Issue No. 266

On 25 December 2024, skirmishes between the Isaaq and Ogaadeen communities exploded into open violence in the Dacawaley kebele in the Harshin district within Ethiopia's Somali Regional State (SRS). In a contested series of events, Liyu police, accompanied by Ogaadeen militias from the Yoale district, appear to have attacked villages populated by the Arab sub-clan of the Isaaq in Dacawaley. Dozens were killed in the fighting that continued over several days. 

The response from the new Waddani administration in Hargeisa was unequivocal, with Somaliland's Minister of Internal Security, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, accusing the Liyu police of a "massacre" targeting "primarily pastoralists, in an act that flagrantly violates human rights." He further asserted that the Liyu had abducted Somaliland-based elders who had travelled to Dacawaley to mediate. In turn, authorities in Jijiga claimed that it was the Liyu repelling a heavily armed Somaliland force, including disguised soldiers, that had crossed the border following clan-based clashes over grazing lands in Yoale in Ethiopia to support the Isaaq. After many dozens had been killed and many more displaced, Somaliland and Ethiopian officials agreed to end the hostilities on 28 December and resolve the conflict through "peaceful and sustainable means." The tentative truce remains, with Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) troops deployed to secure the area.

The Dacawaley violence marks a recent nadir in the dynamic relations between the neighbouring Ogaadeen and Isaaq communities and administrations. While there has long been historic low-level pastoralist competition over land and resources, it was not until the 1980s that political relations between the two clan families changed significantly. Rival Isaaq and Ogaadeen-majority military groups were supported by Addis and Mogadishu, respectively, most notably the Somali National Movement (SNM) that primarily operated out of the modern-day Somali region. 

The declaration of independence of Somaliland in 1991 and the overthrow of the Derg regime in Addis just 10 days later, on 28 May, transformed relations for the better. In the years that followed, ties between the SRS and Somaliland, as well as between the Ogaadeen and the cross-border Isaaq, generally improved as security and trade arrangements were agreed upon. Much of this was due to the leadership of Abdul Majid Hussein, who led the SRS between 1995 and 1998. Economic interdependence grew, and today, goods such as textiles and electronics are commonly imported into the SRS via Berbera Port, while Ethiopian khat is sold in Somaliland. Isaaq communities populate a significant stretch of the Berbera trade corridor into Ethiopia. Meanwhile, many of the former SNM leaders that have dominated the body politic of Somaliland since 1991 have remained politically invested in their former homeland in the SRS, not least because of clan ties.

The arrival of notorious and recently freed SRS leader Abdi Iley as the region's security minister, however, drove a significant decline in internal and cross-border Ogaadeen-Isaaq relations. The regional president between 2010-2018 framed his rule as an explicit defender of Ogaadeen interests, seeking to politically and economically marginalise the Isaaq and other minority clans in the SRS. In turn, Isaaq politicians were relegated from senior positions in the regional administration, while Iley directed the formation of several new Ogaadeen-majority districts to cement the clan's grip on the region. 

But it was the Liyu that particularly damaged relations with cross-border Isaaq communities. Formed in 2007 by Iley, then regional security chief, as an anti-Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) force, the Liyu police were wielded as a violent praetorian guard to suppress any political opposition in the SRS. The force also became notorious for their harassment of Isaaq traders from Somaliland as Iley sought to establish a monopoly over the lucrative trade. And, as was the case last month, Liyu forces were implicated in several instances of extrajudicial violence against Isaaq communities near the Somaliland border, including in the Gashamo district that culminated in the execution of 10 civilians by the paramilitaries in 2012.

The status of the Liyu today remains contentious, having been partially disbanded in April 2023 by Ethiopia's federal government as it sought to clip the wings of the Amhara Special Forces (ASF). Elements of the Liyu were maintained due to their role in securing the Ethiopian border from Al-Shabaab, though they were unable to prevent the mass jihadist incursion in July 2022. Since April 2023, significant numbers of the Ogaadeen-dominated Liyu have defected to Jubaland to fight with the Ahmed Madoobe administration or returned to their villages. Liyu troops have also been implicated in the clashes with Afar militias over the three contested kebeles in 2024-- rather than policing the international border against Al-Shabaab incursions from Somalia. 

Though cross-border trading has eased, with contraband networks established by the former SRS president and policed by the Liyu partially dismantled, political issues at the sub-national level continue to simmer. Since 2018, incumbent SRS President Mustafa Agjar's relationship with the Isaaq has also been far from straightforward. Though Ogaadeen, like Iley, Mustafa initially offered greater political space for minority groups and leaders from the Isaaq, favoured by Hargeisa. That has since faded, however, and the Prosperity Party leader has pursued increasingly hostile measures against neighbouring Afar and Oromo communities, as well as political forces such as the ONLF. Loyal to PM Abiy Ahmed, Agjar has consolidated his power in Jigjiga while his initial popularity has collapsed. The Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), now seemingly dead in the water, also proved controversial in SRS, though Agjar sought to drum up public displays of support in 2024.

Though there is an international border that bisects the communities that straddle Somaliland and north-eastern SRS, much of it remains porous. Pastoralist communities travel to and from largely without problem, but the semi-dormant historical grievances between neighbouring communities over land and resources are increasingly under pressure, particularly from climate change. Throwing in a paramilitary force with a chequered-- at best-- human rights record amongst the Isaaq and a glut of weapons amongst the clan militias, the situation proved highly combustible in December. And the clashes could not have come at a less opportune time for Addis's relations with Hargeisa, with the new Waddani-led administration vocally less supportive of the MoU and its predecessors's close ties with the Ethiopian government.