Mustafa Omer's Presidency: How Promised Change Unraveled
Six years ago, the Somali community in Ethiopia appeared to be on the cusp of change as Mustafa Omer, a former activist, rose to the leadership of the Somali region. Seen as a beacon of hope, Mustafa inherited the position from Abdi Iley, the controversial regional president who ruled between 2010 and 2018 and whose administration became synonymous with violent repression. With impressive education credentials and a purported commitment to justice, many believed Mustafa's leadership would usher in a new era of accountability and development for the over 15 million Somalis in eastern Ethiopia. That hope has since disintegrated, however, with his term marked by leadership failures, ineffective development initiatives, and entrenched corruption.
Since its formation nearly three decades ago, the Somali region has wrestled with a fractured socio-political landscape. The Somali People's Democratic Party (SDP), operating under the centralised thumb of the former ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), wielded considerable influence yet often failed to resonate with the communities it ostensibly represented. Instead of advocating for the interests of the Somali people, it was wielded as an instrument by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-led EPRDF to maintain control rather than nurturing genuine engagement. Leadership appointments tended to favour loyalty to military commanders stationed in Harar over genuine merit or capacity.
Amid this backdrop, Somali communities also endured successive waves of armed conflict and humanitarian crises. Insurgent armed groups, particularly the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), campaigning for self-determination and secession further complicated the region's fraught politics. Mustafa initially emerged as a consequential figure in the Somali Regional Alliance for Justice (SRAJ), a coalition of intellectuals advocating for the rights of Somali communities and against the impunity and violence that have plagued them.
The political reforms in Ethiopia in 2018 sparked a wave of optimism for democratic advancement and renewal across the country, including in the long-marginalised peripheral Somali region. The controversial ousting of Abdi Iley, a staunch TPLF loyalist who struggled to align himself with the new leader, incumbent PM Abiy Ahmed, was a moment of collective relief for many. In the aftermath, Mustafa was appointed—an activist known for his vocal opposition to the previous regional government, which had caused him immense personal distress, including the loss of his brother. Many Somalis celebrated the dawn of a new era as the SDP gave way to the ruling Prosperity Party, which initially sought to cast itself as a unifying force after the tumult of the EPRDF's final years.
However, Mustafa's appointment as president in August 2018 was not a result of a democratic process but rather a strategic manoeuvre orchestrated in Addis Ababa. And his leadership, once viewed as a hopeful transition, has become increasingly considered another attempt by another federal government to secure control of the periphery instead of nurturing democracy in the Somali region. Six years in, Mustafa's administration has become characterised by growing corruption and a gulf between the regional leadership and its people.
Mustafa's leadership style has been evident from the outset. Early on in his tenure, drawing on his experience with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Somalia, the regional president adopted the neighbouring country's 4.5 clan-based governance system. As is the case in Somalia, this structure has often prioritised cabinet positions based on clan affiliation rather than merit and accentuated clan divisions, not soothed them. While prior officials had significant flaws, their governance models often proved more effective than this clan-centric system.
Since the violent ousting of Mustafa's predecessor, some have regarded the Somali region as one of the most peaceful in Ethiopia. This is somewhat misleading-- the lack of inter-communal violence has been a consequence of local armed groups opting for non-violent avenues rather than signifying an effective administration. Moreover, there have been successive clashes along the Oromia-Somali regional border, as well as between Afar and Somali communities, particularly since the regional president withdrew from an agreement to establish three 'special kebeles' for Somali communities within Afar territory. Conversely, the threat of Al-Shabaab has intensified, culminating in the mass July 2022 offensive that led to significant losses among the Liyu forces protecting the border. Several hundred of the Al-Shabaab militants that participated penetrated deep into south-eastern Ethiopia and remained there, embedded across the Liban, Afdheer, and Bale zones as the base of Jaysh al-Habash, the militant's wing in the country. Today, these militants are quietly expanding and developing their networks, particularly in the Oromia and Somali regions.
Human rights abuses persist, although there have been fewer arbitrary arrests compared to the previous regional administration. Iley had been given essential carte blanche to rule the Somali region and protect against the penetration of Al-Shabaab, subsequently wielding the Liyu Police as a tool to crush any opposition. Today, though, journalists are facing increasing threats in the Somali region, as evidenced by the Ethiopian Media Authority's bans on 15 foreign media outlets and the arrests of dissenting local journalists. Any exposure of government corruption has been met with increasing intimidation, and reporters have been denied permission to report on the intermittent violence between Afar and Somali militias in 2024.
Nor have the promises of development and investment come to fruition, with the Somali region particularly impacted by successive punishing droughts. Underdevelopment, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient access to essential services such as education and healthcare are the norm in the enormous territory, not the exception. And plans for economic diversification and infrastructure development have proceeded in fits and starts. For instance, while the regional government claims to have built over 500 schools in the past 6 years, this has not translated into increased educational attainment or economic empowerment for the youth.
Similarly, although claims of infrastructure improvements circulate, much of the work cited owes its genesis to funds from the previous regime or international donors rather than the current government's initiatives. Ambitious urban water supply projects intended to serve key towns remain non-operational even after substantial investment, revealing deficiencies in management. Even the expansive new parliament building complex in Jigjiga, which purportedly cost the state over ETB 1.5 billion, leaks during rain and perpetually needs repairs. There are even discussions about abandoning it entirely. A key issue with the Mustafa administration is that large-scale projects are often launched without proper assessments and cost-benefit analyses.
Renowned economist Amartya Sen once noted that famines do not occur in democracies. Mustafa's administration has failed to establish the foundations for democratic governance necessary for sustainable development amidst crises, such as the ongoing drought that has left millions in precarious conditions. Responses to pressing issues are reactive rather than proactive, often dictated by the whims of social media rather than structured policy planning.
While Abdi Iley's regime was mired in human rights abuses, Mustafa's governance has a troubling culture of corruption and impunity. His tenure has sent a chilling message to Somalis in Ethiopia-- questioning authority is perilous, and vying for state resources demands strategic compliance. In the Somali region today, officials' self-interest too often supersedes the common good. Short-term, corrupt, and self-interested leadership has become engrained to the detriment of Somali communities. Fourteen years of rule under Abdi Iley and Mustafa Omer has taken a severe toll on one of the most overlooked regions of Ethiopia. The Somali region should not be an afterthought for those in Addis, only rearing its head when jihadists infiltrate, or clashes erupt along its regional borders, nor handed to those like Iley and Mustafa to run like their personal fiefdoms. Those in the Somali region deserve better.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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