Issue No. 274

The ONLF Warns Of Return To Conflict
 

Renewed conflict may be looming in Ethiopia's Somali region. Having given up arms in 2018, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has warned that it is considering a return to insurgency after months of deteriorating relations with the federal government. Last week, ONLF Chairman Abdikarim Sheikh Mahdi 'Maaday' confirmed that the party was exploring all eventualities in light of Addis's refusal to implement key articles of the 2018 peace agreement. The risk of a return to conflict had been apparent for some time, with the ONLF voicing increasing frustration at its own marginalisation as well as perceived infringements on the Somali Regional State's (SRS) independence and rights.

Since the mid-1980s, the ONLF has advocated for ethnic Somalis in what is today known as the SRS, conducting successive insurgencies against the central government in Addis. Governance of the long-marginalised region of Ethiopia has often been treated as an afterthought, primarily perceived in the context of security threats emanating from Somali irredentism or jihadism. Across the years, though violence ebbed and flowed, the ONLF remained a persistent thorn in the side of the federal government, which directed a harsh counter-insurgency against the movement led by former SRS President Abdi Iley between 2010 and 2018.

After years of Kenyan-backed negotiations, however, the 2018 peace accord was agreed upon amidst a flurry of early democratic and political reforms by incumbent PM Abiy Ahmed and the thawing of relations with Asmara, where the ONLF operated offices. In turn, the Ogaden National Liberation Army (ONLA), the armed wing of the ONLF, pledged to disarm in exchange for a DDR programme. It was further agreed that the ONLF would be recognised as a legitimate political party. Yet many of the core provisions of the 2018 accord have not been fulfilled, including the reintegration of ONLA fighters. For the ONLF, however, the steady erosion of the SRS's territorial integrity and rights within Ethiopia's weakened federal system is particularly driving this latest crisis.

The inept and corrupt governance of the SRS by Prosperity Party leader Mustafa Agjar has further grated on many Ethiopian Somalis and the ONLF. The Somali region remains one of the worst-run regions despite the comparative richness of its resources. One of the projects often cited as having significant funds diverted from is the ETB 1.4bn Jigjiga water project, which remains unfinished, leaving the city without reliable access to clean water. Agjar has been accused of squirrelling millions away offshore for his own gain, as well as bribing the Oromo and Amhara elite within the Prosperity Party to maintain his position in office. And although the little-known Agjar was hailed as a possible political reformer for the SRS, the democratic and civic space in the region remains heavily curtailed.

While the regional administration under Agjar has repeatedly sought to undermine and corral the ONLF, it has struggled to dent the former insurgency's popularity. The SRS president has, in recent times, attempted to drum up support for his fake 'wing' of the ONLF. The ONLF's increasing criticisms of the federal government in recent months have further fuelled Addis's backing of Agjar's endeavours to divide the movement and weaken Maaday's position as chairman. But it is unlikely to succeed, with the party leader still favoured amongst the ONLF leadership. Nevertheless, it is part of a broader 'divide and conquer' strategy of Addis and its allied regional administrations attempting to undermine legitimate political opposition. A similar dynamic is currently playing out in Tigray, where Addis is stoking divisions within the Tigray People's Liberation Front, as well as in Oromia.

ONLF-Addis relations further deteriorated in early September 2024 when Ethiopian National Defense Force Chief of Staff Berhanu Jula slighted the group, referring to it as an "enemy of the state." The comments came amidst rising controversies within the SRS over the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding and attempts by Agjar's government to demonstrate support for the controversial agreement. And with the Prosperity Party refusing to take the ONLF's concerns seriously, the party subsequently withdrew from the much-compromised National Dialogue Commission in October 2024, further reducing its participants to only a handful of government-sanctioned groups.

Armed conflict is far from certain, but in an interview with BBC Somali last week, Maaday stated, "We are currently holding consultations. Our response could involve taking up arms, exerting political pressure, engaging in peaceful resistance, or resuming negotiations." However, the appetite and prospect for further negotiations with such a controversial and compromised leader as Agjar may prove limited. Instead, the ONLF's recent agitation for greater rights for ethnic Somalis and the SRS in Ethiopia has struck a broader chord in the region and within the diaspora. It also marks a return for the ONLF to the grassroots position it once held.

Further attempts to undermine the ONLF are a short-sighted strategy and are far more likely to result in a return to armed conflict—something that Ethiopia can ill-afford. While the ONLF does not have the immediate capacity to wage a large-scale insurgency, any further destabilisation of the Somali region at this sensitive time would only compound the country's broader instability. The latest political crisis in the SRS is symptomatic of a number of wider issues in Ethiopia-- the undermining of political opposition, the reneging on peace deals, and the weakening of the federal system. All these must be dealt with in the round to prevent the country slipping further into its current quagmire of internal conflict and unstable politics. To begin with, averting violence in the SRS will require concerted and genuine attempts to implement the 2018 peace accord.