Issue No. 247

Internal Divides: TPLF's Power Struggle Grows

Over the weekend, Tigrayan commentators took to X to highlight the short distance between the headquarters of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Mekelle's Hawelti neighbourhood and the office of the Tigray Interim Administration's (TIA) President Getachew Reda. However, the political divide between the 'Hawelti' old guard of the TPLF, led by Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, and the TIA faction led by Getachew, has widened significantly and now threatens to engulf the entire region. The fractious battle over the party's future and Tigray continues to escalate in the wake of the Debretsion's decision to hold the party's 14th Congress against the wishes of Getachew and over a dozen other Central Committee members.

The two factions are grappling for power in plain view, with echoes of the acrimonious 2001 Party Congress that pitted Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi against former Defence Minister Siye Abraha and then-Tigray President Gebru Asrat. Much like today, accusations of corruption were laid out against senior figures within the divided TPLF. Meles's faction eventually and controversially prevailed against the dissenters, using support from within the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition to subdue his rivals. Two decades ago, the TPLF were the 'vanguard party' of the EPRDF, and Meles was backed by the instruments of government to expel 12 Central Committee members-- despite the Audit and Control Commission ruling against their expulsion. 

The current crisis is partly a legacy of the party's political decay that began decades ago, with dissent and new perspectives quashed. In 2018, at another Party Congress, the TPLF's leadership agreed that there had been a tendency towards internal repression and against pluralist thought. The sudden death of Meles in 2012 created a power vacuum that could have been an opportunity to renew the TPLF's vision and ideology for the 21st century, but this opportunity was missed.

Today, with the TPLF embattled on all sides, it is less clear who will prevail between the two factions. As expected at the 14th Congress meeting, the old guard announced the purging of most of Getachew's allies in the Central Committee and TIA cabinet ministers in the newly elected 45-member Committee. And, as widely anticipated, Debretsion was re-elected as Chairman, while Vice-Chair Getachew was replaced by Amanuel Assefa as number two in the party. Notably, Alem Gebrewahid, a member of the old guard and TPLF secretariat, was not re-elected to his position in the 9-member politburo. But with the Congress going unrecognised by the TIA president, the TPLF Audit and Control Commission members, the federal government, and the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the legality of these elections are unclear. Still, the Congress has thrown the future of the TIA and Tigray's governance into the air.

Getachew is actively resisting efforts to oust him from the TPLF. On Sunday, the TIA president hosted a rival summit, along with the other dissenting Central Committee members, the party's Audit and Control Commission, and several district and zone representatives in Mekelle. Several points were adopted at the end of the meeting that was supposedly attended by 1,000 people, including reiterating support for the Pretoria agreement, a promise to transition the TPLF into a democratic body, and urging the Debretsion faction to "abandon the destructive path" they are on. In a press conference the day prior, Getachew said that he would seek to rebuild the party using these groups and again asserted that the TPLF had been illegally re-registered by Debretsion's side. More concerningly, he has hinted that an unnamed foreign power, widely assumed to be Eritrea, is steering elements of the Hawelti group. The similarities with the federal government's rhetoric were clear, to whom Getachew has been accused of aligning himself with by his rivals.

Thankfully, the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) leadership is remaining publicly neutral, even if it is reportedly internally divided. Last week, the TDF military commander and head of security for the TIA, Tadesse Werede, banned public rallies or demonstrations on either side and reiterated the military's support for the Pretoria agreement. Werede warned that the split in the TPLF should not undermine Tigray's security. In a rare press conference earlier this year, another senior TDF official and TIA Vice-President, Tsadkan Gebretensae, called upon the two factions to resolve their differences peacefully. 

The fallout of the Congress has yet to be fully gauged, but it should not be taken lightly. Few want a return to war, with both factions and the TDF all reiterating their support for Pretoria, albeit with differences. Still, there is a chance that localised fighting could erupt if the TPLF-TIA split continues to develop. More concerning is the rhetoric from the federal government that has warned of renewed conflict– once again euphemistically couched in the language of 'law enforcement.' With the ENDF over-stretched and Ethiopia coming back into the international fold after its brief exile, a return to war in Tigray would be political suicide for the Prosperity Party government. And it could tip Ethiopia over the edge.

The already fragile and flawed Pretoria agreement is at risk from the TPLF's divisions. Debretsion has argued that the NEBE forcing the TPLF to re-register is a precursor to allowing the federal governments to contravene the Pretoria agreement. Major parts of the expanded Cessation of Hostilities Agreement already remain unfulfilled, including that Eritrean troops occupy much of northern Tigray and continue to erase the indigenous Irob community. Analysts are split over whether the agreement necessitates the restoration of the TPLF to its pre-war status, as it does the removal of the 'terrorist' label, or whether it just requires political dialogue with the party to set up another Tigray government. This is a reflection of the Pretoria agreement's deliberate vagueness in key articles; it was a victor's peace hastily extracted by the federal government with Tigray on its last legs. 

The TPLF's current split is the latest in a history of acrimonious internal divisions that have distracted the party from governance and reform. Post-war, Tigray's younger, more dynamic elements, such as the Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals, have not been allowed to help shape the region's politics towards a more democratic position. And corruption, particularly surrounding Tigray's gold mines, has flared up again as a dividing line between the reformist and older elements within the TPLF. Ultimately, this conflict is largely about control over the regional government, with Debretsion believing it shouldn't be Getachew, and vice versa. At the same time, the federal government has further stoked the divisions by wielding ambiguities in the Pretoria agreement.

Negotiations are urgently needed between these factions as well as between the TPLF and the federal government. While Getachew could possibly make a deal with Abiy to see him recognised by the federal government as the leader of the TPLF, this would certainly be a risky move and one liable to raise the possibility of internal armed conflict. The old guard is firmly on a collision course with the federal government, despite saying that it is committed to the Pretoria agreement. The reports that the Hawelti faction has sought support from Asmara should be of immense concern, considering that Eritrean troops continue to kill and abduct Tigrayans. Neither Getachew nor Debretsion should turn to others to secure their position within the region to the detriment of Tigray's strategic interests. Particularly important, though, is that the TDF remain neutral and not be dragged into violence that could quickly escalate. The walk between Hawelti and Getachew's office in Deben may be short, but the TPLF is more divided today than it has been in years.