Geopolitics and Hyper-Nationalism Hijacks AUSSOM
The African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia is at risk of becoming entangled in a tangential geopolitical tussle as Mogadishu prioritises a potential war with Ethiopia over battling Al-Shabaab. Somali hyper-nationalists bunkered in Mogadishu, as well as Egypt and Djibouti, are seeking to wield the next iteration, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as a cudgel for their own geopolitical interests. Rather than being directed against Al-Shabaab, Villa Somalia is instead actively seeking to reposition AUSSOM against its 'true enemies' of Ethiopia and Somaliland. Hellbent on frustrating the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia at any cost, Somalia's federal government is showing an alarming willingness to risk the country's stability and the region's security by inviting Egyptian soldiers to potentially deploy near the Ethiopian border. The African Union and elements of the international community that believe AUSSOM will serve as a continuity force are badly misguided-- not only is it likely to allow Al-Shabaab to seize more territory, but the mission's composition could well drive the eruption of proxy conflicts in the Horn.
Up until April 2024, Somali military and federal officials continued to insist that the defeat of Al-Shabaab was imminent, even while the extremist group was steadily clawing back the hard-fought territorial gains of 2022 and early 2023. An extension to ATMIS was roundly dismissed until it became clear that Mogadishu could no longer deny the reality that the Somali National Army (SNA) and its assorted forces were on the back foot, in large part due to an inability to learn from the mistakes of the past two years. Yet rather than the extension allowing for a sober reassessment of Somalia's security, all rhetorical force is being directed against Ethiopia, not the extremist group. Among others, Somali Disaster Management Agency Commissioner Mohamud Moallim and Transport Ministry Director General Bashir Moallim have called Ethiopia the "true enemy" of Somalia, with the former calling on his countrymen to prepare for war over the weekend. And the troop-contributing countries of AUSSOM of Egypt and Djibouti are acquiescing to the FGS's hyper-nationalist tune alongside promoting their own geopolitical interests through the mission.
The African Union has bizarrely allowed AUSSOM to be wielded as a weapon against Ethiopia and Somaliland, never mind the risk of war or proxy conflict erupting in Somalia. Rather than soothing tensions as the continent's principal multi-lateral is meant to do, it has opened the door for the hyper-nationalists in Mogadishu and stepped back as tensions spiral. Hurriedly approved, AUSSOM threatens to ride roughshod over the established principles of peacekeeping missions in the Horn, including using regional troops. The AU's lack of consultation with the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) speaks volumes about the health of both multi-laterals, with regional peacebuilding and mechanisms paralysed by a host of factors, not least the rise of the so-called 'Middle Powers,' including Mogadishu's close ally of Turkey.
Cairo has made it abundantly clear that it is deploying forces as part of its geopolitical feud with Ethiopia, sounding off loudly about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the politics of water. Those who believe Egypt's military support is about defeating Al-Shabaab are naive. Cairo is not only concerned about the management of the Nile basin but has also long sought to deny Ethiopia a geopolitical role in managing Red Sea politics and security, actively seeking to lock Addis out of any multi-lateral forum on the world's most critical waterway. Consequently, an Ethiopian naval port in Somaliland would shatter Cairo's flagging containment strategy. It is no coincidence that on 1 September, Egypt wrote to the UN Security Council, warning it would take all necessary measures to defend its water security interests. Egyptian troops may be coming as a bifurcated force, with some soldiers likely to be deployed as part of AUSSOM and some under the recently negotiated bilateral defence agreement. But AUSSOM has provided a veneer of respectability to what Cairo has long sought-- an actual territorial border with Ethiopia.
It is not just Egypt and Somalia seeking to weaponise the next iteration of the AU peacekeeping mission, but Djibouti as well. The Djiboutians have also re-upped their promised forces to AUSSOM as a clear message to Somaliland, with whom their bilateral relations have also rapidly deteriorated since the MoU was announced. Djibouti has hosted both Awdal State Movement and SSC-Khaatumo leaders in recent weeks, seeking to stoke discontent in Somaliland's east and west. Economically heavily dependent on Ethiopia's import-export business through its port, Djibouti is attempting to keep both Addis and Mogadishu on its side but has clearly sided with the latter in its attempts to frustrate the MoU— and Somaliland's push for independence by extension.
Mogadishu's extreme and rapid delegation of Somalia's security and natural resources to defend their 'unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity,' particularly to Turkey and Egypt, is far from a sustainable solution to the country's deep fragility. As the federal government appears happy to burn any and all relations, domestic or international, in sight, the next targets of its hyper-nationalist agenda could well be Kenya and Jubaland. If Nairobi does not subscribe to the vision of Addis as the new enemy– not Al-Shabaab– an emboldened Villa Somalia could seek to expel the Kenyans next, who play a critical role in protecting Jubaland from Al-Shabaab. But who needs Ethiopia and Kenya when you have Egypt securing your 'territorial integrity' on land and the Turks at sea?
With reckless leadership on multiple sides of the regional schism, the stakes are high. We are heading for more fission and fragmentation in Somalia at the worst possible time, with Al-Shabaab continuing to consolidate its grip in central and southern Somalia. War often does not start by design but by accident or misunderstanding. The invitation of Egyptian troops into Somalia drastically raises this risk.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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