discussed enhancing "cooperation" with the federal government's Coast Guard. As ever, the officials reaffirmed their commitment to "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and Somalia."

On 5 June, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir declared a six-month state of emergency in Warrap State and Mayom County in Unity State, authorising sweeping security powers justified under 'restoring stability' after a spate of violence in late May. Following intense political violence in Nasir against the White Army earlier this year, the latest emergency decree – and the disarmament campaign that followed – are part of a broader strategy aimed at violently consolidating regime control in the fractious peripheries. And so, amid Kiir's regime succession planning, the ruling clique of Dinka politicians has sought to quash any remaining opposition through its mass arrests and military campaigns in Juba and outside its control, and simultaneously redirecting resource flows to the capital.