Ethiopia's Isolation in New York
At the 79th UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed cut an isolated figure. Acrimony over the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and proposed deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia made its way to New York, with Egyptian, Eritrean, and Somali officials all using the UNGA opportunities to cement their ties and critique Addis. Once the darling of the international community and a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy has few allies remaining.
The meeting between the Somali, Eritrean, and Egyptian foreign ministers on the sidelines in New York was emblematic of Ethiopia's geopolitical struggles. Once again, all three proclaimed their euphemistic 'respect' for Somalia's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, but it is the rapidly deepening ties between Asmara and Cairo that should be of particular concern to Addis. Egyptian and Eritrean military intelligence recently met in the Eritrean capital, and there have been reports that Cairo, like Asmara, may seek to arm the growing Fano insurgency in Ethiopia's Amhara region.
Addis's reckless foreign policy has helped draw its geostrategic opponents together and offered them the space to exploit Ethiopia's internal fragility. Djiboutian officials, too, have become increasingly critical of Ethiopia on the international stage, even though the country remains highly economically dependent on its southern neighbour. Djibouti opposes Addis's hegemonic ambitions and is frustrated with Ethiopia's rejection of its recent offer to manage the Tadjoura Port-- a blatant attempt to kill the MoU to which it is opposed. And despite the state visit of Abiy to Nairobi in August 2024, the Ethiopia-Kenya relationship also remains frosty. Addis continues to be envious of Kenya's improved ties with the West.
The Eritrea-Somalia-Egypt meeting called to mind the destabilising 'tripartite' alliance between former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed, and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. Despite repeat, and violent, attempts to extend his term, Farmaajo lost to incumbent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May 2022, while Isaias and Abiy fell out in the aftermath of the obliteration of Tigray. Reflexively authoritarian, the destructive alliance sought to undermine multilateral scrutiny and resulted in numerous controversies, including the covert deployment of young Somali recruits to the Tigray war. Whether the Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu relationship is transient or a more permanent reshaping of regional politics is yet to be seen, but it certainly does not bode well for Ethiopia.
An isolated Ethiopia in the Horn would have been nearly unimaginable two decades ago. Backed by the US and other Western powers, Addis was the unquestionable hegemon in the region and played a central role in both African peacekeeping missions and diplomatic initiatives. Domestically, while unpopular in several constituencies, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government's control was never seriously politically or militarily challenged in the 2000s.
In contrast, it is difficult to overstate the challenges facing Ethiopia today. A confluence of growing political, economic, and security crises from Tigray to the newly formed regions in southern Ethiopia has eviscerated government services. Despite major offensives, the Fano insurgency in Amhara continues to gather pace, with significant factions in Gojjam and Gondar launching more audacious assaults on urban centres. Particularly accelerated by the war on Tigray, the country is undergoing a painful process of both state contraction and militarisation that shows no sign of easing. And as government services have retreated, so have the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) become increasingly involved in national politics. Rather than tools of the government, these are active players in shaping policy, such as through the 'command posts' in Oromia and Amhara.
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plans to release several USD billion for the federal government, the country's economy remains in dire straights. The pain from the collapse of the Ethiopian Birr as the country was forced to float its currency is being keenly felt by millions. Again, this appears to matter little to the federal government, which has instead taken measures to prevent any widespread protests erupting that could threaten the ruling Prosperity Party. There are concerns that the bailing out of the Ethiopian government may only further compound the militarisation and the rolling back of limited democratic progress.
The deterioration of Ethiopia's regional standing and Mogadishu's furious attempts to undermine the MoU is emboldening and enabling Asmara and Cairo to insert themselves into the Horn's politics with destructive consequences. The irrationality and haphazardness of Addis's foreign policy are clear to see, but neither should Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt seek to wield Ethiopia's faultlines to further destabilise the country, which can only spell greater problems for the Horn. The bringing of Egyptian troops to Somalia is foolhardy and highly dangerous, and it is a grave mistake that the African Union has proposed they play a role in the next iteration of the peacekeeping mission. Yet, by all accounts, the possibility of yet more war, or proxy conflict, erupting in the Horn went overlooked in New York. The absence of regional tensions from the international agenda has allowed these countries, who many still care about their reputation, to continue their sabre-rattling unchecked.
Once known for its inclusive, solution-orientated foreign policy, Ethiopia has managed to isolate itself from many of its neighbours and elements of the international community, including the African Union in the country's capital. Addis cannot continue to ignore the fact it is under intense diplomatic pressure, and it is beyond time for the federal government to internally and internationally reset itself to address the immense challenges it is facing.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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