(Re)building Addis: An Imperial Vision
Over a few days in March, the famed historic neighbourhood 'Piassa' in Addis was unceremoniously pulled down. Established by the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II in the late 19th century, Addis's old quarter came to be known as the Piassa during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930s. Home to dozens of much-loved and supposedly protected modernist buildings, bulldozers tore through these and the informal dwellings that had been slung up in the neighbourhood earlier this year. For decades, it had been a core piece of Addis's collective memory and an area inhabited mainly by Amhara communities. Its erasure was sudden and brutal– wiping out history and long-established communities almost overnight.
The ostensible justification for bulldozing the old quarter is part of the 'Addis Ababa Corridor Development Project'- a major widening of roads across the capital to enhance connectivity. Addis is undergoing a facelift, with neighbourhoods being pulled down, skyscrapers being thrown up apace, fresh lighting, and gentrified urban squares installed. But the scale and speed of change are both immense and surreal, considering the insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, the high levels of food insecurity and displacement, and the widespread economic hardship.
The plan to create a glittering city akin to Dubai belies a more complicated and darker reality. The vast sums being ploughed into these projects are only making the country's economic inequalities starker in Addis and across Ethiopia. Many have questioned the justification of such a massively expensive undertaking when the estimated cost of Tigray's post-war reconstruction is believed to be in the tens of USD billions. The economic fabric of the northern region still lies in ruin. Meanwhile, the escalating Fano insurgency in the Amhara region and the federal government's heavily militarised response have also caused significant damage to the region's finances, with government services decimated, farmers unable to plant their crops, and transportation choked. The photos being pumped out from government-affiliated news websites of electrified streets and lush promenades jar with the everyday realities of the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians.
Meanwhile, in the capital, residents in informal settlements are being displaced, often with little warning. Many have been moved into new constructions, but these communities are becoming ever more peripheral—physically and socially isolated from its newly modernised core. And while these new high-end developments may attract some foreign investment, they will do little to address the reality that over 21 million Ethiopians still require humanitarian assistance due to conflict, drought, and environmental disasters. But this is far from the priority of the increasingly militarised federal government focused on the capital.
Indeed, the securitisation of the capital has gone hand-in-hand with the modernisation scheme. The ruling clique has directed the creation of parallel security forces that are answerable to a trusted elite, not the broader national security architecture and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). The establishment of a Praetorian guard and the co-opting or jailing of key opponents has allowed the prime minister to consolidate his hold on Addis– even while insurgencies rage in Amhara and Oromia. As part of the rebuilding of Addis is the construction of an immense presidential palace complex on top of a hill overlooking the capital. Details are few and far between, with extreme secrecy surrounding its planning and building. However, the cost of Abiy's new palace has been touted at several billion USD and is believed to be underwritten by Abu Dhabi.
The tearing down of the Piassa is part of a broader rewriting, or rebuilding, of Ethiopia's history in a new image. Abiy has long framed his premiership in the rhetoric of a semi-imperial Ethiopia which he was destined to rule, and the appropriation or removal of key pieces of national identity– be it the Piassa, the Battle of Adwa, or 'sea access' is part of this broader political symbolism. The vision of an urban renewal with Abiy as the leader destined to guide Ethiopia into a new era of prosperity fits squarely into this. Yet it was the Prosperity Party government which oversaw the destruction and looting of ancient culture and heritage during the Tigray war. Many of the items, including ancient manuscripts, that were stolen will never be recovered, and the knowledge and role of the hundreds of religious figures who were killed are also irrecoverable. The next chapter of this 'imperial Ethiopia' is more than just a shiny new Adwa Museum.
Addis is far from the only city in the Horn to undergo immense construction. Nairobi, too, is witnessing skyscrapers being erected in once-leafy neighbourhoods like Kilimani and Kileleshewa. But the ongoing construction in Addis is markedly different and part of a broader concentration of money and attention to the capital at the expense of the rest of Ethiopia. Many have mourned the loss of the historic Piassa, but for the Prosperity Party, this is just one part of a broader attempt to re-brand and re-form an increasingly fragile state in their particular vision.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.