Ethiopia's Struggle for Accountability
Ethiopia's federal government is navigating a period marked by significant accountability concerns and growing scrutiny over its actions. Since the war in Tigray began in November 2020, the administration has faced allegations of attempting to suppress oversight by lawmakers, journalists and international observers— often wielding coercive measures and censorship. While governments often attempt to manage scrutiny, Ethiopia's recent approach to media and dissent has raised particular concerns. But there remains opportunity for Ethiopia to honour its commitment to transparency and reconciliation.
One example of Ethiopia’s current challenges was the arrest of French journalist Antoine Galindo in Addis Ababa in February 2024 after he interviewed Bate Urgessa, spokesperson for the opposition Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Galindo was charged with "conspiracy to create chaos" and denied legal representation, while Urgessa, a prominent critic of the government, was also arrested. After release on bail, however, he was found dead on the outskirts of his home town of Meki in Oromia, leading to international calls for an investigation. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported that government interference hindered its attempts to investigate. Compounding the situation, Bate Urgessa’s brother, Millo Urgessa, remains in custody despite a court order for his release, following claims he made about the circumstances of his brother’s death.
Since January 2023, 15 foreign television broadcasters, including the BBC Somali, have been prohibited from operating in the Somali region of Ethiopia in directives issued by the Ethiopian Media Authority. Local journalists like Muhiyadin Mohammed Ali of Kalsan TV have been arrested for challenging these restrictions. This in turn has prevented scrutiny and oversight of regional politicians, and reporting on the scale of recent fighting between Afar and Somali communities there.
On 19 August, Ethiopia’s federal government announced the completion of its transitional justice mechanism’s implementation roadmap, a process intended to promote reconciliation after prolonged inter-communal and political violence all over Ethiopia. The mechanism has faced criticism for its lack of clarity on key issues, such as prosecuting Eritrean nationals for war crimes committed in Tigray. Concerns persist regarding the government’s reluctance to allow full scrutiny of its own actions in Tigray, as well as Amhara and Oromia. The closure of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) in September 2023 has fueled these concerns.
Western countries find themselves caught between the need for strategic relations with Addis, now aligned with BRICS, and concerns about accountability and transparency. On 6 September, the US, a partner to Ethiopia, chose to extend its sanctions into the fourth year due to ongoing human rights violations and the government's handling of the Tigray conflict citing that the situation in northern Ethiopia poses an "unusual and extraordinary threat to its national security and foreign policy. As crucial as it is for these allies to leverage their positions to influence Ethiopia towards accountability, it is even more important for the Ethiopian government to remember that upholding democracy involves more than just managing external relationships. It also requires an independent press, vibrant civil society, robust justice mechanisms, and active political engagement. By allowing press freedom and listening to international advocacy for accountability, Ethiopia could thrive.
Within the current fraught context, the absence of an effective and credible transitional justice framework and national dialogue platform deepens tensions and fuels cycles of political unrest and armed conflict. For real transformation to take root, Ethiopians require robust processes that acknowledge past atrocities and actively involve survivors and relevant communities in meaningful dialogue.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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Months of simmering tensions in the Hiiraan region and escalating political rifts with Mogadishu have morphed into a full-blown armed insurrection this week. This development compounds the widening revolt across Somalia's periphery against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration, deepening its political isolation.
In a landmark ruling last week, five senior judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court declared incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) May 2026 term extension unlawful and held that Parliament’s mandate had expired in April 2026, thereby rendering Villa Somalia’s "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) electoral process illegal and its outcome invalid. Consequently, the judges directed all Somali political parties to agree on a new electoral framework within 30 days and conduct a credible poll within 90 days.
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